Friday, December 20, 2024

Prominent Public Intellectual, Philosopher, Scholar, Political Theorist, Sociologist, Teacher, And Activist Wendy Brown On the Presidential Election and the Structural Breakdown and Corruption of the U.S. Political System and the Very Idea of Democracy

PHOTO:  Wendy Brown
Image: Wikimedia Commons


Philosophy, Politics


The Violent Exhaustion of Liberal Democracy

A conversation with Wendy Brown on the U.S. presidential election, the exclusions liberal democracy is built on, and why we must aim at more than restoring its mythical former splendor.

Wendy Brown

Francis Wade

Democracy, Elections, Environment and Climate, Interview

by Francis Wade
October 21, 2024
Boston Review


Events of the past decade have prompted frenzied discussion of the state of democracy across the globe. In countries across Europe, Latin America, and Asia—as well as, of course, in the United States—far-right political figures with outwardly antidemocratic stances have won office. Their misogyny and xenophobia, their promotion of violence, and their dismissal of the climate emergency haven’t dented their support but rather secured it. In a number of cases, including Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Narendra Modi in India, they have been reelected several times over by sizable majorities. Meanwhile, the “only liberal democracy in the Middle East,” as Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu likes to say, is controlled by the far-right Likud party and executing a genocide in Gaza and an expanding war in Lebanon.

Attempts to diagnose the so-called crisis of democracy have led in several directions: to the explosion of economic inequality and a widespread loss of faith in the ability of public institutions to deliver for everyone; to changes in party systems that allow radical groups to enter the mainstream; to the internal contradictions of liberalism and the bordered nation-state itself, opening the door to strongmen leaders. The list goes on.

But while the concern tends to focus on declining faith in democracy—a phenomenon as old as the system itself—less attention goes to a deeper, more pressing problem. Among liberals, democracy remains the political institution par excellence, and yet, says political theorist Wendy Brown, not only is it in an exhausted form; it is wholly unsuited to the challenges posed by ecological breakdown, and indeed is hastening it. In this interview, Brown and I discuss the crisis of democracy in all its forms, as well as a counter-conception of democracy she has been developing that seeks to orient our politics away from its destructive human-centeredness, toward connection and repair.
—Francis Wade

Francis Wade: Let’s start with an event close to home for you, both in a literal and intellectual sense: the coming U.S. elections, and what its outcome will say about the so-called “crisis of democracy” in the United States (and elsewhere). A win for the Democrats—and at this moment, such a win is deeply uncertain—would mark two straight defeats for Trump and likely be received by liberals as proof that the crisis is receding, just as it seemed to do with, for instance, Lula in Brazil. What would you say to that?


Wendy Brown: Nothing would be more dangerous than treating a win for the Democrats as proof that the crisis of democracy is receding.

First, even if Harris wins, nearly half of American voters will have voted for fascism. Those who deem the fascist label hyperbole note that many hold their noses while voting for their imagined economic interests or voting against loathed liberals. But this framing ignores the willingness of millions to abide not only a violently ethnonationalist, racist, and misogynist regime, but one that would shred what little remains of liberal democratic principles and institutions. They are voting for fascism.
“Nothing would be more dangerous than treating a win for the Democrats as proof that the crisis of democracy is receding.”

Second, Trump is symptom, not cause, of the “crisis of democracy.” Trump did not turn the nation in a hard-right direction, and if the liberal political establishment doesn’t ask what wind he caught in his sails, it will remain clueless about the wellsprings and fuel of contemporary antidemocratic thinking and practices. It will ignore the cratered prospects and anxiety of the working and middle classes wrought by neoliberalism and financialization; the unconscionable alignment of the Democratic Party with those forces for decades; a scandalously unaccountable and largely bought mainstream media and the challenges of siloed social media; neoliberalism’s direct and indirect assault on democratic principles and practices; degraded and denigrated public education; and mounting anxiety about constitutional democracy’s seeming inability to meet the greatest challenges of our time, especially but not only the climate catastrophe and the devastating global deformations and inequalities emanating from two centuries of Euro-Atlantic empire. Without facing these things, we will not develop democratic prospects for the coming century.

Sure, we would sigh with relief if Trump and Vance (the scarier one) are defeated this time around. But liberal democratic institutions—courts, majority rule, separation of powers, and more—are in tatters, democratic values are literally absent in half the population, democratic culture has been devastated by neoliberal reason, and the financing and arming of an unfathomably brutal genocide and ecocide in the Middle East by the Biden-Harris administration has soured a generation of young progressives on electoral politics.

Democrats, real democrats, need to ask whether “liberal democracy,” more than simply attacked by the right, might be a historically exhausted form, both for representing the demos and for addressing our gravest predicaments. If so, what follows?

FW: You’ve lately been developing a counter-conception of democracy that you call “reparative democracy.” What do you mean by this? And what led you to it?

WB: My thinking about reparative democracy emerges from the twin crises of democracy and ecology imperiling all planetary life today, however unevenly. It aims to bring democracy into direct engagement with the deep and lasting damages of colonial capitalist modernity, an epoch built on fossil fuels, unsustainable practices of production and consumption, extreme geopolitical inequalities, and wretched forms of destruction and exploitation for both human and nonhuman life. Such direct engagement with long histories and their effects on all possible futures isn’t part of the temporal orientation and practices of liberal democracies or democratic subjects. It requires some serious transformations of both, which we will want to talk about. But for now, the big points are these: if we are to sustain the commitment to collective self-rule promised by democracy, we must reorient it for this engagement and transformation. Conversely, if we are to have ecologically viable and just futures, democracy must be remade for reparative purposes.

Because it’s easy to misunderstand, let me just say what reparative democracy is not. It is not about restoring liberal constitutional nation-state democracy to a mythical former splendor. That is, it is not about recuperating extant democracy as if it was once fine and only now is broken. Nor is it primarily concerned with reparations to peoples and places brutalized or exploited under past regimes. Rather, my argument is that the democratic ethos and practices we require today must be relentlessly and radically reparative in relation to past and present damaging modes of life, especially over the past two centuries. This orientation breaks sharply with the notions structuring liberal democracy, including progressivism, anthropocentrism, and individual interests and rights as the essence of political freedom. So it radically transforms what democracy means and entails, including its ways of relating to past and future, its ways of casting the human and of relating human and nonhuman life, and its understandings of where democracy resides and matters.

The idea of reparative democracy emerged from both practical and theoretical concerns. Practically, liberal nation-state democracy centered on individual rights and interests is not just threatened by authoritarian and neofascist mobilizations. For many reasons, it’s unsuited to contemporary powers and predicaments, especially but not only the climate emergency. Theoretically, while many are thinking about repair these days, I have been especially influenced by Andreas Folkers’s formulation of the reparative in a critical theory of what he calls “fossil modernity.” For Folkers, the very nature of critique is altered by the ongoing damages—which he calls residuals—of intensive fossil fuel use. These include fouled land and water, a heating planet, extinction chains, and more. No longer can critique be premised on overcoming the past or on an open future. Both modernist conceits have collapsed. Instead, what I would call “honest” critique must be oriented by seeking to limit and repair (forward) the damages of fossil modernity. I extend Folkers’s appreciation of residuals to the politics of Euro-Atlantic modernity, especially empire, and adapt it for reparative democracy.

FW: The Ancient Greek conception of democracy was people-oriented by definition, and it accordingly instituted a range of separations and subordinations: of the “civilized” from the “uncivilized,” the city from the outside, humans from nature, and so forth. Various transformations to human life in the period since have intensified that separation, not least the effort by the industrializing West from the eighteenth century onward to gain greater mastery of nature so that it would better serve human “progress” and “freedom.” So is it fair to say that democracy posed a grave ecological threat from the get-go?


WB: Most good political thinking about ecological damage centers capitalism as the culprit. Certainly the reign of capital—with its need for growth based on artless and wasteful consumption, its powering by fossil fuels (coal, then oil), its valorization of profit over any other value, and more recently the capture of state projects, including decarbonization, by private finance—has been a planetary disaster. And in every way, it has roughed up the Global South more than the North. We can’t overstate the need for a different political economy for a habitable and just future.

However, Western anthropocentrism is older and deeper than capitalism, which is why socialism is insufficient for addressing the climate emergency and cratering biodiversity. As you say, democracy in the West emerges at the site of ancient Greek oppositions between polis and oikos, politics and economy, city and outside lands—freedom always aligned with the former and in opposition to the latter. This means democracy is founded in a sequester of politics from life, both social and earthly. Political freedom in the West is founded in consequential political and ecological exclusions.

The foundational splitting of politics from everything arrayed under “necessity” and “nature”—nonhuman life as well as human production and reproduction—delivers both a very limited demos and an irresponsible form of rule, or kratia, one cut off from and self-authorized to violate the sources of its own sustenance. This suggests that Western democracy, its very ontology, might be co-responsible with the voraciousness of capitalism for histories of damage to human and nonhuman life, which are now at an emergency pitch.


FW: You’ve previously cited the work of the political ecologist Pierre Charbonnier, who writes in Affluence and Freedom (2021) that “we inherit a world that no available political category is designed to manage.” It’s long been clear that liberal democracy places no constraints on our destructive impulses, and in fact seems to feed them, so can you say a little on how and where reparative democracy departs from it?


WB: Reparative democracy, as I’m thinking about it, is not a set of institutional arrangements, though it would bear on them. Rather, it is an ethos or orientation, one which refigures democratic principles, practices, and subjects. This ethos includes overcoming the foundational opposition between humans and “nature” just discussed. However, it also involves transforming the damaging methodological individualism and “presentism” of liberal democracy—its focus on what individuals want right now rather than our interlinked and common past, present, and future.

Reparative democracy would tether the demos to both the nonhuman and to histories of damage bearing on the future. This challenges liberalism’s centering of justice on rights and distribution, replacing them with sustenance and regeneration amidst interdependence. Freedom would also lose its presentist and autonomous character. To mobilize human capacities for democratic ecological repair, both personal and political freedom would have to take shape as relational, responsive, and responsible, with past and future always on their horizons.

Reparative democracy also entails a transformation of political equality. Those who can and cannot represent themselves by speaking must not count differentially. Listening, and listening differently to those who do not speak one’s own language, would have to supplant speech as the ultimate citizen practice. And, concentrations of economic and social power must be vigilantly restrained from either amplifying or suppressing any part of this expanded democratic subject and constituency. Still, political equality is about more than counting or who counts, and it exceeds measure by individual units. Political equality in a reparative mode must be responsive to deep histories of inequalities and violences—racial, gendered, regional, hemispheric, and between human and nonhuman—that bear on discursive norms and agendas in democratic spheres. Political equality also requires more effectively enfranchising life forms that democracy has not previously bothered with—earthworms and coral reefs, forests, wetlands, and bee colonies.

Framed philosophically, reparative democracy is rooted in that deep ecological materialism called for by Bruno Latour. Such materialism comprises not only modes of production and reproduction, or agency discovered in “things,” but all constellations of interdependent planetary life, human and nonhuman, shaping past, present, and future. Similarly, reparative critique does not merely “grasp things by their root,” as Marx puts it in his account of materialism. Rather, the soil nourishing the root, the historical residuals within that soil, and the conditions for its regeneration, must be grasped and addressed.

FW: How does it work in practice then? Are there contemporary examples of, as you put it earlier, “direct engagement with long histories” on a scale that suggests a kind of reparative social compact in the making?

WB: There are instances of reparative democracy all over the world. Some are fleeting and partial; others are more sustained. Many emerge from the indigenous and the young, who do not need to be told that human and nonhuman life are interdependent, that the world is in an emergency state, and that constitutional liberal democracy is both incapable of addressing that emergency and itself an exhausted form. 
 
“#StopCopCity brings into relief why ordinary political channels routinely fail the future so resoundingly.”

One contemporary example can be found in #StopCopCity in Atlanta, Georgia. Cop City is the oppositional nickname for a planned militarized police training facility that involves clear-cutting forests abutting Atlanta’s poorest and Blackest neighborhoods. The $100 million project is largely privately funded and driven by the needs and demands of the global corporations and finance networks (investment banks, law, insurance, and consulting firms) at the heart of Atlanta’s current growth and wealth generation. The city government kowtowed to these global economic powers to repeatedly endorse the project, spurning local public opposition that spans local and national racial justice organizations; ecological and conservation groups; lawyers guilds; area schools; neighborhood, church and community associations; abolitionists; and anarchists. These groups have not only fought together, they have learned from and protected one another. Black community organizations defend white anarchist tree sitters, and many anarchists have allied with liberals seeking to stop the facility with legal maneuvers. The state has responded with outsized military force and juridical harshness, charging occupiers and demonstrators with outlandish crimes and threatening scandalously long prison sentences.

#StopCopCity melds ecology with racial justice aims and opposes economies of destruction of human and nonhuman life and wholly bought political representation. It also foregrounds all the painful and damaging histories on this patch of land: from the dispossession of early indigenous inhabitants to slave-based cotton farming and to carceral institutions that harbor racialized and gendered abuses. The movement constantly draws attention to the dangers of deforestation and “forest fragmentation” and to the neighborhoods, already suffering from neglect and traumatized by racialized policing, that will be most impacted by the loss of forest tree canopy and the presence of a militarized police training site.

Altogether, these features make #StopCopCity simultaneously an instance of reparative democracy and a demonstration of why it is so essential. It brings into relief why ordinary political channels routinely fail the future so resoundingly. The movement is a powerful critique of liberal democracy today—institutional corruptions and erosions, its privileging of capital interests, its blinding individualism, its ferocious repression of protest, and its radical exclusion of nonhuman worlds.


FW: Your 2015 book Undoing the Demos warned of the peril that neoliberalism posed to both democracy and “the meaning of citizenship itself.” It argued that no area of life was now spared from “capital enhancement,” that “neoliberalism is the rationality through which capitalism finally swallows humanity.” The picture it painted of our future was bleak. How does your thinking on reparative democracy today speak to the arguments you set out a decade ago?

WB: Neoliberalism contributed profoundly to the crisis of actually existing democracy from which theories and practices of reparative democracy emerge. Its elevation of markets to the highest form of truth and governing displaced democratic principles ranging from political equality to legislated justice. Its privatization or extractive private financing of every public good compounded its devastation of working- and middle-class prospects that turned millions in a hard-right direction. Its conversion of everything and everyone to market behavior did not spare the political sphere, which has become steadily more ruthless and less oriented by the common good, and features increasingly quotidian corruption of political institutions for partisan ends. Neoliberalism escalated the capture of law and especially of rights—that essential liberal democratic icon—to amplify the wealth and power of the powerful (from mega-churches to the mega-rich to mega-corporations) and diminish the power of the people in politics and policy.

So, yes, neoliberalism is part of the story of cratering liberal democracy.

But only part. Even as it saturates everything, neoliberalism does not explain everything, and it does not carry the whole weight of liberal democracy’s mounting failures and exhaustion. Ecocide has been intensified by deregulated capital and states increasingly subordinated to institutional finance but is older and bigger than these. Racist gerrymandering and voter suppression is an old story. And while the Global South has been slugged harder than the North by neoliberal austerity, big finance, and exploitative manufacturing and extractivist practices, modern Euro-Atlantic democracy carried empire in its belly and carved the earth accordingly. 
 
“Even as it saturates everything, neoliberalism does not explain everything. Ecocide is older than deregulated capital and institutional finance.”

As I suggested earlier, reparative democracy arises from the consequential exclusions, violences, and individualist and presentist orientation of modern democracy across its liberal, social, and socialist variants. Neoliberal effects make these uniquely vivid but are not singularly causal.

FW: Recognition of the interdependency of human and nonhuman life seems central to your concept, but it’s on display at the #StopCopCity protests in large part because of—and say if you disagree—the very particular set of circumstances being opposed: destruction of already diminished forest cover in the service of greater state militarization, in close proximity to communities that have long felt the effects of state violence. So I wonder, how, in the absence of Cop City–like circumstances, recognition of that interdependency, or that human-nature connectedness, might be engineered, especially in modern secular and individualist societies that lack the core emotional and spiritual bonding (for instance, of ancestor worship or other forms of veneration of place) that have historically tethered humans to the nonhuman world?


WB: I’m enough of a materialist to know it is impossible to engineer any kind of consciousness in the absence of conditions that would incite and foster it. Put the other way around, given liberalism’s human-centeredness and individualism, and capitalism’s alienation of us from the source or production of almost everything we need and consume, what hope is there of appreciating our deep imbrication with all planetary life or becoming creatures who easily share, or have cares beyond, their own lives?

The answer, of course, rests in the effects of the multiple crises that touch everyone on the planet, however differently: crises of climate change, extinction chains and biodiversity collapse, water availability, breathable air, pandemics, forever chemicals, and microplastics everywhere. All of these confront us directly with the perils of treating nonhuman life or “nature” as mere exploitable resource. All bring us face to face with the disastrous conceits of Euro-Atlantic modernity: individualism, boundless growth and consumption, fossil fueled energy, “conquering” nature, Europe and Other.

These crises are conditions for curiosity, learning, reorienting, transforming. (Of course they are also conditions for denialism, hoarding, and violent barricading.) However, even with these conditions, a deep grasp of our interdependency, and a politics that addresses it, are not automatic; they have to be developed. For reparative democracy oriented by the ecological emergency, for example, we need new ways of envisioning and hearing the nonhuman and our place within it. Sound theory, and especially bioacoustics, has much to teach us here. So also do some parts of indigenous cosmologies and ways of knowing.



FW: This brings me back to something you said earlier, that “listening . . . would have to supplant speech as the ultimate citizen practice.” For millennia, rational speech or language has been understood as a key signifier of politically able actors—in other words, without rational language, you can’t do politics; because only we humans are thought to possess it, we are the only true political creatures. And it seems that no amount of research into, for instance, the democratic practices of certain animals has been able to shift that. As others have explored in work on “political listening,” this view has helped drive the lasting separation of humans from nonhumans. You said just now that “we need new ways of envisioning and hearing the nonhuman.” How do we do that?


WB: Yes, we conventionally identify speech as the premier political action, and free speech as an icon of democracy. We also believe this comes to us from ancient Athens. In fact, the notion of isegoria, one of the three pillars of Athenian democracy, translates as the equal right to speak and be heard in the Assembly. It is a political right of all citizens to persuade the collective power that is the people. Isegoria identifies practices of speech and listening that are constitutive of democracy, not derivative from it. It could not be further from the liberal notion of saying whatever, wherever, because you have a personal right of expression. It’s not a personal right to speak but a political right to be heard, shared equally by all citizens.
“Imagine if we all actually listened to cries of pain and grief at the site of contemporary genocidal violence!”

Listening as well as political persuasion have been scraped out of liberal free speech politics. This compounds the problem of what I am suggesting we need in the Anthropocene, an epoch in which our imbrication with all earthly life, and capacity to destroy it, is so vivid. Listening, not speaking, is one of our most powerful forms of learning this imbrication and developing a politics appropriate to it. All life listens for survival, as a means of detecting food, water, danger, or degraded conditions. Many species—from bees and plants to worms and whales—also listen in order to coordinate among themselves for food, shelter, defense. Call it politics, if you will.

Humans need to learn to listen better for exactly these purposes, for our survival and to coordinate among ourselves, in the context of earthly life. But we have such limited hearing, have filled the world with so much noise (and then slapped on noise-cancelling headphones to block it), and have so degraded the importance of listening compared to speech in political life, that revalorizing and training our listening capacities seems nothing short of revolutionary. Fortunately, the rich fields of sound studies and animal and plant science, along with digital technologies of many kinds, are our friends here.

Together these help us to hear and to understand what we are hearing, including pain, poisoning and death in human and nonhuman worlds. Imagine if we all actually listened to cries of pain and grief at the site of contemporary genocidal violence! Books like Karen Bakker’s The Sounds of Life, Brandon LaBelle’s Acoustic Justice, Eva Meijer’s When Animals Speak, and Robin Wall Kimmerer’s Braiding Sweetgrass open these doors. Donna Haraway, Anna Tsing, and the Latourian School contribute. The point is to develop an ecological ear that most indigenous communities had, and also to learn from nonhuman communications how to listen better. As Bakker writes, with digital bioacoustics “we can listen not only to turtles but also like turtles.” This technology “reveals subtleties that might escape human listeners.” Becoming such listeners facilitates enfranchising “nature” as part of us—a far better strategy than allocating nature human rights to obtain political protection.

Becoming listeners could deprovincialize the cares of democrats, allowing us to orient toward conditions for thriving beyond our personal or national borders. Nothing could be more important in a time of ecological emergency and the persistent violence of colonial modernity.
 
 
ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS:


Wendy Brown

Wendy Brown is UPS Foundation Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study. Her latest book is Nihilistic Times: Thinking with Max Weber.


Francis Wade

Francis Wade is a London-based journalist covering political violence, identity, borders, and displacement. He is author of Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim Other.

THIS IS WHAT GENUINE FASCISM AND ITS VILE HENCHMEN AND WOMEN ACTUALLY LOOKS, SOUNDS, AND ACTS LIKE AND THIS IS WHAT THE DEADLY AND CRIMINALLY CORRUPT TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS ACTIVELY OFFERING THE NATION. PLEASE PAY ATTENTION…

And as always...

DEFEAT FASCISM BEFORE FASCISM DEFEATS YOU


https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/trump-influence-vought-wiles-miller-epshteyn-yarvin/

Feature

 
A Guide to Some of the Key Movers and Influencers in Trump’s Orbit

While showboats like Elon Musk and RFK Jr. get all the attention, the real power in a second Trump term is likely to be wielded by quietly effective bureaucrats and policy intellectuals like these men and women.

by Chris Lehmann
December 18, 2024
The Nation



Miller, Vought, and Yarvin. Illustration by Eli Valley.This article appears in the January 2025 issue, with the headline “Trump’s World.”

Shortly after Donald Trump won reelection to the presidency, he announced a series of cabinet nominations that redoubled his past derangements of executive-branch governance, tapping a confederacy of thieves and shysters—from accused sexual assaulter Pete Hegseth as secretary of defense to loyal baksheesh recipient and Jeffrey Epstein helpmeet Pam Bondi as attorney general to vax-denying conspiracy monger Robert F. Kennedy Jr. as director of Health and Human Services. This is to say nothing of his standard-issue trolling nominees, like Tulsi Gabbard as head of the Directorate of National Intelligence or Elise Stefanik—the dictionary definition of whatever the opposite of a diplomat is—as ambassador to the United Nations. But for all the fireworks attending these big-name announcements, the real power in a second Trump term is likely to be wielded by quietly effective bureaucrats and policy intellectuals—people who intimately understand, and gleefully prosecute, politics as war by other means. Even though the disbursement of power behind Trump’s throne is far from a settled question, here’s a preliminary guide to the key figures to watch as the authoritarian nightmare before us unfolds.

Stephen Miller

Along with the returning president, Stephen Miller is the most prominent holdover from the first incarnation of the Trump White House. It’s not hard to see why. Miller stormed to the front ranks of Trump promoters in DC when he left his gig as communications director for Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions to lay the foundations for Trump’s brutal immigration policies, beginning with the ban on Muslim travelers and continuing on to family separation at the border and the use of public health statutes to shut the border down during the Covid pandemic. His official title, senior adviser, deliberately obscured the scale of his in-house influence: By the end of Trump’s term, Miller was the vindictive face of MAGA xenophobia and grievance politics, and the most effective force translating them into policy.

During the Biden interregnum, Miller spent his time outside of government at the helm of the America First Legal Foundation, a right-wing litigation clearing house that aggressively pursues a MAGA agenda in the courts. Miller touted it as “the long-awaited answer to the ACLU,” but unlike that group, which pursues free-speech litigation on behalf of unpopular conservative clients as well as a roster of left-leaning plaintiffs, America First Legal goes to court only in service of Trumpian crusades. It brought suit against putative trans indoctrination in the Mesa, Arizona, school district, and has sued both corporate and university employers in cases of alleged reverse discrimination brought by white male plaintiffs. The group also filed an amicus brief in Trump’s Mar-a-Lago documents case, claiming that the National Archives lacked the legal authority to make a criminal referral—an argument that even Trump-osculating federal judge Aileen Cannon called a “red herring.”

Red herrings are pretty much the group’s stock in trade. In 2022, America First spent just $1.7 million on legal expenses and more than $29 million on promotion and advertising. Miller’s position as a carny barker for the right-wing Kulturkampf was brought to light once more this fall, when the Chilean reporter José María Del Pino did what virtually none of his US counterparts can be stirred to do and repeatedly challenged Miller’s bogus claim that violent criminals were disproportionately represented in the ranks of recent Venezuelan immigrants to the United States.

Yet peddling discredited urban legends about immigration is an executive-branch credential that Trump and Miller have reinvented—and so Miller is back in action as Trump’s deputy chief of staff. Like his former job title, this one is deceptively modest. With Trump already committed to launching mass deportations under the pretext of a national immigration emergency on his first day back in office, Miller will once more be driving the signature domestic policies of the White House. And with the extensive list of congressional and legal allies he compiled at America First, he will be able to command yet greater deference throughout the Republican power structure. As Trump embarks on shaping his second term as a prolonged revenge tour, Stephen Miller will, against all odds, be a much more lethal dispenser of punishment from on high than he was the first time out.

January 2025 Issue

Curtis Yarvin

You probably already know about the reactionary excesses of Vice President–elect JD Vance: his hardcore natalist opposition to reproductive rights, his dalliances with replacement theory, his election denialism, his blood-and-soil brand of Herrenvolk nationalism. But you may not know about the figure who’s served as a fascist pied piper to Vance and scores of other Silicon Valley heimat bros: the pro-slavery monarchist Curtis Yarvin, who blogs under the pseudonym Mencius Moldbug. During his 2022 Senate run, Vance embraced one of Yarvin’s pet causes—an initiative called Retire All Government Employees, or (should the radical character of the plan somehow elude you) RAGE. Vance laid out the reasoning behind it in a podcast interview a year earlier, declaring that in a second Trump term, “We need to fire every mid-level bureaucrat, every civil servant in the administrative state, replace them with our people.” Pressed on the legality of this rolling purge, Vance said that Trump should just ignore the law. Now this frontal assault on government workers is also a central plank of Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s blueprint to transform the federal government into a sequel to The Handmaid’s Tale during a second Trump term.

The animus behind Yarvin’s agenda comes from a paranoid vision of key social institutions—the government, the universities, the media—as a monolithic “Cathedral” of addled progressive groupthink that somehow exerts a Sauron-like power over American public life. (Labored Lord of the Rings metaphors are a tic of Yarvin’s prose style—a common affliction among Valley reactionaries, most notably in the maunderings of fellow Yarvinite and Vance patron Peter Thiel.) Resistance to the Cathedral’s perfidy, in the Yarvin worldview, is justified by any means necessary. In a 2022 interview with Vox, Yarvin enthused that “you’re not that far from a world in which you can have a candidate” overthrow the Cathedral from the top down. “I think you can get away with it,” he said. “That’s sort of what people already thought was happening with Trump. To do it for real is not going to make them much more hysterical, and it’s actually much more effective!” While Yarvin won’t likely have any formal ties to a Trump White House, he won’t need them: Trump’s chief lieutenant is an enthusiastic true believer.

Russell Vought

Russell Vought, who served as director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the first Trump administration, is perhaps the quintessential conservative-movement insider. He’s spent his time outside of government running a Christian nationalist think tank called the Center for Renewing America, a theologically tinged hothouse of conspiracy theories, election denialism, and lurid right-wing persecution fantasies. Vought led the policy committee at the 2024 Republican National Convention and, perhaps most crucially, is the central architect of Project 2025. In his contribution to the Heritage Foundation’s policy bible, Vought pledged holy war on a federal bureaucracy allegedly gone amok “carrying out its own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly ‘woke’ faction of the country.”

It’s the same lamentation you hear from Curtis Yarvin, albeit in a less vulgar, more pious register. And Vought’s proposed remedies are just as radical as Yarvin’s. Among the measures he endorses to face down the Great Satan of the administrative state are the abolition of the Environmental Protection Agency and the use of federal military force to quash dissent. “We have detailed agency plans,” Vought bragged in a 2024 speech. “We are writing the actual executive orders. We are writing the actual regulations now, and we are sorting out the legal authorities for all of what President Trump is running on.”

Vought was reportedly in the running to serve as chief of staff in the second Trump White House, but he’s now on track to reprise his role at OMB, the key nerve center of day-to-day White House operations. In one way or another, he’s sure to preside over the federal bureaucracy with singular righteous zeal, exhorting his corps of Christian soldiers to continue marching as to war.

 

Wiles and Epshteyn.  Illustration by Eli Valley    


Susie Wiles

A cochair of Trump’s 2024 campaign, Susie Wiles is the quintessential power behind the throne. A steady stream of media profiles throughout the campaign stressed her quiet influence and her penchant for staying out of the spotlight—traits that put her at odds with former Trump campaign director Corey Lewandowski, who was brought on to unleash Trump’s thwarted rage for chaos in the homestretch. Wiles emerged from that power struggle with her influence intact—and, within days of Trump’s victory, he had tapped her as his chief of staff.

Trump clearly wants to depart from the initial miscues he made in filling that position in his tumultuous first term, and Wiles is perfectly positioned to take up the maximum-sycophant mantle relinquished by Trump’s indicted January 6 co-conspirator Mark Meadows. For all her careful burnishing of her image as a competent, retiring campaign hand, she has, like most campaign professionals, a decidedly Machiavellian streak; there’s a reason her colleagues have designated her “the ice maiden.” Wiles famously fell afoul of her other big-ticket MAGA client, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, after an internal power struggle within his campaign brain trust: DeSantis later accused her of leaking damning documents about his cozy relationships with lobbyists and donors. DeSantis’s allegations appear to be baseless, but his hostility toward the mastermind behind his narrow 2018 election to the governorship rages on; he got Trump to cashier Wiles in 2019 and initially told Trump in 2020 that if he went ahead with plans to bring her back, he might withdraw his support. (Of course, DeSantis’s later 2024 primary run against Trump rendered all such threats moot.)


Now Wiles is very much in the deepest reaches of Trump’s circle of trust; according to federal prosecutor Jack Smith’s indictment in the Mar-a-Lago prosecution, she was one of the unnamed people to whom Trump showed a classified map of an unnamed country, and she reportedly met with Smith’s investigative team about the purloined papers. With the prosecution deep-sixed by the Trump-appointed federal judge Aileen Cannon, no one is likely to know anytime soon what the candidate and his campaign manager were conferring over—but the whole set piece was no doubt encouraging to Trump as he sought to audition a toadying new chief of staff in the Meadows mold. With a proven legacy of accomplishment in what now passes for normie Republican politics, Wiles should be ideally positioned to gratify Trump’s operatic quest for vengeance and dominance while ensuring the internal workings of his White House. 

Boris Epshteyn

A longtime legal fixer for Trump, Boris Epshteyn has gained greater influence as the president-elect’s legal troubles have multiplied. Epshteyn, a former investment banker who worked for a controversially short stint in the communications office of Trump’s first presidency, was the adviser who directed Trump to attempt to delay all the pending trials before him with a blizzard of obstruction tactics—a strategy that now has Trump in a position to pardon himself and effectively terminate most of the proceedings against him. (It’s also noteworthy that Epshteyn himself stands to benefit from this blanket legal offensive, as he faces nine felony counts of election fraud stemming from his role in promoting a slate of fake Arizona electors to overturn Biden’s victory there.)

As this résumé entry shows, Epshteyn is an enthusiastic political brawler and a die-hard Trump loyalist. He entered national politics as an aide to Sarah Palin when she was a vice presidential candidate; after he wore out his welcome in the White House communications office, Epshteyn recorded a series of fawning video commentaries about Trump that ran as mandatory programming across the vast right-wing Sinclair TV network. Even in his role as transition whisperer, Epshteyn managed to combine extreme fealty with extreme opportunism, reportedly soliciting pay-to-play fees from would-be cabinet appointments. Thus far, Trump has stood by his designated crony; after all, Trump would never have surged into national leadership if he hadn’t been a devoted student of government-by-corruption.

Whether Epshteyn ultimately stays or goes, his fingerprints are already all over the new Trump White House. He reportedly helped engineer the appointment of Scott Bessent to head up the Treasury Department (after supplying the nominee with a crash course in Trumpenomics by, allegedly, soliciting one of the aforementioned bribes), and he has also been pivotal in remaking federal law enforcement into an outlet of MAGA mob justice by maneuvering loyal apparatchiks like Pam Bondi and Kash Patel into key positions. Epshteyn has also reportedly advocated that Trump bypass traditional FBI clearances for his cabinet nominees and instead rely on an informal series of background checks conducted by contracted private investigators.

His outsize role has indeed drawn the ire of another prominent toady of the Trump transition team, Elon Musk, who reportedly has challenged Epshteyn’s authority on key cabinet picks; an explosive rhetorical race to the Trump-appeasing bottom ensued between the two flunkies at a Mar-a-Lago dinner table.

Epshteyn has already sought to leverage his influential role in shaping the new Trump White House into a post as envoy to broker an end to the Russia-Ukraine war—even though the Russian-born lawyer has zero background in diplomacy or foreign policy. Trump reportedly took the request under serious consideration before dismissing it—at least for now. But it’s clear that Epshteyn possesses the only credential that matters in a Trump White House. “He always sought to be close to Trump,” an official from Trump’s first campaign told Politico. “He tells the president what he always wants to hear.”



ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

 


Chris Lehmann

 

 
Chris Lehmann is the DC Bureau chief for The Nation and a contributing editor at The Baffler. He was formerly editor of The Baffler and The New Republic, and is the author, most recently, of The Money Cult: Capitalism, Christianity, and the Unmaking of the American Dream (Melville House, 2016). 






Trump’s Fascist Attack on the Free Press Is Just Getting Started

https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/trump-abc-settlement/

Politics

Trump’s Attack on the Free Press Is Just Getting Started

The president-elect’s recent settlement with ABC News is an early volley in an all-out MAGA war against media independence.
 
by Chris Lehmann
December 17, 2024
The Nation
 

President Donald Trump talks with ABC News anchor George Stephanopoulos before a town hall at National Constitution Center, Tuesday, September 15, 2020, in Philadelphia. (Evan Vucci / AP Photo)

Like all sequels, the incoming Trump administration promises a grislier body count driven by ever more implausible narrative arcs. A prime case in point has been the media’s repellent capitulation to the Trumpian ethos of impunity for the powerful, well in advance of the president-elect’s inauguration next month. MSNBC’s erstwhile resistance mascots Joe Scarborough and Mika Brzezinski started the ball rolling with a deferential post-election junket to Mar-a-Lago. Los Angeles Times publisher Patrick Soon-Shiong chimed in by throttling stories critical of MAGA prerogatives—and then announced an absurd AI feature that allowed readers to clock and correct alleged bias in the paper’s coverage, thereby downgrading the chronicle of current events into a choose-your-own adventure computer app for irate ideologues. It was a bit like the Weimar press greeting the Reichstag fire with a campaign to decriminalize arson.

Now, ABC News, a subsidiary of the Disney Corporation, has accelerated the quisling march of mainstream journalism into inert MAGA observance with a $15 million settlement of a defamation suit that Trump brought against the network after George Stephanopoulos characterized Trump as having been found “liable for rape” in E. Jean Carroll’s successful civil suit against him. ABC and Stephanopoulos will further oblige the incoming Trump White House with an on-air apology for the anchor’s remarks.

There’s almost no legal justification for the agreement. Under New York law, Carroll’s claim that Trump had digitally penetrated her by force fell short of the full definition of rape, but Judge Lewis A. Kaplan issued a statement holding that this was largely a distinction without a difference. “The finding that Ms. Carroll failed to prove that she was ‘raped’ within the meaning of the New York Penal Law does not mean that she failed to prove that Mr. Trump ‘raped’ her as many people commonly understand the word ‘rape,’” Kaplan’s statement read in part.

Under the standards of libel, Stephanopoulos’s comments clearly were fair game. For public figures such as Trump, a libel action has to prove reckless disregard of the truth or actual malice on the part of a defendant. In this case, Stephanopoulos was plainly summarizing the sense of the judge’s own reasoning in the Carroll complaint; a robust defense by ABC would have both vindicated plain-spoken coverage of Trump and his movement and marked a key reversal of the industry-wide swoon into Trump-appeasing prostration.

Instead, the network opted to roll over. The bulk of the settlement will be a donation to the Trump Presidential Library—its own grim joke, being a text-driven monument to a post-literate chief executive who hopes to festoon his incoming cabinet with 15 Fox News personalities (at the present count). But the larger point of the settlement is to telegraph to the incoming Trump administration that the network will be standing alongside Soon-Shiong, Scarborough, Brzezinski and a host of others in eager solicitude before Trump-sanctioned narratives and policy initiatives. The nominal cost of the settlement, after all, is a rounding error for the Disney Corporation, and will likely come under the provisions of ABC’s libel insurance anyway. In other high-profile network television libel actions, such as Gen. William Westmoreland’s complaint against CBS News, settlements haven’t involved cash payouts beyond legal fees—in this context, ABC’s donation to the Trump library is akin to the donations other media players are doling out to the Trump inauguration committee—the standard pay-to-play backsheesh extracted by corrupt authoritarian regimes on the make.

This is all to say nothing, of course, of the freestanding media complex that already functions as wall-to-wall infomercial programing for the MAGA movement. In a weekend exchange on the cursed social media platform X, its Trump-addled owner, Elon Musk, largely conceded that his 2022 purchase of the site was instrumental in Trump’s reelection. (That’s on top of Musk’s direct outlay ofa quarter of a billion dollars to Trump-aligned super PACs in the 2024 cycle.) And Fox News is far more than a conduit for Trump cabinet recruits; the network was forced to engineer a far more consequential $787 million defamation settlement with Dominion Voting Systems last year over its barrage of lies about the company’s supposed role in brokering the theft of the 2020 election for Joe Biden. The second Trump administration is poised to be a grim case study in the complete absence of fallout from that agreement; the still wildly profitable Fox operation will continue to enjoy privileged access to the White House, as Trump himself studiously sets about rewriting the history surrounding his failed coup on January 6. He’s already pledged to extend pardons to convicted January 6 defendants at the outset of his term, and his election will likely continue to insulate him from the legal consequences of his illegal power grab. (Here the country’s decrepit political-and-media complex has been shown up by South Korea, which wasted no time in impeaching President Yoon Suk Yeol after his failed declaration of martial law, and driving his ruling party from power.)
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Trump himself is still pursuing a plainly frivolous $1 billion lawsuit against CBS News for supposedly biased editing of a 60 Minutes interview with Kamala Harris, and had threatened to get ABC’s license suspended for fact-checking his replies in his debate with Harris. (Indeed, in a recent Mar-a-Lago news conference, he threatened to sue Iowa pollster Ann Selzer and The Des Moines Register for publishing survey results mistakenly showing Trump trailing Harris in the Hawkeye State—alongside a threatened suit against Washington Post political reporter Bob Woodward and a reiterated bid to sue the Pulitzer Peace Prize committee.)

Trump’s example of strongman journalistic bullying is also gaining wider traction in MAGAland. The lawyer for Trump’s embattled defense secretary nominee, Fox News host Pete Hegseth, has threatened to seek a civil extortion action against the victim whom Hegseth was accused of sexually assaulting at a California conference of conservative activists—and lofted libel threats against Vanity Fair and The New York Times for publishing pieces about Hegseth’s drinking and marital difficulties. Kash Patel, Trump’s vengeance-minded pick to head the FBI, has threatened to sue former Mike Pence aide Olivia Troye for referring to him as a delusional liar in an MSNBC appearance. Patel also pledged on a 2023 podcast interview with Steve Bannon that “we will go out and find the conspirators not just in the government, but in the media. Yes, we’re going to come after the people in the media who lied about American citizens, who helped Joe Biden rig presidential elections.”

These quests for payback from a critical press are very much of a piece with Trump-driven efforts to strip out key bulwarks of media independence. The lame-duck Congress appears to be letting a federal shield law to safeguard journalists against naming their sources fall by the wayside. Trump and his allies will continue pressing to get the courts to “loosen up libel law”—which is to say, to overturn the high standards for libel and defamation cases set out in the landmark 1964 Supreme Court ruling Sullivan v. The New York Times. And Trump has appointed media-baiting attorney Brendan Carr to head the Federal Communications Commission and serial election-denialist Kari Lake to chair Voice of America. It’s not yet clear how far Trump apparatchiks will go in trashing whatever remains of a principled, independent media in the flailing American republic. Yet, regardless of their track record, many of them may be able to add cushy sinecures as ABC commentators to their résumés.
 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:


Chris Lehmann
 

Chris Lehmann is the DC Bureau chief for The Nation and a contributing editor at The Baffler. He was formerly editor of The Baffler and The New Republic, and is the author, most recently, of The Money Cult: Capitalism, Christianity, and the Unmaking of the American Dream (Melville House, 2016).



African American Polymath and Scholar Saidiya Hartman On History, Literature, Philosophy, Critical Theory, and Politics: PART 2

https://www.thenation.com/article/society/saidiya-hartman-interview/

How Saidiya Hartman Changed the Study of Black Life
 
A conversation with writer about her pathbreaking book Scenes of Subjection and how our understanding of race has changed in the last two decades.


Saidiya Hartman   (Illustration by Diane Zhou)

Saidiya Hartman has shaped studies of Black life for over two decades. Her first book, 1997’s Scenes of Subjection, argued that slavery was foundational to the American project and its notions of liberty. Her follow-up, 2006’s Lose Your Mother, combines elements of historiography and memoir in exploring the experience and legacy of enslavement. Here she first used a speculative method of writing history given the silences of the archive. And her most recent book, 2019’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments, examines the revolution of everyday life enacted in the practices of young Black women and queer people that created and sustained expansive notions of freedom.

After 25 years, Hartman’s influence is everywhere. Her coining of the phrase “the afterlife of slavery” changed the ways that historians consider the long ramifications of the chattel regime on Black life. It has prepared the public to engage with the work of artists like Kara Walker, who represent slavery’s continued hold on the present. And even the critiques of Hartman’s work demonstrate an anxiety about her influence, conceding that she has, in fact, influenced our ability to see the world. I spoke with Hartman earlier this year about the republication of Scenes of Subjection on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, about the ways that people in the 1990s misunderstood race and slavery, and about the expansive visions of freedom that enslaved people cultivated. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Elias Rodriques: What led you to writing Scenes of Subjection?

Saidiya Hartman: I arrived at slavery unexpectedly. I started out writing a dissertation on the blues. To understand that substrate of Black life, I began to research slavery. To my eyes, it was impossible to make sense of the structural logic and foundational character of racism without reckoning with slavery. The available critical language seemed inadequate for describing the necessary violence and the extreme domination characteristic of slavery. I didn’t imagine that I would become a scholar of slavery. But I felt that the key terms of life in the modern age were set in stone in that formative moment; it provided the structure for our language of freedom and rights, man and citizen. I was also troubled by the prevailing liberal framework that marked formal emancipation as the end of slavery and as an incredible rupture. I had read Marx and [Orlando] Patterson, so I understood the limits of political emancipation as well as the distinction between manumission and emancipation and the disestablishment or abolition of slavery. The other major concern was theorizing violence: not just spectacular instances of violence, but the ordinary or quotidian violence that structures everyday life. The Marxist narrative of modes of production or the Foucauldian account of modes of power seemed inadequate when accounting for slavery. Taking seriously the issue of chattel slavery or racial slavery in the settler colony threw a wrench into those explanatory frames. This set of concerns formed the project that became Scenes.

ER: How did people think about race at the time that you were writing Scenes?

SH: For me, the people who most productively thought about racism were people like Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, and Hazel Carby. Theirs was a Marxist or post-Marxist framework that attempted to explain the way in which racism was structuring the social. Stuart Hall’s “Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance” analyzed social formations in which race was the dominant feature and which couldn’t be explained as a secondary factor or by-product of the mode of production. How could racism, woven through the essential fabric of the West as a political project, be confined to the realm of ideology? How could we account for its materiality?

My intellectual training was very much shaped by the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, because Hazel Carby was on my dissertation committee. [Carby’s] Reconstructing Womanhood and [Paul Gilroy’s] The Black Atlantic were important anchors. Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s racial formation theory was also important to engaging racism not simply as “ideology” but as producing and determining the character of the social formation. Yet even with all of this, a rigorous analytic of racism, or what people would now describe as anti-Blackness, was emerging and not at all the given.

Tackling racial slavery was no less difficult. At that time, Western historiography had devoted 50 years to refuting [Eric Williams’s] Capitalism and Slavery. People argued that racial domination had little or nothing to do with capitalism and tried to contain slavery as a premodern formation, both in terms of power relations and capitalist accumulation. When I was an assistant professor at Berkeley, European historians—I remember Hugh Thomas specifically—were still writing papers about why Eric Williams was wrong in asserting that slavery was essential to the emergence and development of capitalism. Joseph Inikori’s work was an important contribution to this debate. The European project was to deny that slavery was a key factor in the making of the modern world. This was the consensus. Yet I had an intuitive sense, even if I didn’t have the language to articulate it, that racial slavery was a constitutive feature of the world I inhabited. It had everything to do with our present and with the disposability of Black life.

ER: What was it like to hold on to that intuition at the time?

SH: When I shared with friends and classmates at Yale that I was writing about slavery, their eyes glazed over with boredom. “What kind of boring historical project is that?” they seemed to say. Then I read Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism, which encouraged me to continue. But Black Marxism was also very challenging for me, because my education was within a post-Marxist framework, in which one took for granted critique of the totality. And Robinson was talking about an African totality! Robinson was thinking about racial capitalism, but slavery was not a moment of genesis in Black Marxism. He tracks racism as a formation inside of Europe that gets projected out, structures the encounters between Europeans and Africans, and shapes the language of the slave trade. But largely, he thinks about racism as part of capitalism’s emergence in Europe. I was studying these things and wanted to engage with the critical thinking of those who were enslaved and who lived in the aftermath of slavery. I was also reading subaltern studies, where scholars were asking, “How do we think about dominated people who have limited or no access to the means of representation? How does one push against the normative framework of history?”

ER: Who was pushing against that framework with regard to slavery?

SH: Some Marxists applied Marxism in a strange way: “Let’s think about Gramsci’s hegemony and apply that to the relationship between slave owners and the enslaved.” Then others replied, “Well, no, that’s not hegemony. That’s extreme domination.” So I wondered, “Who’s thinking about extreme domination and the particular constituents of slavery?” The work of political theorists was key in questioning the character of power and critical engaging the assumptions of liberalism. The testimony of the enslaved was the most valuable resource. For this, we owe a great deal to the editor of the WPA Slave Narrative Collection, George Rawick. He thought about the enslaved from a tradition of Italian Marxism—autonomia—that considered the significance of local struggles. He considered the plantation alongside the factory floor, although ultimately, Scenes underscores the discontinuity between the worker on the factory floor and the enslaved as a sentient commodity in the plantation order. Instead, it strives to think about the specificity of enslaved people in a thoroughly racialized order.

ER: In your new preface, you note that terms like “exploited worker” and “unpaid laborer” failed to describe slavery. What did they fail to describe?

SH: They failed to describe the fundamental violence of slavery; the particular modes of accumulation, extraction, and reproduction in racial slavery; the dual existence of the enslaved as subject-object; the state of social death; the hierarchy of the human; and the fungibility of Black life. When I wrote Scenes, I didn’t have access to Sylvia Wynter’s Black Metamorphosis, which will soon appear in the world. (Anthony Bougues and a team of graduate students are editing it.) Wynter expands the frame and states explicitly that domination and accumulation are fundamental to the position and experience of the captive. This original and ongoing accumulation conditions the exploitation of the worker, but the exploitation of the worker cannot and does not explain the position of the enslaved, the colonized, the wretched.

Orlando Patterson was also essential. Patterson provides a critical vocabulary of the constituent elements of slavery and its idioms of power in Slavery and Social Death. Patterson took note of the inadequacy of critical discourse in describing and explicating slavery. In an interview with David Scott in Small Axe, Patterson recounts his intellectual journey as a historical sociologist, and tells a story about standing in Trenchtown [a neighborhood in the Jamaican capital of Kingston] and wanting to account for its genesis. What was the relationship between that space of racialized enclosure, the ghetto, and the plantation that engendered it?

These people were essential to my thinking. Another person who comes to mind is [Hortense] Spillers in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe.” I was a graduate student when Spillers gave the talk at the Yale Humanities Center; it is one of the most cited essays in Black studies. The response of the faculty was, “Why is she dealing with the Moynihan Report?” It wasn’t, “Oh my God! The intellectual ground has shifted.” Spillers asserted that our understanding of the human is thrown into crisis by the transatlantic slave trade and racial slavery. What critical language can attend to its features? The implications of Spillers, Patterson, and Wynter are enormous. Their work structures Black studies and has shaped two or three generations of scholars. It is not coincidental that thinking about slavery was key to their projects.

ER: In terms of timing, your own book came out in the 1990s. In your preface, you note that you could feel “the force and disfigurement of slavery in the present.” How did you feel it?

SH: The fungibility and disposability of Black life. The state-sanctioned murder of Black people. The radically restricted life chances of Black people. That is the world I knew and experienced, but thinking along these lines was untimely and certainly unwelcome. On the one hand, multiculturalism and the post-racial society were the hegemonic frame at the time, and on the other hand, the tremendous violence of the state and its carceral machinery targeted Black people as predators and criminals and made incarceration and premature death the expected horizon. [President Bill] Clinton’s liberal establishment was dismantling the welfare state and building the carceral complex.

Settler colonialism and racial slavery and liberal ideals of freedom gave shape to the United States. That is undeniable. But there’s a constant and relentless attempt to deny this. After [Barack] Obama was elected, a colleague of mine, a classicist, said to me, “Now your work is passé.” [laughter] That says everything.

When Scenes was published, it had a chilly reception. To state directly, plainly, and unapologetically the ways in which Blackness was marked by this experience of having been a commodity, to elaborate the conditions of social death, and to attenuate the notion of agency was not welcome. When historians began to address the question of agency, they failed to cite my work. Historians like Rawick, Sterling Stuckey, [Herbert] Gutman, and other pioneering radical historians of slavery offered rich accounts of the agency of the enslaved and slave culture. The intent of Scenes wasn’t to negate that work, but to think about power and structures of violence in a systemic way. While there are variations in the condition of slavery, I wanted to address the state of slavery, its structural features and constituent elements. That’s why Orlando Patterson and Claude Meillassoux were very important to me. Those thinkers helped me develop a critical language of slavery. Graduate students and young readers kept Scenes alive.

ER: The new version is very much a collective endeavor as well. Can you tell me about the new additions?

SH: I wanted the new edition of Scenes to enter the world with a collective voice and as a collaboration with others. The notations and compositions by Torkwase Dyson and Cameron Rowland make thought available in other ways. They are critical commentaries, abstract compositions, and elaborations of the central terms of the book. Over the years, people have said, “Scenes is so hard!” So when Cameron and I were collaborating on the notations, we thought, “Suppose you wanted a crib sheet of Scenes? Maybe you could just tear out the notations.” We offer the notations as points of clarification, which allow a variety of people to enter the text. They are outlines, provocations to read otherwise. Torkwase’s compositions or blueprints address issues of flight, enclosure, and Black movement in confined spaces. These abstract renderings frame the chapters; they are dense and suggestive in that they open other ways of reading and approaching the text. The new foreword by Keeanga Yamahtta-Taylor underscores the critique of the prevailing structures and the recognition that they cannot save us and cannot actualize our longing for another way to exist. This radical critique cannot be mistaken for resignation and despair. The afterword by Marisa Fuentes and Sarah Haley explicates the historical intervention, archival labor and critical context of Scenes. So, there are several different interpretations of Scenes inside the book. For me, this was a way of expanding and amplifying the work. It made collective utterance part of its framing.

ER: About that critique: You note that the recognition of humanity does not end violence so much as enable other kinds of violence. How?

SH: There was a commonsense understanding that the violence of slavery solely concerned the object status or denied humanity of the enslaved. But enslaved people were also recognized as human in slave law and statutes. The enslaved existed as subject and object—as property and as human—and their humanity was another site of violence. The promise of emancipation was the transition from being the property of another to the property of oneself. The liberal narrative of slavery’s end celebrates and fetishizes this transition: “Now you are a free worker!” But as Marx observed, the worker goes to the market, trades his hide, and needs to prepare for a tanning. That made me think, “Was this the liberatory horizon of freedom? It was so impoverished.” As we know, the domination of the ex-slave required direct forms of violence and of racist terror; the control of the Black laboring classes continued to employ forms of extreme violence, and the spectacle of terror never disappeared. Racism is a distribution of death, controlled depletion, and a brutal allocation of chances at life. The forms of direct, extrajudicial, and extra-economic modes of violence remained dominant after emancipation. Racism, as Du Bois notes, gave every white person the power of police over Black folk. This is to say nothing of the psychic dimensions of anti-Blackness.

If individualism and wage labor aren’t the horizon of freedom, then we need a radically different understanding of what the disestablishment of slavery or abolition entails, and a different language and imagination of possibility. We see the traces and practices of these other visions of freedom in the thoughts and in the social assembly of the enslaved. It isn’t a notion of freedom defined as the “liberty of contract,” which is what the Freedmen’s Bureau and Northern capitalists and missionaries imposed as the vision. The ex-slave was taught to read and, at the same time, was being trained to become a self-possessed subject; this was part and parcel of the “training and formation” of the dutiful and disciplined worker.

Of course, an enormous violence is required to produce a working class and drive people without any resources but the self to the market. However, this transition was radically truncated for the formerly enslaved. Late 19th- and 20th-century Black intellectuals, as well as ordinary Black folks, who were primarily agricultural laborers and domestics, stated repeatedly that Black people were living in a condition that was all but slavery in name. That was the reality. So, why the faith in the liberal narrative about emancipation and the end of slavery; why erect the barrier between variants of involuntary servitude when many of the essential features of unfreedom were still in place, when racist terror and state violence was the norm?

ER: What did you find studying that transition?

SH: I read the reports of field workers in the Freedmen’s Bureau and other visitors to the South reporting on the great violence in the former insurrectionary states. These reports were written by white officials and bureaucrats, and even what they described was sobering. Again, it raised the question: What does it mean to abolish slavery? Certainly, it would mean the end of racial capitalism and the hierarchy of life it has produced. It would entail dismantling the Western scheme of value and disenchanting the human. The racial taxonomy of life and value and the hierarchy of species would all have to be abolished. The end of private property—that’s what abolition entails. It is not the burdened individuality of freedom or the end of the legal property in slaves. Abolition requires uprooting the order of value and overturning the vertical order of life that created the system. A more far-reaching vision of abolition is imperative. The testimony of the formerly enslaved articulates this longing as well as the poverty of liberal and market freedom. The imagination of Black freedom has never been content to be defined by legal liberalism. It was always more capacious. What people wanted and hoped for was a revolution of the social order. In the US, the outcome of the Civil War negated property in slaves, and there was the possibility that the social order would be remade, so that an actual reconstruction might be possible.

ER: What are some of these other, more expansive visions of freedom?

SH: There is an expansive vision of freedom articulated in the everyday struggles against the plantation, the boss, the white man. The visions of what might be articulated by the enslaved were utterly antagonistic to white supremacy and the capitalist order. Sometimes it took the form of a messianic vision that didn’t imagine justice was even possible within the secular world, so people ran away from the plantation, took to the hills, and lived in the swamps. The majority expressed what might be or welcomed the world to come in spiritual practice. They articulated other visions of the possible and values fundamentally opposed to the prevailing scheme of captivity. For the settler and the colonizer, Earth is something that can be parceled out, that can be commodified, that can be sold. You can plant your flag or build your fort or erect your fence or post a “No Trespassing” sign and construct the sanctity of the private, the dominion of the sovereign nation or sovereign individual. This is a worldview that is at odds with the way most inhabitants of the planet have lived and have understood their relation to the earth. I wanted to recover those beliefs and values that have always supported and animated Black life and that remain utterly hostile to this project—to capitalism, to racism, to the sovereign “I.”

How did the enslaved conceive, imagine, describe, and engage the world in which they were situated? How did they attempt to create openings and lines of flight within the racialized enclosure of the plantation? Practice was the domain in which to engage these matters. It is the link between Scenes and Wayward Lives. What does it mean to know that you will be free? What sustains a belief in freedom when there’s nothing in the world that would allow or encourage you to think that it is reasonable or possible? This belief has a dramatic impact on the way the Civil War unfolded. For Lincoln, the goal was reunification of a warring nation. But as Du Bois observed in Black Reconstruction, the enslaved had a different vision and understanding of what this war meant. For them, it was a war against slavery. And they made it so.

ER: I want to ask you a question that you ask of Olaudah Equiano [the Black abolitionist and author of a slave narrative]: “How do you commemorate what has yet to arrive?”

SH: I love that moment in Equiano’s narrative in which he imagines and commemorates the end of the Atlantic slave trade and slavery, although the book was published in 1789. He has a knowledge of freedom that is tantamount to faith; it is faith. He knows that slavery will end and anticipates the celebration of that end. I aspire to such faith. I can see the wonder of it; I can see the hope it offers. I experience these moments as a writer. They’re short-lived and fleeting, but they are moments in which there is a glimpse of the possible, where radical transformation is palpable. 
 
 
ABOUT THE GUEST SPEAKER:


Saidiya Hartman


Dr. Hartman is a writer, critic, literary scholar and a professor at Columbia University specializing in African-American literature and history. She grew up in Brooklyn and received her B.A. from Wesleyan University and Ph.D. from Yale University.

Hartman's major fields of interest are African-American and American literature and cultural history, slavery, law and literature, gender studies, and performance studies. She is on the editorial board of the journal Callaloo. Hartman has been a Fulbright, Rockefeller, Whitney Oates, and University of California President's Fellow and was awarded the 2007 Narrative Prize from Narrative Magazine and the Gustav Myers Award for Human Rights. She is the author of Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-making in Nineteenth Century America (Oxford University Press, 1997), Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), and Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval (W. W. Norton, 2019) . Hartman's essays have been widely published and anthologized.



ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER:


Elias Rodriques


Elias Rodriques is the author of All the Water I’ve Seen Is Running and teaches at Sarah Lawrence College.







Tuesday, December 17, 2024

African American Polymath and Scholar Saidiya Hartman On History, Literature, Music, Philosophy, Art, Critical Theory, and Politics

 
The Tragic Mode

Saidiya Hartman, interviewed by Max Nelson


“I love Ralph Ellison’s definition of the blues as ‘an autobiographical chronicle of personal catastrophe expressed lyrically.’ I set out to engage the catastrophe.”
 
November 19, 2022
New York Review of Books


Saidiya Hartman. Photo by Ryan Cardoso

Last month, the Review published “The Hold of Slavery,” an essay by Saidiya Hartman about writing her landmark first book, Scenes of Subjection (1997). (A version of the piece appears as the preface to the book’s revised twenty-fifth anniversary edition, out now from Norton.) “In the archive of slavery,” she writes, “I encountered a paradox: the recognition of the slave’s humanity and status as a subject extended and intensified servitude and dispossession, rather than conferring some small measure of rights and protection.” The “critical lexicon” in the late twentieth century for understanding slavery and emancipation failed to capture that paradox. So Hartman set out to develop a new one.

That work, she writes, “would preoccupy me for two decades.” In Lose Your Mother (2007), which interleaves a history and theory of the Middle Passage with a memoir of the year Hartman spent in Ghana in the late 1990s, she developed an account of what it meant to live in “the afterlife of slavery.” In the essay “Venus in Two Acts” (2008), she struggled with how to tell the stories of lives only fleetingly registered in transatlantic slavery’s ledgers and legal records. (“How,” she asks, “does one recuperate lives entangled with and impossible to differentiate from the terrible utterances that condemned them to death?”) And in her most recent book, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments (2019), she reconstructed “the radical imagination and wayward practices” of young black women in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia and New York. Their rebellions against segregation and patriarchy, she showed, amounted to nothing less than “a revolution in a minor key.”

Over e-mail we discussed Hartman’s memories of growing up in New York, her academic and literary influences, and the place of tragedy and romance in historical writing.


Max Nelson: In The New Yorker, Alexis Okeowo noted that you started graduate school at Yale hoping to write about the blues—a subject to which you’ve since returned in your book Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments. What convinced you to change tracks back then and start researching what would become Scenes of Subjection?

Saidiya Hartman: Amiri Baraka’s Blues People guided this change of course. He quotes a musician who described the blues as suffused with the sounds of the field, with slave songs and field hollers and dirges, even as it was the music of freed people. The sonic resonances of slavery and West African music in the blues were concrete examples of duration and change, what Baraka described as “the changing same” in black musical culture and what James Snead described as “repetition as a figure of black culture.” Baraka placed so much emphasis on black music in the nineteenth and twentieth century as the music of the ex-slave. It was the cultural equivalent to what Hortense Spillers terms “the hieroglyphics of the flesh,” a marking and branding that might transfer from one generation to the next.

I love Ralph Ellison’s definition of the blues as “an autobiographical chronicle of personal catastrophe expressed lyrically.” I set out to engage the catastrophe and the ways it was performed and articulated in cultural practice. The reckoning with catastrophe and performance required a deeper understanding of the material conditions of slavery and its afterlife. I read Sterling Stuckey’s Slave Culture, Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Édouard Glissant’s Caribbean Discourse, and Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death, and there was no turning back.

With Scenes, you made what in your essay you call “a radical departure” from the prevailing ways of writing the history of slavery. What was this radical departure? The book’s acknowledgments name some of the people who helped you develop it: classmates, teachers like Hazel Carby and Judith Butler, and colleagues like Farah Jasmine Griffin. How did the intellectual milieus you were in—and the relationships you formed in and outside academia—shape the book?

Scenes is an interdisciplinary text that engages history, critical theory, philosophy, anthropology, cultural studies, law, literature, and performance. I had so many great teachers. I read Raymond Williams, György Lukács, and Stuart Hall with Hazel Carby. Karl Marx and Louis Althusser with Gayatri Spivak. Nietzsche, the Frankfurt School, and post-Marxist theory with Cornel West. Cultural studies gave me a method for reading and engaging practice as a way of doing and making dense with historicity, determined by material and social relations, and capable of critically elaborating and transforming these relations. A Juba song or a ritual like the Ring Shout or a dance like the Buzzard Lope were forms that articulated what had been endured as well as what might be. They provided a space for breath within the social death of slavery. They possessed a latent capacity or potential to imagine after slavery.

I was surrounded by a cohort of brilliant graduate students at Yale. On a train ride to Princeton to hear Toni Morrison read a lecture that would become Playing in the Dark, Farah Griffin and I discussed our respective dissertation topics. We encouraged each other; when I floundered, she extended her hand. After the lecture, Cornel West took us to dinner and emboldened us in our nascent intellectual labors, saying that soon black women intellectuals would receive their due. We took him at his word.

As I write in the preface, it is impossible for me to read Scenes without discerning the contributions of my interlocutors, by which I mean to say that I recognize the traces of texts published after 1997 in its lines. Certainly, the echoes of many decades of conversation are palpable. My engagement and collaborations with artists have been critically important for my thinking, and this is apparent in the revised edition.

Growing up in New York City, I encountered so many incredible organic intellectuals: Una Mulzac, the owner of Liberation Bookstore in Harlem; Elombe Brath and the activities of the Patrice Lumumba Coalition; Queen Mother Moore; a feminist lecture series organized by the Sisterhood of Black Single Mothers; Pan-Africanist study groups; a poetry workshop with Quincy Troupe. I had the chance to hear Larry Neal read at the Schomburg Library, to interview Amiri Baraka when I was in high school, to see artists like Dianne McIntyre, Butch Morris, and Olu Dara perform in loft spaces—when artists, not investment bankers, lived in those spaces. Kitchen Table Press, St. Mark’s Bookshop, Film Forum, and The East Organization were as critical to my intellectual development as the university.

Your essay is at once an account of how you wrote Scenes and a reflection on the book’s reception. You write that your aim was “to account for extreme domination and the possibilities seized in practice”—all “the countless ways in which the enslaved challenged, refused, defied, and resisted the condition of enslavement.” The latter theme has, you suggest, “received less attention in the reception of the book,” even as it’s remained central to your work. Why, in your view, has this theory of practice been “overshadowed” by the book’s other influential arguments?

By far the most pressing tasks were to articulate the structural character of slavery’s violence and the dimensions of subjection, and to detail the fundamental ways in which slavery had not been disestablished. Rather than look at the most obvious and egregious examples—lynching, white supremacist violence, and convict labor—I examined the ways in which liberalism and rights discourse were shaped and interpreted to maintain the racial order of the plantation and to legitimate segregation. Other historians and cultural critics had addressed the force and brilliance of black culture and day-to-day resistance, but the discussion of domination, sexual violence, fungibility, and agency shifted the terms of discourse about slavery.

For some, it proved to be a challenge to hold the necessary terror and quotidian violence of slavery with practice. Scenes is not a bleak or hopeless book; however, it is utterly unrelenting in its critique of the liberal freedom founded upon slavery and the hierarchy and exclusion that characterize the human. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor’s introduction does a great job clarifying this point. The disorientation of Scenes is in the assertion that the “gift of emancipation” and the recognition of black personhood were no less brutal. When one describes US democracy as experienced and endured by the enslaved and the emancipated, the romance of the republic is shattered. Black people were governed and abandoned by the state, disenfranchised by the law, and subjected to great violence ranging from massacres to state-sanctioned and extra-juridical forms of execution and murder. We were subjected to the law, but only in rare instances protected by it. Theft and terror enabled the freedom of property-holding whites, and this truth cannot be avoided when writing the history of slavery. Most citizens are still not ready to countenance it.

You write that “the work of novelists and poets provided a model” for the book, and you list a number of those writers in a footnote, from Paule Marshall and Toni Morrison to Maryse Condé, Jamaica Kincaid, and Robert Hayden. Could you elaborate on your history of reading those writers? Were there specific works that made an especially strong impression on you, or to which you found yourself returning especially often?

Novelists and poets provided the models for creatively disordering the archive, transforming and rearranging its statements, looking at its documents from below, from the vantage of those in the hold, contesting its regime of fact and truth. I remember the impact of reading Glissant’s deconstruction of “the document of emancipation” in Caribbean Discourse, and Morrison’s dramatic deployment of fragmented narratives of the Middle Passage in Beloved. Novelists like Condé, Caryl Phillips, Gayl Jones, and Fred D’Aguiar created fictions of the archive. They worked within and against its silences and constraints, the purposeful acts of destruction intended to make our history impossible. Lack and absence made poesis necessary. The work of these writers taught me how to break the frame of the imposed discourse and what might be accomplished by dis-composing and remaking narrative.

In Scenes, you stress that narrating “the social relations of slavery” requires abandoning the form of the “romance, even if it is a romance of resistance.” You return to that thought throughout your work. “In the sixties,” you write in Lose Your Mother about the black Americans who emigrated to Ghana after independence, “it was still possible to believe that the past could be left behind because it appeared as though the future, finally, had arrived; whereas in my age the impress of racism and colonialism seemed nearly indestructible. Mine was not the age of romance.” The word returns, with what struck me as a slightly different emphasis, in “The End of White Supremacy, An American Romance” (2020), your more recent essay on W. E. B. Du Bois’s “The Comet” (1920). What place do romance and tragedy have in your thinking about what you have come to call “the afterlife of slavery”?

That is a great question. Largely, histories of slavery were narrated as romances of overcoming bondage. An early article, “The Poverty of Tragedy in Historical Writing on Southern Slavery” (1986), was one of the few to address the lack of attention paid to the tragic in the historiography. Hayden White’s Metahistory (1973) was an important text in my graduate education because it considered the relation of narrative form and the ideological horizon of history. Most historians took for granted that this most enduring and obdurate form of subjection and dispossession had ended by legal decree. The tragic mode was an important way of underscoring temporal entanglement, what lived on and endured.

Lose Your Mother, along the lines of David Scott’s Conscripts of Modernity (2004), attended to the romance that fueled the anticolonial struggle—the vision of a world after or beyond empire. A generation of freedom fighters imagined that end was within reach, they could almost grasp it. It was a dying colonialism. Yet we belonged to a later generation who lived in the wake of that thwarted and deferred dream of escaping the stranglehold of the West and defeating colonialism and capitalism, and we were keenly aware of living in a present determined by slavery and coloniality. The afterlife of slavery illuminates the dispossession and precarity of black life that is the consequence of slavery.

“The End of White Supremacy” explores the contending or antagonistic romances of the US. For some, the romance is that white supremacy can and will be defeated, and that we might even experience its end in our lifetime. For others, white supremacy is the romance; it is the ideational core of making America great again. In Du Bois’s speculative fiction, “The Comet,” the end of white supremacy requires the end of the world. This tragic romance never tires of imagining when and how the afterlife of slavery might finally reach its end.


ABOUT THE GUEST SPEAKER:


Saidiya Hartman


Dr. Hartman is a writer, critic, literary scholar and a professor at Columbia University specializing in African-American literature and history. She grew up in Brooklyn and received her B.A. from Wesleyan University and Ph.D. from Yale University.

Hartman's major fields of interest are African-American and American literature and cultural history, slavery, law and literature, gender studies, and performance studies. She is on the editorial board of the journal Callaloo. Hartman has been a Fulbright, Rockefeller, Whitney Oates, and University of California President's Fellow and was awarded the 2007 Narrative Prize from Narrative Magazine and the Gustav Myers Award for Human Rights. She is the author of Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-making in Nineteenth Century America (Oxford University Press, 1997), Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), and Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval (W. W. Norton, 2019) . Hartman's essays have been widely published and anthologized.



ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER:


Max Nelson

Max Nelson is on the editorial staff of The New York Review.