Tuesday, August 25, 2026

FASCIST AMERICA 2026: The Historical Background To and Major Ideological and Political Foundation Of the Insidious Circuitous Rise Of Donald Trump in American Politics and Media Culture From 1972- 2015. A Chief Component of This Truly Bizarro Yet Thoroughly 'Mainstream' Trajectory Was Trump's Intense Protege Relationship To The Heinous Mentorship of The Notorious ROY COHN (1927-1986)

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/frank-rich-roy-cohn-the-original-donald-trump.html

 
Frank Rich: 
 
Roy Cohn, Donald Trump, and the New York Cesspool That Created Them
 
9 Comments

The Original Donald Trump
 
The New York Establishment will ignore unscrupulous acts to serve its interests — just look how it treated Roy Cohn, onetime lawyer to the president.
 
by Frank Rich
April 30, 2018
The Intelligencer
New York Magazine


Photograph by Mary Ellen Mark
 
Above: Cohn in 1986, a few months before he died.
 
Amid the aftershocks of Donald Trump’s firing of James Comey last May, I went to see Angels in America at the same theater in London, the National, where I’d first seen it as a New York Times drama critic some 25 years earlier. The play didn’t transport me quite as far from the lamentable present as I’d hoped. The new production, now on Broadway, doesn’t radically depart in tone or quality (high) from the first. But the play’s center of gravity had shifted. While Tony Kushner’s epic had been seared into my memory by the frail figure of Prior Walter, a young gay man fighting AIDS with almost the entire world aligned against him, this time it was Roy Cohn who dominated: a closeted, homophobic, middle-aged gay man also battling AIDS but who, unlike the fictional Prior, was a real-life Über-villain of America’s 20th century. “The polestar of human evil,” as one character describes him. “The worst human being who ever lived … the most evil, twisted, vicious bastard ever to snort coke at Studio 54.”
 
What has changed is not Angels but America. Even if you hadn’t known that Cohn had been Trump’s mentor and hadn’t read the election-year journalistic retrospectives on their toxic common tactics (counterpunch viciously, deny everything, stiff your creditors, manipulate the tabloids), you’d see and hear the current president in Cohn’s ruthless bullying and profane braggadocio. That isn’t because Nathan Lane, a Cohn for the ages, is doing a Trump impersonation. The uncanny overlap between these two figures is all there in the writing. “Was it legal? Fuck legal,” Cohn rants at one point, about having privately lobbied the judge Irving Kaufman to send Ethel Rosenberg to the electric chair. “Am I a nice man? Fuck nice. They say terrible things about me in the Nation. Fuck the Nation. You want to be Nice, or you want to be Effective?” It turns out that in his rendering of Cohn a quarter-century ago, Kushner had identified an enduring strain of political evil that is as malignant in its way as the AIDS virus, just as dangerous to the nation, and just as difficult to eradicate.
 
Cohn, after all, was supposed to have been washed up in 1954, after he and his superior in witch-hunting, Joe McCarthy, imploded in the televised Army-McCarthy hearings. McCarthy drank himself to death, and Cohn fled Washington a pariah, his brief career in government service in ruins. Yet as Kushner accurately picks up the story three decades later, Cohn had reinvented himself as a power broker after returning to his hometown of New York, and he would remain so right up until disbarment and AIDS finally leveled him in 1986. How could that be? Sure, the right-wing resurgence of the 1980s gave him a late-in-life boost. Cohn’s juice with Ronnie and Nancy, as Kushner dramatizes, gained him access to the experimental medication AZT denied most everyone else. (He may have been the only AIDS patient the Reagan White House lifted a finger to help.) But the question of how Cohn both survived and flourished as a Manhattan eminence in the quarter-century between McCarthy and Reagan is beyond the play’s already-considerable scope.
 
It’s an ellipsis that gnawed at me because the same question applies to Trump. Cohn thrived throughout a New York second act rife with indictments and scandals that included accusations of multiple bank- and securities-law violations, perennial tax evasion, bribery, extortion, theft, and even precipitating the death of a young man in a suspicious fire. Trump may never have been suspected of manslaughter, but he also flourished for decades despite being a shameless lawbreaker, tax evader, liar, racist, bankruptcy aficionado, and hypocrite notorious for his mob connections, transactional sexual promiscuity, and utter disregard for rules, scruples, and morals. Indeed, Trump triumphed despite having all of Cohn’s debits, wartime draft dodging included, but none of his assets — legal cunning, erudition, a sense of humor, brainpower, and loyalty. (The putz-cum-fixer Michael Cohen, who is to Cohn what Dan Quayle was to Jack Kennedy, boasts none of these attributes either.) And Trump, like Cohn, got away with it all under the ostensibly pitiless magnifying glass of New York. Much as one hates to concede it, it’s no small achievement that he succeeded where so many of his betters failed in becoming the first New Yorker to catapult himself to the White House since Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 
The story of Trump’s ascent complicates the equation for those who want to believe that it was exclusively a product of his genius for publicity, or his B-stardom in a long-running reality show in NBC’s prime time, or a vast right-wing conspiracy abetted by deplorable voters like those in Wisconsin who sent McCarthy to the Senate in 1946 and helped Trump take the Electoral College in 2016. Nor is Trump’s New York backstory comforting to those of us in the habit of quarantining the blame for his unlikely victory to Russian and/or Comey’s interference, the ineptitude of the Clinton campaign, the Fox News–Breitbart complex, and the cynical, feckless Vichy Republicans who stood by as Trump subverted every principle they once claimed to have held dear.
 
There are Vichy Democrats too. From the mid-1970s to the turn of the century, well before Trump debuted on The Apprentice or flirted more than glancingly with politics, he gained power and consolidated it with the help of allies among the elites of New York’s often nominally Democratic and liberal Establishment — some of them literally the same allies who boosted Cohn. Like Cohn (a registered Democrat until he died) and Trump (an off-and-on Democrat for years), their enablers were not committed to any party or ideology. Their priority was raw personal power that could be leveraged for their own enrichment, privilege, and celebrity. Cohn’s biographer Nicholas von Hoffman described what he called the “Roy Cohn Barter and Swap Exchange”: It specialized in “deals, favors, hand washings, and reciprocities of all kinds.” And while Cohn is gone, the exchange never shut down. Its unofficial legislative body is the floating quid pro quo Favor Bank that has always made New York tick at its highest levels, however corruptly, since Tammany Hall. It’s a realm where everyone has his (or her) price, and clout is always valued higher than any civic good. All that matters is the next transaction. Since time immemorial, those who find it unsavory are invariably dismissed as naïve.
 
The more I’ve looked back at the entanglements of Trump, Cohn, and their overlapping circles and modi operandi, the more I think the crux of their political culture could be best captured if Edward Sorel were to create a raucous mural depicting the Friday night in February 1979 when Cohn celebrated his 52nd birthday at Studio 54. That sprawling midtown Valhalla of the disco era, a nexus for boldface names, omnivorous drug consumption, anonymous sex, and managerial larceny, was owned by Cohn’s clients (and soon-to-be-imprisoned felons) Steve Rubell and Ian Schrager. The guest list? “If you’re indicted, you’re invited,” went the comedian Joey Adams’s oft-repeated joke about Cohn’s soirées. Among the (all-white) Democratic revelers joining Republican and Conservative party leaders at Cohn’s black-tie testimonial were the borough presidents of Queens (Donald Manes), Brooklyn (Howard Golden), and Manhattan (Andrew Stein), not to mention the former Democratic mayor Abe Beame and a bevy of judges, including the chief of the U.S. District Court. The investigative reporter Wayne Barrett, who covered the scrum from the sidewalk for the Village Voice, noted that, among the usual Warhol celebrity crowd, politicians, and fixers, was a “surprise” attendee — “newcomer Chuck Schumer, a ‘reform’ assemblyman from Brooklyn who insisted he was just the date of a gossip columnist.” Also in attendance, less surprisingly, and camera-ready for the paparazzi, was the 32-year-old Trump, who by then had been in Cohn’s orbit for six years.
 
Like the other developers on hand, Trump had sought and won favors from some of the older, more powerful Democrats who were present. With Cohn’s imprimatur, Trump gained easy access to the ostensibly nonpartisan press Establishment as well. Si Newhouse, the chairman of Condé Nast magazines and Cohn’s best friend since their high-school days at Horace Mann, showed up for the Studio 54 blast. Earlier in the day, Abe Rosenthal, the executive editor of the Times, had brought his companion, Katharine Balfour, to pay homage to Cohn over lunch at the ‘21’ Club. In years to come, Rosenthal would enjoy Trump’s hospitality at Mar-a-Lago.
 
Neither the Newhouse magazine-and-newspaper empire nor Rosenthal’s Times was in those days conspicuous for prying too deeply into the shadows surrounding Cohn or Trump. Some journalistic big guns preferred to be behind velvet ropes with McCarthy’s former henchman than out on the pavement casing the joint like Barrett. A few months after the Studio 54 bacchanal, Morley Safer would front a soft 60 Minutes Cohn profile in which, among other euphemisms, viewers were informed that Cohn had never tied the knot with his oft-rumored fiancée Barbara Walters because “he’s just not the marrying kind.” In its effort to be “balanced,” the piece came off as a free ad for Cohn’s supposed legal wizardry and cast him as something of a victim. (Intriguingly, this 60 Minutes segment cannot be found on YouTube, while a tougher, if tardy, Mike Wallace profile, made as Cohn was dying seven years later, can be.) By that point, Walters had long since delivered for her platonic fiancé with her first promotional profile of his shiny young protégé for ABC’s 60 Minutes rival 20/20. Titled “The Man Who Has Everything,” it was, in the Trump biographer Michael D’Antonio’s description, “wealth pornography.” Among other superlatives, it floated the dubious claim (for the 1970s) that “the Trumps are treated like American royalty.”
 
For years it’s been a parlor game for Americans to wonder how history might have turned out if someone had stopped Lee Harvey Oswald before he shot JFK. One might be tempted — just as fruitlessly — to speculate on what might have happened if more of New York’s elites had intervened back then, nonviolently, to block or seriously challenge Trump’s path to power. They had plenty of provocation and opportunities to do so. Trump practiced bigotry on a grand scale, was a world-class liar, and ripped off customers, investors, and the city itself. Yet for many among New York’s upper register, there was no horror he could commit that would merit his excommunication. As with Cohn before him, the more outrageously and reprehensibly Trump behaved, the more the top rungs of society were titillated by him. They could cop out of any moral judgments or actions by rationalizing him as an entertaining con man: a cheesy, cynical, dumbed-down Gatsby who fit the city’s tacky 1980s Gilded Age much as F. Scott Fitzgerald’s more romantic prototype had the soigné Jazz Age of the 1920s. And so most of those who might have stopped Trump gawked like the rest of us as he scrambled up the city’s ladder, grabbing anything that wasn’t nailed down.

Roy Cohn on Madison Avenue, 1963. Photo: Arthur Schatz/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty
It was Democrats in New York who taught both Cohn and Trump that they could buy off politicians and try to get away with anything. Cohn’s father, Al, was a Bronx and then New York State Supreme Court judge. The elder Cohn’s roots in the party’s machine were hardwired into his son: Young Roy figured out how to pull strings to fix a parking ticket for a teacher while still in high school. Trump grew up with a father who had been intertwined with the Brooklyn Democratic machine while building his residential-real-estate empire. By the time the clubhouse hack Beame arrived in City Hall in 1974 after the reform mayoralty of John Lindsay, Fred Trump had known him for 30 years. The new mayor immediately gave both Trumps a license to steal by declaring that “whatever Donald and Fred want, they have my complete backing.” Never mind, as the Trump biographers Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher observed, that Donald Trump didn’t have the financing to snag the real-estate prize he then sought, the properties of the bankrupt Penn Central railroad. The Beame deputy mayor Stanley Friedman pushed through an enormous 40-year, $400 million tax abatement — this at the city’s bankrupt nadir — and in his waning weeks in office fast-tracked the agency approvals Trump needed to rebuild the decrepit old Commodore Hotel as the Grand Hyatt, his first big deal. Roy Cohn served as the closer: The day after the Beame administration was succeeded by Ed Koch’s in 1978, Friedman was paid off for his Trump handiwork with a new job as a partner in Cohn’s law firm. (It was not enough to save Friedman from federal prison a decade later, when he was convicted in unrelated kickback scandals the year after Cohn’s death.)
 
Trump’s other major political ally as he erected a new, Manhattan real-estate empire on top of his father’s outer-borough fiefdom was the Democratic governor Hugh Carey. Trump engineered a brazen conflict-of-interest that you’d be tempted to call mind-boggling were its contours not being replicated on a far grander scale within the current White House. In the 1970s, Trump hired as his lobbyist Carey’s chief political fund-raiser, Louise Sunshine, even as he and his father were the second-biggest contributors to Carey’s 1978 reelection campaign (only a Carey brother, an oilman, gave more). “He’ll do anything for a developer who gives him a campaign contribution,” said Trump of Carey. And so he did. Trump was unstoppable, though he kept writing checks to other useful Democrats, including a record $270,000 (for a Board of Estimate election) to the Cohn crony Andrew Stein, who served as Manhattan borough president and then New York City Council president from 1978 to 1994 and “whose varied public performances for Trump were a metaphor for gutter government,” in Wayne Barrett’s estimation. (Stein would years later plead guilty to un-Trump-related tax evasion.) Trump would also give to (among others) Schumer, Eliot Spitzer, and Andrew Cuomo, who took Trump as a client even as his father was governor and Trump was conniving to develop the West Side yards and build a domed football stadium in Queens.
 
Unlike Trump, Cohn had no interest in building anything. He wanted to tear down institutions and people for fun and profit. To shield him from repercussions, legal or otherwise, he didn’t have just a retinue of politicians from both parties in his pocket but a client list whose breadth was no doubt aspirational to the young Trump — the Catholic Archdiocese of New York, the self-described “boss of bosses” Carmine “Lilo” Galante, and the city’s reigning real-estate titans (the Helmsleys, LeFraks, et al.), as well as the Newhouse publishing empire and Studio 54. This coterie either looked the other way or gave Cohn cover during transgression after transgression, some of them proto-Trump financial flimflams in which he looted banks or companies; others involving unpaid bills to creditors as varied as the IRS, Dunhill Tailors, and a local locksmith; still others more sensational. In the late 1960s, Cohn took a loan of $100,000 from a client for whom he negotiated a suspiciously parsimonious divorce settlement from a billionaire, and fought paying it back until the case threatened his law license in the early 1980s. In the 1970s, a Florida court ruled that Cohn had pushed an elderly friend in mental decline, Lewis Rosenstiel, the founder of the Schenley liquor empire, into signing a will that made Cohn a trustee of his estate. It was in 1973, the year he met Trump, that perhaps the most sinister of the Cohn horror stories of his post-McCarthy career unfolded. A yacht leased by a shell company Cohn controlled was sent to sea despite having been judged in dire disrepair by its previous captain. A suspicious fire broke out, the yacht sank, a crew member died, and Cohn collected both legal fees and a back-channel insurance payout.
 
Some of these escapades would figure in the disbarment proceedings that finally ended Cohn’s legal career in 1986, though in truth it was over anyway, since AIDS would finish him off six weeks later. But until then he was often protected by the press. Through a fluke, he had friendships dating back to childhood with Generoso Pope Jr., the owner of the very same National Enquirer whose current CEO, David Pecker, now tries to protect Trump, and Richard Berlin, the CEO of Hearst, as well as Si Newhouse. Before he joined McCarthy in Washington, the young Cohn had been an acolyte of and tipster for the mighty Hearst gossip columnist Walter Winchell, who demonstrated by example how the press could be enlisted into the Favor Bank of the powerful. As Thomas Maier writes in the 1994 biography Newhouse, Cohn used his influence in the early ’80s to secure favors for himself and Mob clients in Newhouse publications — even writing an IRS-trashing cover story in its national Sunday-newspaper supplement, Parade. After Rupert Murdoch bought the New York Post in 1976, Cohn wielded the paper as his personal shiv, slipping tips about friends and enemies to “Page Six.” His own ensuing image rehabilitation was at least as effective as his many face-lifts. “For younger people,” Nicholas von Hoffman wrote in the 1980s, Roy Cohn was no longer the McCarthy smear artist but “another name for a très smart lawyer, for Disco Dan, for the international, I-go-by-private-plane man.” The journalist Ken Auletta, in an unflinching 1978 dissection for Esquire, tried to puncture Cohn’s makeover, and was invited by 60 Minutes to be the contrarian in Safer’s sanitizing profile. Nonetheless, CBS’s piece ended with a generous summation, read onscreen by Dan Rather, that firmly humanized him: “Roy Cohn is not an enigma. He’s simply a man who is seen differently by different people. If you engaged in amateur analysis, you might say that Roy Cohn was the kid on the block that all the bullies beat up on. And so, when Roy Marcus Cohn was growing up, he was determined to get rich, and get even, and he has.” Tick tick tick tick.
 

Cohn at a press conference with Trump, 1984. Photo: Bettmann/Bettmann Archive
 
During his steady rise in New York from the 1970s into the 1990s, Trump was tracked by some Aulettas of his own in addition to the Voice’s Barrett, from Neil Barsky at the pre-Murdoch Wall Street Journal and Daily News to the dedicated Trump-baiting magazine Spy. But these journalists, like many to come, could be outshouted and bulldozed by Trump’s relentless lies and self-mythologizing. With the aid of Cohn’s own compliant press pool and the contacts he courted at the television networks, Trump would continue to promote himself on his own terms in the pre-digital media era. Magazines, New York prominent among them, grabbed the commercial rewards of exploiting his latest stunts as glossily as possible. The most powerful news organizations and media barons often let Trump have his way. In a scathing editorial this month, the Times observed that “Mr. Trump has spent his career in the company of developers and celebrities, and also of grifters, cons, sharks, goons and crooks.” While the Times would start covering his corruption in earnest in the 2000s after Timothy L. O’Brien, the author of the hard-hitting 2005 book TrumpNation, was hired, the paper’s coverage was anything but aggressive during the crucial decades when Trump was amassing his power.
 
Exhibit A of the Times’ credulousness is the puffy feature that put him on the media map in 1976. “He is tall, lean and blond, with dazzling white teeth, and he looks ever so much like Robert Redford,” read the lead. At this early date, Trump had only proposed ambitious projects, not built them or closed any of the requisite deals, but the profile christened him “New York’s No. 1 real estate promoter of the mid-1970’s” nonetheless. The article accepted Trump’s word that he was of Swedish descent, “publicity shy,” ranked first in his class at Wharton, made millions in unspecified land deals in California, was worth $200 million, and with his father owned 22,000 apartment units. None of this was remotely true, but the sexy brew of hyperbole and outright fantasy, having been certified by the paper of record, set the tone for much that was to come.
 
In 1981, for instance, the Times could be found quoting an unnamed “real-estate official” (John Barron, perhaps?) furthering the implausible notion that Prince Charles and Diana were considering the purchase of a 21-room condo in Trump Tower for $5 million — a useful bit of free false advertising as the development’s condos went on the market for a 1983 opening. A 1984 Times Magazine profile christened Trump “the man of the hour” just as he was embarking on his financially reckless (and ultimately catastrophic) expansion into Atlantic City. Along the way, Trump continued to inflate his net worth. He was so obsessed with the Forbes annual list ranking the wealthiest Americans that he had Cohn muscle the magazine to fix it, a tale recently recounted in full by a former Forbes staffer, Jonathan Greenberg, in the Washington Post. By the 1990s, no less a television personage than ABC’s Diane Sawyer courted an exclusive PrimeTime Live interview with Marla Maples, complete with a best-sex-you-ever-had question, to facilitate the promotion of the Trump brand — “one of the low points in television journalism history,” in the judgment of the PBS anchor Robert MacNeil. The ultimate result of such fake news retailed by real-news outlets, as Michael D’Antonio would conclude just before Trump’s presidential run, is that “no one in the world of business — not Bill Gates, not Steve Jobs, or Warren Buffett — has been as famous for as long.” And one might add: No one as famous in business has been famous for a portfolio of low-rent businesses that included the likes of Trump University and Trump Steaks.
 
Trump's War On The Media Has Been Years In The Making
 
Trump knew he could get away with snookering the ostensibly liberal press Establishment because he’d seen Cohn do so. One of the most memorable examples occurred on Sunday, November 17, 1985 — the same day that Trump was the subject of his own first Mike Wallace 60 Minutes profile. That morning’s Times contained a gentle, reflective interview with the dying Cohn at a “Washington-area hospital” in which it was stated as fact that he was “fighting liver cancer” — a fiction Cohn vehemently maintained, much as Trump now tells staff members that the Access Hollywood tape is a hoax. The unnamed Washington-area hospital was the National Institutes of Health, where the Reagans had helped him cut to the front of the line for AIDS treatment. It was a given under Rosenthal’s editorship that the Times would bring up none of this to protect the criminally hypocritical Cohn, who had threatened closeted gay government officials with exposure in the McCarthy era and loudly fought gay rights ever since. Meanwhile, the star Times columnist William Safire had joined William Buckley Jr. and Barbara Walters among the three dozen celebrated character witnesses opposing Cohn’s disbarment. Trump, however, had distanced himself from his dying mentor, for a while dropping him altogether. “I can’t believe he’s doing this to me,” Cohn said. “Donald pisses ice water.” With the help of a new young factotum, Roger Stone, Cohn’s last favor for Trump may have been securing his sister Maryanne Trump Barry a federal judgeship from the Reagan administration in 1983 despite her having received the tepid Bar Association rating of “qualified.”
 
Eventually, the Times’ coddling of Cohn and its institutional homophobia before and during the AIDS epidemic would be aired thoroughly — a process facilitated by Larry Kramer’s landmark 1985 play The Normal Heart, Rosenthal’s retirement in 1986, and Kushner’s portrayal of Cohn in Angels. But much of the similarly embarrassing history of media collusion with Trump has been either forgotten or whitewashed. Look back no further than the obituaries and eulogies in the Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Condé Nast magazines that followed Si Newhouse’s death last October at the age of 89. Not only was his history with Cohn omitted but, more pertinently in 2017, so was his considerable role in transforming Trump from a local celebrity into a national figure. After he added Random House to his family’s holdings, it was Newhouse, having met Trump through Cohn, who had the idea of signing up the book that became The Art of the Deal, an often-fictional exercise in self-promotion billed as an autobiography. At the time the book was published, in 1987, Trump was so vaguely known outside of the tri-state area that publishing insiders worried whether Random House would get back its investment. They hadn’t reckoned, as Newhouse had, that Trump had the ability to market himself with a zeal beyond the imagination of authors who write their own books. The press ate it up. “Mr. Trump makes one believe for a moment in the American dream again,” enthused the Times’s daily book reviewer.
 
The actual author of The Art of the Deal, Tony Schwartz, is the rare prominent collaborator in the burnishing of the Trump myth in those pre-Apprentice decades who has expressed public remorse at having put “lipstick on a pig,” and he tried to make amends by trolling Trump in 2016. “This is the most perilous moment in modern American history,” tweeted Richard Haass, the president of the Council of Foreign Relations, in March of this year, as the Trump presidency careered into danger on nearly every front. “And it has been largely brought about by ourselves, not events.” You don’t hear many others in such circles on the Upper East or West Sides assuming any responsibility. It’s all someone else’s fault.
 
During his campaign, Trump made a cause out of the corruption intrinsic to pay-for-play political donations like those he used to give. “Nobody knows the system better than me,” he claimed, “which is why I alone can fix it.” The second half of that sentence was a lie, but the first was true. As he’d elaborate in pitch-perfect Cohn-speak, he gave to “everybody” because “when I want something, I get it. When I call, they kiss my ass.” At the first Republican presidential debate in August 2015, he fine-tuned his target: “Well, I’ll tell you what, with Hillary Clinton, I said, ‘Be at my wedding,’ and she came to my wedding. You know why? She had no choice, because I gave.”
 
He was referring to the fact that either he or his “foundation” gave at least $100,000 to the Clinton Foundation. He could have added that between 2002 and 2009, he had also contributed six times to Hillary Clinton’s political war chest. And that he had given Bill Clinton, whom he met with to discuss fund-raising as far back as 1994, free access to his northern-Westchester club, Trump National, and on occasion played golf with him there. Even without that degree of incriminating detail, Trump’s accusation of a quid pro quo stung Hillary Clinton — so much so that after her defeat, she felt compelled to revisit Trump’s wedding invitation, sort of, in the opening pages of her postelection self-autopsy, What Happened. “He was a fixture of the New York scene when I was a senator — like a lot of big-shot real-estate guys of the city, only more flamboyant and self-promoting,” she writes of Trump. “In 2005 he invited us to his wedding to Melania in Palm Beach, Florida. We weren’t friends, so I assume he wanted as much star power as you can get. Bill happened to be speaking in the area that weekend, so we decided to go. Why not? I thought it would be a fun, gaudy, over-the-top spectacle, and I was right.”
 
Let’s posit that Clinton is telling the truth when she says that she attended the wedding only because “Bill happened to be speaking in the area that weekend” and she wanted to take in a campy spectacle — an explanation that clears her of Trump’s charge that his contributions compelled her to turn up. Let’s also give her a pass for choosing not to regurgitate her and Bill’s financial history with Trump. Even so, everything else about this breezy and disingenuous paragraph epitomizes the honor-among-celebrities ethos of the bipartisan New York Establishment that helped Trump get where he was by 2005. To say that Trump was typical of “big-shot real-estate guys of the city” but merely “more flamboyant and self-promoting” is tantamount to saying that Robert Durst was typical of the big-shot real-estate guys in the Durst family but more prone to being accused of murder. The Clintons had to know that there was a more malevolent side to Trump’s so-called flamboyance than his boorishness, vulgar properties, television stardom, tawdry tabloid antics, and even his brazen destruction of bas-relief sculptures he had promised to the Metropolitan Museum when demolishing Bonwit Teller for Trump Tower. None of it was secret. If the Clintons didn’t know, it’s because they didn’t want to know.
 
After all, it had been front-page news, including in the Times, when the federal government sued the Trumps under the Fair Housing Act in 1973 for refusing to rent apartments to black applicants (whose paperwork they coded “C” for “colored”). This suit was filed just after Trump had met Cohn, who took on the case and filed a frivolous countersuit demanding $100 million from the government for “defamation.” The Trumps retreated two years later by signing a consent decree — and soon violated that, too, forcing the Department of Justice to file new complaints of racial discrimination in 1978. The Clintons might have also heard how in 1989 Trump, running amok in a trademark rage, tried to help toss the city into turmoil by taking out a full-page racist ad in the four daily papers demanding a reinstitution of the death penalty for “roving bands of wild criminals” after five black male teenagers were charged (erroneously, as DNA would confirm in 2002) in the rape of a white female Central Park jogger. The Clintons may have even encountered the news, as did most Americans, that Ivana Trump had accused her husband of rape in a sworn divorce deposition uncovered by Harry Hurt III for his 1993 Trump biography.
 
So to return to Hillary Clinton’s flip rhetorical question: Why not go to the Trump-Melania wedding in 2005? These incidents are just a few of the many reasons why a former president and sitting United States senator with presidential ambitions should not have gone to this particular “fun, gaudy, over-the-top spectacle” in Palm Beach. But they just couldn’t stop themselves, any more than so many Democratic leaders of a quarter-century earlier couldn’t resist dressing up for Cohn’s fun, gaudy, over-the-top birthday gala at Studio 54. In the bipartisan New York political culture that nurtured Cohn and Trump, the statute of limitations for nearly every crime or outrage lasts about 48 hours. Nothing sticks; even repeated racist bygones can be bygones. Whether Hillary Clinton attended the wedding (Bill showed solely for the reception) because she’d taken Trump’s money, or because she wanted to be in the mix of power and celebrity no matter how tacky, or because she hoped there might be more favors to extract from Trump or someone else in the wedding party, doesn’t matter. Whatever the explanation, the then–New York senator, sitting in a reserved seat in the front row, lent a touch of civic legitimacy to Trump that the other glitzy celebrities on hand could not. He got what he’d paid for. He had written his checks knowing that the Clintons could be counted on not to bite the small hand that fed them — at least not until their own self-interest was threatened in 2016.
In an aside that’s tucked into the Oval Office pyrotechnics of Fire and Fury, Michael Wolff offers a glimpse into a representative back channel in the bipartisan Barter and Swap Exchanges of the Trump era: He points out that it was the flack Matthew Hiltzik, “an active Democrat who had worked for Hillary Clinton” and who “also represented Ivanka Trump’s fashion line,” who gave Trump’s prized aide Hope Hicks her start in public relations. Wolff also helpfully (and accurately) reports that Hiltzik had represented Harvey Weinstein, another major New York player in Democratic politics (and a Trump-wedding attendee), during those years when Hiltzik and his staff were expected to “protect him” from accusations of sexual harassment and abuse. Weinstein was further protected by his contributions to Democrats, led by those to the Clintons. Everyone in New York who had professional dealings with him knew he was a pig and a bully, much as they knew about Trump. But the parties, screenings, and star schmoozing were too much fun for Democratic politicians to resist. It’s because Weinstein had good reason to believe that his political donations and liberal bona fides would serve as a get-out-of-jail-free card for even criminal behavior that he released that bizarre statement vowing to turn his “full attention” to fighting the NRA after the Times and The New Yorker uncovered his history of sexual assaults.
 
Wolff might have added that Hiltzik’s résumé featured stints as deputy executive director of the New York State Democratic Committee, as a consultant on Middle East issues for Kirsten Gillibrand and “Jewish outreach” for Clinton, and as a shill for Jared Kushner’s real-estate company. In December 2016, Hiltzik took on a month’s employment for David Pecker’s American Media Inc. at a time when its flagship, The National Enquirer, was dealing with the aftermath of its coverage (and suppression) of the alleged affair between Trump and the Playboy model Karen McDougal. Hiltzik is also a “longtime friend” of Bill de Blasio, according to the Washington Post, but what are conflicts of interest or politics among clients and friends in pursuit of power? The same strange bedfellows may be useful to de Blasio should he try to pursue Trump’s New York path to the White House.
 
As Cohn says in Angels, the questions that count are not matters of principle but “Who will pick up the phone when I call? Who owes me favors?” Cohn’s Favor Bank was such that he even gained access to the floor of the 1968 Democratic National Convention and briefly sat in the unoccupied box of the liberal Eugene McCarthy. His extended circle included figures as diverse as Cardinal Francis Spellman, various members of the Gambino crime family, Norman Mailer, George Steinbrenner, and the inevitable Alan Dershowitz, who had requested and received Cohn’s help in gaining entrée into Studio 54. Cohn even became pals with the CBS News executive Fred Friendly, who decades before had produced the legendary Edward R. Murrow special that helped rid America of Joe McCarthy. Had Cohn not been struck down by AIDS, Trump might have arrived in Washington far faster.
 
Some of the rich, connected, and powerful New Yorkers who failed to stand up to Trump before it was too late tried to cover their tracks once the music stopped and he had won the Republican nomination for president. When in April 2016 The Hollywood Reporter called 89 guests who had been at his 2005 wedding to request a comment, it did not receive a single response. One attendee who did speak up during the election year was the novelist Joseph O’Neill, who had attended as the plus-one of an invited Vogue editor. Writing in The New Yorker, he suggested that “a revisionist remembrance” was called for given Trump’s “metamorphosis into a would-be dictator.” A wedding that he had viewed ever since as “an anomalous and trivial item of personal recollection” now struck him “as the stuff of historic testimony,” perhaps to be reviewed “in the spirit of a Hannah Arendt or a Victor Klemperer.”
 
Had Cohn not been struck down by AIDS, Trump might have arrived in Washington far faster.
I was not at Trump’s wedding, but O’Neill’s perspective resonated with me because of another wedding, one that I attended in 2012 — indeed the largest and most lavish wedding I’ve ever been to. It, too, calls for a revisionist remembrance. The two men getting married, acquaintances of mine from show business, held their ceremony in a large Broadway house, followed by a vast seated dinner in the old Roseland Ballroom a few blocks away. The mother of one of the grooms was a theater producer who had co-produced a Broadway revival of The Normal Heart a year earlier. Larry Kramer was there, and so were celebrities like Barbara Walters and such politicians as Christine Quinn, the out Speaker of the New York City Council, and her spouse. Quinn was then collecting chits for what would be her unsuccessful Democratic mayoral campaign.
There was premium seating at the ceremony, as it happened. Just before it began, the congregants were treated to the spectacle of Donald and Melania Trump swooping down the aisle to their seats down front. The Trumps were no doubt there because the father of one of the grooms and the host of the wedding was Steven Roth, a far more successful New York real-estate titan than Trump. Roth has also been in business with the scandal-and-debt-plagued real-estate family of Trump’s son-in-law, the (non-Tony) Kushners, themselves profuse Democratic donors until the family patriarch, Charles, went to prison for multiple felonies in 2005.
 
Three and a half years after this wedding, in February 2016, Trump appointed Steven Roth to his campaign’s economic-advisory team. Once Trump took office, Roth would remain a visible supplicant, appearing with the president at a public event in Ohio to lend credence to his bogus infrastructure initiative. By then, Trump was piling up the most aggressive record of assaulting LGBTQ rights since the era of Reagan and Cohn. His Justice Department would soon file a brief at the Supreme Court supporting the case of the Colorado baker who refused to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding like the one Roth hosted and Trump attended for Roth’s son.
 
It’s easy for me, and I imagine a fair number of this wedding’s other attendees, to say that we would never drink a glass of Roth’s Champagne again. But then, we’re not looking for any invitations, favors, or money from him. There’s no sign, however, that Roth is being shunned by the city’s most powerful elites, including those who practice a showy rhetorical liberalism that is a somewhat lower priority than advancing their own social and financial interests. So what if Trump is translating homophobia into federal law at every opportunity, from the transgender military ban to the en masse elevation of gay-rights opponents to the federal bench to the creation of a federal “religious freedom” office to defend health workers who don’t want to treat gay patients? The wedding was fabulous! Let’s move on.
 
Contrast the Vichy passivity of New York’s elites with the mind-set of the citizenry of Abington, Pennsylvania. As the Times reported this month, this Philadelphia suburb was outraged to learn that another billionaire Trump economic adviser, the New York financier Stephen Schwarzman, had purchased the naming rights of its public high school, his alma mater, in exchange for a $25 million gift. As one horrified Abington graduate put it to the Times, if the school’s name can be auctioned off, “what else is for sale?” The local protests were so loud that the school district rescinded the renaming. Needless to say, no such questions or qualms prevented Schwarzman’s name from being plastered all over the New York Public Library’s 42nd Street flagship in exchange for a gift of $100 million.
 
In Angels in America, Prior Walter, these nights embodied by Andrew Garfield, declares that “the world only spins forward.” It can also spin in circles, as it turns out: Steven Roth’s son, married at a gay wedding attended by Roy Cohn’s protégé, is a co-producer of the current Broadway revival. Cohn is dead at the end of Angels, as is the Cold War in which he first thrived, but Prior is still standing, frail but determined, an apostle of hope. Yet the specter of Donald Trump casts a pall over this eight-hour epic, as it does over nearly everything else in America. Watching Angels now, you can’t help but be struck by how the strain of evil that Kushner identified a quarter-century ago has only metastasized in both political parties, albeit in different degrees and in different ways, ever since. Nor can we escape the realization that the cancer now consuming Washington was incubated not in that city’s notorious swamp but in the loftiest Zip Codes of New York.
 
Annotations:
 
A Teller at the Favor Bank
 
From the personal notebooks of Christine Seymour, a switchboard operator in the office of Roy Cohn from the late 1960s until his death. Seymour died in 1994.

➽ Maryanne Trump Barry (Donald Trump’s sister): Roy got the White House to give her her judgeship. Roy was out and the call came in to tell her she got it. I took the call and called her to tell her. Ten minutes later, Donald called to say thank you.
 
➽ Roger Stone: Worked with Roy very heavily before and after elections. He was the one, with Roy, to find out the dirt on [Geraldine] Ferraro. Roger did not like Donald Trump or Si Newhouse — told me they were losers — but if Roy used them, he would, too. His wife’s name is Bitsy. Roy called them Itsy and Bitsy. Roy was very fond of Roger, and I think he saw a little of himself when he was younger. [Reached for comment, Stone denied all of this. “I never said Trump was a loser. Why would I say that?”]
 
➽ Ed Rollins (Reagan campaign adviser) and Lyn Nofziger (White House adviser): Whenever Roy needed an appointment at the White House, that’s who he called. Roy was in constant touch with these two during both elections.
 
➽ George Steinbrenner: He got snotty when you didn’t recognize his voice immediately. So what was one to do? I always asked, “Who’s calling, please?” and listened to him scream.
 
➽ Charles Wick (director of U.S. Information Agency): Roy put Barbara Walters in touch with him, and that’s how she was introduced to the White House crowd.

➽ Steve Rubell: When he and Ian [Schrager] were in jail, Steve would call me at home — collect — and since I had a conference phone … I would connect Steve to whoever he wanted to talk to. Once he called Liza Minnelli, who was staying at Halston’s house out on L.I., and they were talking about her song “New York, New York” and how she was furious with Frank Sinatra. “Mine is so much better” … With Steve calling me every night I had to laugh because … there was an article in New York Magazine about Steve calling people and the A-, B-, and C-list. Which list was everyone on? I certainly was on the A-plus-list — I connected him to these people.
 
➽ Rupert Murdoch: Whenever Roy wanted a story stopped, item put in, or story exploited — i.e., Ferraro and her family — Roy called Murdoch. Roy was also Rupert’s attorney.
 
➽ Paul Laxalt (senator from Nevada): 60 Minutes was going to be doing a story on him, not favorable … Roy called the producer of 60 Minutes and had it taken out of their schedule.
 
➽ Gloria Vanderbilt: One day, she called me [looking for] the attorney Tom Andrews. She said, “This is Gloria Vanderbilt.” I said, “Tom isn’t in — may I please take a message?” She again repeated, “This is Gloria Vanderbilt,” so my dander got up, and I said, “How do you spell that?” … She slammed the phone down and I later heard she demanded that I be fired. Roy just laughed. He loved it when you gave them what they deserved.
 
➽ The Kennedys: Roy hated them … but Roy was going to finally get even when Aristotle Onassis came to see him to handle his divorce from Jackie. But he died before anything could be done.
 
[Source: Marcus Baram]
 
Illustrations by Tony Millionaire
 
*This article appears in the April 30, 2018, issue of New York Magazine. Subscribe Now!


FASCIST AMERICA 2026: Leading public intellectuals, media figures, social and cultural, critics, teachers, and activists Briahna Joy Gray and Eddie Glaude, Jr. brilliantly take on a multitude of very important issues, challenges, and concerns in American politics today and provide a typically sharp, critical, forthright, and dynamic analysis of the respective roles and behaviors of reactionary, liberal, and leftist forces and positions alike in the United States especially when these forces and themselves are confronted by the complex and contradictory perceptions, realities, and demands of the national and global movements dealing with the the contentious ideological, practical, and theoretical dimensions of the political economy of race, class, gender, and culture in the world today. Brianha and Eddie are simply two of the smartest, consistently insightful, intellectually and ethically honest, and thus importantly influential and eminently useful and valuable thinkers, theorists, and activists the U.S. has to offer in the 21st century

Is "Defund" The Left's "Sister Soulja" Moment? (w/ Eddie Glaude, Jr.)


Bad Faith

Premiered 12 hours ago

VIDEO: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mY0beRrMyLI

August 24, 2026

One of Briahna's favorite sparring partners, Princeton professor, primetime pundit, and author of several books including, most recently, America, U.S.A. How Race Shadows The Nation's Anniversaries, Dr. Eddie Glaude, Jr. returns to Bad Faith to offer a broader historical context for the ongoing debate around "woke 1" and defund the police. Is "defund" the left's "Sister Souljah moment" through which it proves its 'seriousness' to the liberal establishment? If so, what is there to be gained by doing so? 

Find Bad Faith on Apple, Spotify, Stitcher, and Google Podcasts. Or subscribe to our RSS feed. 

Follow Bad Faith on Twitter (@badfaithpod) and Instagram (@badfaithpod). Subscribe at patreon.com/badfaithpodcast for an additional Monday episode every week. 

Watch all episodes at Bad Faith YouTube, and don't forget to like and subscribe. Theme by Nick Thorburn (@nickfromislands). 

CHAPTERS: 

 
0:00 Angie Nixon and the “woke” framing
5:06 Defund the police and criminal justice reform
11:43 Palestine advocacy as a reframing model 14:53 Is “woke” being discarded as crazy?
21:19 The left, race, and electoral compromise 27:05 Black voters, the DSA, and a captured electorate
30:21 Podcast support and closing message


Monday, August 24, 2026

FASCIST AMERICA 2026: An Important essay from HAMMER AND HOPE: A MAGAZINE OF BLACK POLITICS AND CULTURE, Number 7, Summer 2025 by Sociology Professor, Activist, and the Director of Community Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz Michael A. McCarthy On What Genuine Progressive Political and Cultural Solidarity Really Is and Means

https://hammerandhope.org/article/identity-politics-class

In Issue No. 7 from Summer 2025, Hammer & Hope magazine published Michael A. McCarthy’s essay The False Choice Between Identity Politics and Economic Populism,” which argued that “in order to build a movement, you need to address specific yet important concerns that affect only some parts of your coalition while also speaking to the issues shared by everyone you want to draw into your base.” In the wake of Zohran Mamdani’s historic election as mayor of New York City, McCarthy highlights how Mamdani’s campaign accomplished that.

Zohran Mamdani’s victory in the New York City mayoral race overturns the destructive bipartisan consensus that identity politics are simply a dead end. He won because he combined economic populist demands — rent freezes, universal child care, fast and free buses, municipally operated grocery stores to curtail inflation — with explicit solidarity with Palestine, immigrant communities, and New York’s most marginalized residents. In other words, the way Mamdani centered the cost of living in his campaign became the key way he incorporated different communities into his coalition through evocative appeals to their own unique experiences and struggles.
 
In his Nov. 4 victory speech, he said: “Thank you to those so often forgotten by the politics of our city, who made this movement their own. I speak of Yemeni bodega owners and Mexican abuelas. Senegalese taxi drivers and Uzbek nurses. Trinidadian line cooks and Ethiopian aunties. Yes, aunties.”
 
A less savvy economic populist might have just talked about a generic hard-working voter. But instead of downplaying people’s differences, Mamdani organized through them. In that speech, he continued: “I am young, despite my best efforts to grow older. I am Muslim. I am a democratic socialist, and most damning of all, I refuse to apologize for any of this.” This is not a politics of retreat in response to the right wing winning elections and passing laws on anti-woke positions. It is what Stuart Hall, the Jamaican-born British cultural theorist, called the politics of articulation: the construction of political unity through negotiations of difference.
 
The deeper lesson of the campaign is that organizing, not mere messaging or style, wins in politics. This organizing undoubtedly involves articulation, but it also involves organization itself. The Democratic Socialists of America’s roughly 11,000-member New York City chapter created a political culture that DSA member Mamdani and his campaign were embedded in. Not only did NYC-DSA help shape the political messaging of the campaign, the organization also brought together a group of canvassers that anchored the campaign and helped it grow. More than 104,000 volunteers knocked on 3 million doors and made more than 4 million calls.
 
Those visits and calls involved both giving and receiving information in one-on-ones with New Yorkers living in many different situations. Feedback from those conversations in doorways worked its way through the task forces and field operations of both the campaign and NYC-DSA, in turn shaping the political messaging of the campaign itself.
 
Mamdani didn’t win by calibrating his message for some imagined homogenous group of voters or by selective interpretation of poll data. He won through a grassroots movement that created a sustained dialogue among the campaign, NYC-DSA, and the people of New York City. Organization, rather than messaging, was the method that articulated difference into a powerful political force. As Mamdani said in his DSA convention keynote address back in 2023, it all comes back to “knowing that I am a member of an organization that means what it says, that delivers on its promises.”
 
Read McCarthy’s essay here:

HAMMER & HOPE: 
 
A MAGAZINE OF BLACK POLITICS AND CULTURE
 
The False Choice Between Identity Politics and Economic Populism
 
A left that ignores the differences within the working class will never build power.
 
HAMMER AND HOPE: A MAGAZINE OF BLACK POLITICS AND CULTURE


Brittney Leeanne Williams, Inner Storm 2: Spiraling, 2022. Courtesy of the artist and Alexander Berggruen, N.Y.
 
In building a politics to fight the right, economic populism is necessary but insufficient. Policies and rhetoric framed in the interests of the working class as a whole are crucial. But organizers have always known that in order to build a movement, you need to address specific yet important concerns that affect only some parts of your coalition while also speaking to the issues shared by everyone you want to draw into your base. Because the U.S. working class is already segmented, an emancipatory class politics that can beat the right must do both.
 
But recent conventional wisdom says otherwise.
In the wake of Kamala Harris’s catastrophic loss to Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential election, a narrative has taken hold: “Woke” costs elections. Only by abandoning so-called identity politics or issues specific to minorities will the left win working-class voters back.
 
This war on identity has powerful proponents across the political spectrum, including the tech billionaires Marc Andreessen, Elon Musk, and Peter Thiel, who continue to pour millions of dollars into initiatives aimed at destroying the causes they deem woke or antiracist. Even prominent centrists like The New York Times editorial board joined the right-wing activist Christopher Rufo’s side of the culture war when it recently complained that the Democratic Party “remains too focused on personal identity and on Americans’ differences — by race, gender, sexuality and religion — rather than our shared values.”
 
Instead, economic populism has emerged as a compelling alternative. On the left, some argue that economic populism is the only grounds for building a working-class movement that can reverse class dealignment. In this view, the left should simply pursue a politics of class while identity issues, such as immigration, gender, race, and sexuality, should be downplayed in political organizing. Others go further and treat conservative views on those topics as working-class majority views that the left must learn to embrace.
 
But this new common sense contradicts reality. Setting forms of identity, such as race, against class as fundamentally opposed bases of politics misrepresents how building working-class power works on the ground, both today and throughout history. Dismissing the social differences between working-class people as irrelevant ignores the key building blocks of class politics. And a left that embraces the right’s divide-and-conquer rhetoric on criminal justice, gender, race, and immigration will only deepen political divisions within the working class. Subscribing to either view would doom the working-class solidarity needed to win.
 
When it comes to building a working-class politics against the right, the stakes couldn’t be higher. Either we construct the solidarity needed to dismantle the political oligarchy and achieve the massive redistribution that the 99 percent needs, or our country will continue to slide into an authoritarianism that scapegoats the most precarious members of the working class.

A closer look at the democratic socialist Zohran Mamdani’s extraordinary victory over Andrew Cuomo in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary shows how economic populism works best when combined with targeted appeals. Some have held up Mamdani’s win as vindication of the view that economic populism alone gets the goods, but he built a campaign on listening and meeting voters where they are. After his success in the primary, he told New York magazine, “We have tried to listen more and lecture less, and it’s in those very conversations that I had with Democrats who voted for Donald Trump many months ago that I heard what it would take to bring them back to the Democratic Party — that it would be a relentless focus on an economic agenda.” It’s true his campaign foregrounded bread-and-butter issues, but not at the exclusion of other aspects of working people’s lives that matter to them.
 
Though Mamdani leads with the cost of living and uses plain, sensible language, his platform also includes positions on particular sectors of the working class and the unique problems they face. He has been a principled voice of opposition against the genocide in Gaza, has vowed to oppose ICE, and celebrates his status as an immigrant and a South Asian. On policing and public safety, while he distanced himself from unpopular rhetoric such as “defund the police” on the campaign trail, he offered restorative justice proposals, including expanding non-police social workers to intervene in crises, providing mental health services, and ending Mayor Eric Adams’s plan to build a $225 million “cop city” in Queens. He invited people into his coalition by recognizing LGBTQIA+ New Yorkers; appealing to Haitian New Yorkers by calling Haiti its Creole name, Ayiti; and speaking to the particular experiences of Bangladeshi aunties, who turned out to be a powerful organizing force for his campaign. These complexities don’t fit easily into the economic populist playbook, and upend the view that working people have conservative cultural values that the left needs to defer to.
Mamdani’s campaign shows that working-class politics always relates to the ways people’s particular experiences move them to fight. The idea that workers simply have a one-dimensional set of interchangeable class interests that motivate them and that politicians can activate with the correct message deals in what Stuart Hall termed “low-flying economism masquerading as ‘materialism.’” The reality is that working-class political action always develops out of the intersecting forces, interests, and identities of the working class itself and cannot be activated or imposed from above. People don’t merely show up to a protest against ICE because they are immigrants themselves. They may be there because they have undocumented people in their personal networks or simply want to express solidarity for a group they feel is being treated unfairly. People voted for Mamdani not only because he promises to lower the cost of living in New York but also because particular aspects of his platform, targeted at subgroups such as parents who cannot afford child care, either benefit them personally or are things they believe in. Emancipatory working-class politics is about both what is good for workers and also what is good in general.
 
There are versions of the view that identity politics is a distraction from the real class struggle on both the left and on the right. A closer look shows that perspective is based on simplistic and distorting characterizations of working-class people and their interests, an error my colleague Mathieu Desan and I call class abstractionism.
 
The core claims of this view of the working class are: Everyone requires a basic set of material needs — housing, health care, and food — to live. In capitalist society, most people work for an employer to acquire these core goods. Capitalists depend on workers but have an interest in minimizing the wages and benefits they give their workers in order to increase profits. So far, so good, but here is the twist: Class is therefore more important than non-class social factors, including race, because it alone directly governs workers’ material well-being. Both capitalists and workers understand their antagonistic interests, and that understanding shapes them as political actors. Identity categories such as race occlude these core relations because they form social bases to organize politically that are distinct from class. The argument is that you can organize on the basis of class or race — the two do not overlap.
That leads to an important strategic upshot. The working class is the only group able to challenge the power of capitalists because its members make up the majority of society and, because of their unique role in production, can shut the system down by withholding labor. They have both the numbers and the leverage. Again, so far, so good, but class abstractionists further argue that that makes identity-based movements within the working class distractions from working-class politics at large because, as one commenter puts it, they are not “the central and the key players in this society that can bring the kind of changes we need.” Only a working-class majority can win, and to the extent that minorities are part of that majority, they need to subsume their own interests into those of the whole.
 
But this claim is absurd when set against demographic and historical facts. First, even within a working-class majority, it is always a minority of workers who are involved in major labor actions and strikes. The working class never acts as a whole; it isn’t a unitary bloc. Second, subgroups within the working class organize along non-class lines regularly and have dramatically changed history — see the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
 
More broadly, many aspects of how working people’s lives are structured beyond the worker-employer relation determine what they do to survive and therefore how they see their own material interests. This is obvious for Black politics. Consider, for instance, the greater historic risk of Black people dying of tuberculosis in the U.S. because of racial segregation. Or the stress and physical pain of social alienation caused by persistent racial dehumanization. Or the psychic burden of the double consciousness described by W. E. B. Du Bois that results from pervasive discrimination. Or the anxiety produced by the increased surveillance and hostile interactions with law enforcement a poor Black neighborhood endures. Or the difficulty in navigating labor or housing markets because of racism or fewer personal and familial networks to draw upon. The list goes on. The key point is that all of these factors shape what people have to do to get by and therefore their material interests. In New York, the Black teenager who regularly gets stopped and frisked by the police on the way to his underfunded public high school doesn’t merely have interests as a worker.
 
The wealth of elites can afford them the ability to transcend any hardships that might be particular to their demographic group, allowing them to have a laser focus on amassing more money and prestige. But working-class people aren’t defined only by the burden of capitalists gaining more and more at their expense; a wide range of things matter to them, too, and some are specific to their sectors of the working class. The fruit picker in California’s Central Valley is not only exploited by the Trump-voting farmer who withholds wages but also is dominated by the ICE agents stalking him through the fields.
What does this mean for working-class politics? First, workers come to redistributive and egalitarian projects through both class and non-class appeals. In the workplace, they do not form unions and withdraw their labor in protest only as workers but also as Democrats or Republicans, immigrants or citizens, free or incarcerated, straight or queer, Christians or Muslims, women or men, white people or Black people. The hard work of organizing involves creating shared goals that can speak to different needs, as well as acts of solidarity in which some segments of workers defend others, thereby creating the social context for broader collective action. It means building a view of what is good in general, not just what is good for an individual. The Knights of Labor slogan, which the organization sometimes struggled to live up to, captures it best: “An injury to one is the concern of all.”
 
Second, working-class politics develops and forms in all the places working-class people live, breathe, and form attachments, needs, and grievances, including outside the workplace. Look at organizing among Black prisoners led by working-class Black women connected to the carceral state through their families. The existence of Mothers Reclaiming Our Children, Black Mamas Bail Out Action, and similar organizations shows that the issues workers fight for reflect their distinct positions in an overlapping set of material relations. This is precisely why, as the criminologist Beth Richie writes, “in the realm of issues related to incarceration, women have assumed key leadership positions, advocating for critical resistance to the prison-industrial complex, sentencing reform, a moratorium on the death penalty, and the development of alternative sanctions,” even when these are not narrowly understood as women’s issues or working-class issues.
 
The abstract class structure does not determine the form working-class politics takes. Anyone interested in the future of working-class politics needs to consider non-class social structures, such as race, gender, citizenship, and place — what are dismissed as identity issues in U.S. politics — not as distractions but as building blocks. The working class as an organizational and political force has always been assembled out of those segments.
 
As capitalism develops, it generates social differentiation within the working class itself. Competition between firms and workers creates uneven development both within and between places. Profit-driven competition does not raise all boats; some places receive more investment while others are starved. Similar to the way a city can have both food deserts and extraordinary food waste, the working class encompasses credentialed workers who have job protections and good wages, people in rural and urban areas with concentrated poverty whose work is poorly paid and precarious, and undocumented workers in the shadows earning below the minimum wage because of their citizenship status.
 
Class struggles that emerge from working-class communities where there are already strong communal bonds tend to be more effective. Capitalism doesn’t simply dissolve such bonds, leaving unorganized workers atomized; it also produces them or builds them anew. It segments the working class into subgroups with their own subcultures. This differentiation makes non-class identities such as race central to class politics. This is our basic reality. Working-class politics always starts with an already differentiated working class that is mobilized around different collective concerns.
 
It is also why building solidarity across social differences both at the workplace and beyond, where people have competing material grievances, is so hard. The challenge is exponentially harder at the national level. And it is even more precarious as an international project, as we see today, when some segments of the working class embrace immigration restrictions while others protest the armed forces defending ICE raids. Segments of the working class are often involved in opposing political projects that self-serving politicians across the political spectrum claim to be in their class interests.
 
It is no surprise that in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the wave of foreclosures that disproportionately devastated Black and Latino working-class neighborhoods the collective political struggles springing up from working-class Black neighborhoods were articulated as Black struggles. These poor people’s movements took the form of a radical refusal not of work but of civil order. It was not a movement of workers in the workplace via strikes but rather, because of residential segregation and concentrated unemployment, a movement of workers in the streets via protests. Black politics was the form this class struggle took before political entrepreneurs, corporate boards, and diversity officers claimed the movement as their own.
 
Politicians using economic populist or class rhetoric don’t create working-class politics; at their best, they help assemble it. Class politics always arises out of the identities and bonds people have already formed, which is precisely why successful left politicians need multidimensional platforms.

Nowhere is the dynamic view of class more explicit than in the work of Du Bois. In his 1935 masterpiece, Black Reconstruction in America 1860–1880, he gives an account of the democratic revolution of enslaved Black people and the counterrevolution of property as one of class struggle, domination, and divisions, expressed in racial terms. Du Bois explains the mass exodus of former slaves from Southern plantations during the Civil War as a general strike, in which Black power was class power. But the book is titled Black Reconstruction rather than Working-Class Reconstruction because it tells the history of poor and disenfranchised Black people liberating themselves and then seeing their gains ripped away. The bourgeois counterrevolution of the Southern planter class allied with Northern manufacturing, with the Southern white worker as junior partner, to crush the nascent Southern democracy by stripping away Black people’s newly won right to vote and destroying their organizations with racial terror. Du Bois writes, “The slave went free; stood for a brief moment in the sun, then moved back again toward slavery,” thanks to capital’s offensive and white workers’ failure to pursue working-class solidarity.
 
Earlier, in 1933, Du Bois wrote, “There is not at present the slightest indication that a Marxian revolution based on a united class-conscious proletariat is anywhere on the American far horizon. Rather race antagonism and labor group rivalry is still undisturbed by world catastrophe. In the hearts of black laborers alone, therefore, lie those ideals of democracy in politics and industry which may in time make the workers of the world effective dictators of civilization.” Du Bois’s claim is that it is through the unique political agency of the Black working class that America might move toward genuine interracial solidarity.
 
Many other Black socialists also understood Black people’s struggle for democratic rights as central to the working-class struggle. In 1948 the Trinidadian revolutionary C. L. R. James clearly centered Black agency, pointing out that the Black struggle of the emergent civil rights movement “has a vitality and a validity of its own” with “roots in the past of America” that give it “an organic political perspective” that “is in itself a constituent part of the struggle for socialism.”
 
The dynamic perspectives of Du Bois and James emphasize the way that working-class politics emerge out of particular historical moments by particular subsections of the working class itself — and not always under the banner of “workers.” They understood the working class as segmented and their unity as potential rather than given. When movements and organizers lose sight of the reality of working-class differentiation, solidarity has no ground to stand on.
 
The socialist movement in the U.S. had to learn this lesson early in the 20th century. At the Socialist Party’s founding convention in Indianapolis in 1901, members adopted a “Negro Resolution” that acknowledged the “peculiar position” of Black workers. Yet the resolution offered nothing more than an invitation to Black workers to join the party, asserting, “We declare to the negro worker the identity of his interests and struggles with the interests and struggles of the workers of all lands, without regard to race, or color, or sectional lines.” Socialist Party members pushed to remove a clause from the resolution recognizing Black people’s political disenfranchisement and subjection to lynching terror, instead opting to emphasize the homogeneity of the working class, declaring that “the only line of division which exists in fact is that between the producers and the owners of the world.”
 
There were real racists in the party, such as the founding party member Victor Berger, the first socialist elected to Congress. But the majority view within the Socialist Party was that Black people in America needed no special place on the party’s founding platform because Black working-class people were already part of that class and therefore entirely equal. Eugene Debs raged against the “savory bouquet of white superiority” and cancelled a 1912 speaking tour of the South in protest of segregation. Yet even Debs said “the class struggle is colorless” and supported the repeal of Socialist Party resolutions on the “Negro question” on the grounds that “we have nothing special to offer the Negro, and we cannot make separate appeals to all the races.” In 1913, Du Bois argued that “the Negro Problem” is “the great test of the American Socialist.” What history shows ever since is that the class struggle is colorful.
 
There are, of course, far darker moments in the U.S. labor movement. Working-class politics and organizing can just as easily turn reactionary. Consider the massacre of East St. Louis, Ill., where in 1917 as many as 200 Black workers and their family members were shot, burned, or hanged by mobs of raging white workers. Investigating the mass violence for The Crisis, Martha Gruening and Du Bois homed in on the cause: Strikes of the relatively unskilled all-white manufacturing unions were being weakened by Black strikebreakers, who had recently migrated in the thousands from the South. Instead of organizing with them — an idea that was beyond the pale for the union — white workers opted for a murderous race riot. Of the union’s motto, “Labor conquers everything,” Du Bois wrote, “In East St. Louis it has conquered Liberty, Justice, Mercy, Law and the Democracy which is a nation’s vaunt.”
 
But socialism and labor in the U.S. have seen more than just missteps and massacres; an intertwining current of interracial solidarity also runs through their histories. In 1921, at Vladimir Lenin’s urging, the Communist Party USA explicitly recognized the special character of Black oppression in America, acknowledging that “the history of the Southern Negro is the history of a reign of terror — of persecution, rape and murder.” The party program pledged, “The Workers Party will support the Negroes in their struggle for Liberation, and will help them in their fight for economic, political and social equality.” It continued, “Its task will be to destroy altogether the barrier of race prejudice that has been used to keep apart the Black and white workers, and bind them into a solid union of revolutionary forces for the overthrow of our common enemy.” During the Great Depression, Black workers in both the North and the South joined the Communist Party in far greater numbers than they did the Socialist Party.
 
When the communists soon began to organize explicitly around struggles particular to Black people, such as the wrongful conviction of the Scottsboro Boys, their Black working-class membership grew. Robin D. G. Kelley’s Hammer and Hoe shows that in the early 1930s, Black membership in the Alabama Communist Party grew even more rapidly than white membership. The interracial solidarity of Reds in the workplace in turn helped to fuel the grassroots organizing that injected the CIO with militancy, leading to a major upsurge in labor organizing and an increase in union density. Despite the New Deal’s racial shortfalls, as a whole it established crucial labor provisions that were a direct result of this interracial solidarity.
 
After the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 demanded labor leaders submit affidavits disavowing communism and the Red Scare took hold, communists — many of them Black — were purged from American unions. The result was that many unions shifted into business unionism, weakening their militancy and inroads into interracial solidarity.
 
Class abstractionists view class politics and racial politics as mutually exclusive and competing alternatives when it comes to organizing. In reality, class struggles and antiracist struggles often feed into each other. As the labor scholar Cedric De Leon argues, Black working-class organizations played the driving role in desegregating the American labor movement. A. Philip Randolph helped create the Negro American Labor Council to fight against segregation when the AFL-CIO refused to desegregate its own unions. Work from the sociologist Matthew Nichter shows that many of the communists and socialists trained in the interracial labor organizing of the 1930s and 1940s became leaders of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In turn, the civil rights movement revitalized American labor militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. Continuing the pattern of one feeding into the other, following a series of labor strikes demanding hazard pay and coronavirus protections, the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 led to new workplace organizing over the past five years. Working-class fights at work were triggered by Black struggles in the streets, and vice versa.
 
Through the lens of Black socialists like Du Bois, we understand that the working class is not an undifferentiated mass with a one-dimensional set of interests located in the employer-worker relation. Competition in the labor market, which pits workers against one another and divides working people into segments, makes solidarity across the workplace and beyond it the fundamental key to building a working-class politics that can ratchet up to the level of a national and international political project.
 
Working-class solidarity is cleareyed about these divisions and the different conditions they produce for the separate segments of the class. They cannot be papered over with empty theoretical abstractions. This is a challenge for working-class politics that nobody understands better than Steve Bannon and other economic populists on the right who manipulate insider-outsider divisions among the working class to build their own coalitions. When Trump described immigrants as “poisoning the blood of our country,” he was framing his populism around the idea that there are good and bad workers. The right is undeniably practicing identity politics. An economic populism of the left that wishes such differences away will have only weak grounds for building a coalition.
 
Karl Marx himself came to similar conclusions. In an 1870 letter to America, he compared intra-class divisions between poor white workers and Black workers there to the divisions between Irish workers and English workers: “Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life.” He continued, “This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power.” Working-class power in England had to be forged through solidarity, he argued, and the work had to be done by the workers themselves, because “the national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation.”
 
What is the future of working-class politics in America? Either organizers in the workplace and community and politicians on the campaign trail and in Congress build a project that links the distinct segments of the working-class together in solidarity through both economic populism and targeted appeals, or the fascists will win.
 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
 
Michael A. McCarthy is the director of community studies and an associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His most recent book is The Master’s Tools: How Finance Wrecked Democracy (And a Radical Plan to Rebuild It).
 
 
Hammer & Hope is free to read. Sign up for our mailing list, follow us on Instagram, and click here to download this article.