Thursday, April 16, 2026

FASCIST AMERICA 2026: The Structural and Institutional Interconnections Between Foreign and Domestic Policy within the Ideological and Systemic Dimensions of the Political Economy and Corrupt Aspirations of American Imperialism Under the Imposed Deeply Chaotic and Deadly Conditions Fostered by A Fascist Regime--PART 2

 BREAKING: US To Send Thousands of TROOPS to Iran


Wajahat Ali

April 15, 2026

VIDEO:  

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JuaJzHi7Nk

#BreakingNews #Iran #USPolitics

The war just escalated. The U.S. is sending thousands of troops to the region as tensions with Iran rise, retaliation looms, and the situation grows more volatile by the hour. Joining the conversation is Vali Nasr, leading Iran expert and author, who breaks down what this escalation means, how we got here, and what could come next. This isn’t just another headline. It’s a moment that could reshape the region—and beyond thelefthook.substack.com

#BreakingNews #Iran #USPolitics #Trump #MiddleEast #War #Geopolitics #WorldNews #ValiNasr #Politics #CurrentEvents #News #Analysis #Global #crisis

Gerald Horne Around The Horne: Trump’s Iran War: A Strategic Blunder & End of US Global Dominance


Activist News Network

Streamed live 12 hours ago

#GeraldHorne #AroundTheHorne #BRICS

April 15, 2026 


VIDEO: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SH9qPU0Vtaw

Around The Horne! The Weekly Internationalist News Update with Gerald Horne. 

Check out the Around The Horne Substack, entitled Notes from Around the Horne:

https://notesfromaroundthehorne.subst... 

And shout out and salute to comrade @Marc_Dub for creating, curating, updating and administering the Substack!

#GeraldHorne #AroundTheHorne #BRICS #China #Iran #Deportations #DRC #Congo #Germany #Macron #Canada #Ukraine #Russia #Ceasesfire #Migrants #TradeWar #Tariffs #TariffWar #USTariffs #Canada #Australia #Election #DRC #India #Pakistan #China #Iran #Mamdani #NYC #CharlieKirk #Kirk #Trump #BRICS #Eu #KenBurns #1776 #2025 #2026 #Venezuela #Maduro #Greenland #Epstein #EpsteinFiles #BadBunny #SuperBowl #StateOfTheUnion

World
Iran

US deploys 10,000 troops as Iran blockade tested | Sunrise



Sunrise

April 15, 2026


VIDEO:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kPTSyvsFwkg


Sunrise 2026

The United States has deployed 10,000 additional troops to the Middle East, bringing total military personnel connected to the Iran conflict to over 50,000. An American destroyer intercepted an Iranian ship attempting to evade a newly announced U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports. Nuclear weapons remain a central sticking point in negotiations, with Iran's leadership refusing to surrender enriched uranium or discuss their proxy network activities in the region, despite ongoing military and economic pressure from Washington. 


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https://time.com/article/2026/04/15/amid-trump-s-blockade-threat-of-escalation-leaves-thousands-of-u-s-forces-on-high-alert/

World
Iran

 
Amid Trump's Blockade, Threat of Escalation Leaves Thousands of U.S. Forces on High Alert


by Brian Bennett
April 15, 2026
TIME

[Bennett is the senior White House correspondent at TIME.]

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is seen at the Pentagon participating in an honor cordon in Arlington, Virginia, on April 13, 2026.Chip Somodevilla—Getty Images

Thousands of U.S. troops in the Middle East are once again on high alert as a U.S. military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz that began Monday raises the specter of a new round of combat in the war against Iran.

President Trump ordered the U.S. Navy to block Iranian shipping through the narrow chokepoint after talks between U.S. and Iranian officials in Islamabad failed to land on a deal to end the war. For weeks, the Iranian military had effectively controlled the critical strait, blocking much of the traffic through the 21-mile-wide passage and disrupting the global economy.

The standoff has further undermined a shaky ceasefire that is scheduled to lapse on April 21 if the two countries don’t come to an agreement. Trump has declined to rule out deploying ground troops into Iran.

The array of troops in the region cover a wide range of specialties and backgrounds. In March, President Trump sent the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the region on board the USS Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship floating in the Arabian Sea south of the strait. Not far away is the firepower of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group—which includes F-18 strike fighter squadrons the “Tophatters,” the “Black Aces,” and the “Vigilantes,” and the Marine F-35 fighter attack squadron known as the “Black Knights.” The U.S. Navy has also arrayed eight Aegis guided missile destroyers in the Arabian Sea within striking distance of Iran. And Trump has ordered the 82nd Airborne elite paratroopers to deploy to an undisclosed forward base in the Middle East.

All of those forces remain in place, giving Trump options for additional actions if the ceasefire fails, a former U.S. special operations soldier who has close ties to Trump’s Pentagon tells TIME.

And even more U.S. forces are on the way. About 1,000 members of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit are headed to the region, according to a U.S. official with knowledge of the planning. And the USS George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier, which was recently off the coast of Africa, is also moving toward the Middle East, according to the US Naval Institute.

“Let us be clear: a ceasefire is a pause, and the joint force remains ready, if ordered or called upon, to resume combat operations with the same speed and precision,” Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon on April 8.

Trump and others in the Administration have discussed the prospects of an attack on Iran’s principal oil depot at Kharg Island or a ground operation to seize parts of the strait’s coastline inside Iran. Trump also requested an audacious, if unlikely, military plan for an aerial assault deep inside Iran to dig up enriched uranium buried under rubble by previous U.S. strikes, and then fly the uranium out of the country.

The 82nd Airborne and the Marines could be used to seize small areas inside Iran, experts tell TIME, but would not be able to hold territory for long on their own, especially against Iran’s arsenal of cheap, short-range, low-flying Iranian drones. Those drones, also known as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), have proven able to slip past expensive and sophisticated American anti-missile systems.

“I wouldn't want to hold anything in the region until we fix our counter-UAS interceptor problem,” says retired Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, a fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

For now, the blockade is primarily being enforced by the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which is based on the western edge of the Persian Gulf at a U.S. naval base in Manama, Bahrain’s capital. For decades, the Fifth Fleet has been the U.S.’s principle bludgeon to ensure freedom of navigation through the strait. But now, Trump has given the fleet the opposite mission—to block Iranian shipments instead of ensuring safe passage for all vessels.

So far, 15 service members have died in combat during the Iran War, beginning with a drone attack against a U.S. logistics port in Kuwait on March 1 that killed six American troops. Another American service member was killed in Saudi Arabia on March 8, and six crew died in a crash of an air refueling plane in Iraq on March 12.

“If the United States did renege on the ceasefire and start using either the 82nd or the MEU for purpose—that would just open up further escalation,” says Brandan Buck, a former intelligence officer with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency who is now a foreign policy expert at the Cato Institute. Iranian military capabilities, he adds, “are good enough to make things hurt.”

Here’s a look at the forces the U.S. has in the region that could be deployed if the fighting starts up again.

US Navy's Fifth Fleet


A US Navy Martin UAV drone flies over the Gulf waters as Royal Bahrain Naval Force Abdulrahman Al Fadhel takes part in joint naval exercise between U.S. 5th Fleet Command and Bahraini forces, on Oct. 26, 2021. Mazen Mahdi—AFP via Getty Images

The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Naval Support Activity Bahrain, a naval base in Manama, Bahrain that hosts around 8,000 personnel. It is responsible for protecting maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and is currently enforcing a blockade of the strait.

Iran understands the central role the base plays in the conflict. When the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28, Iran targeted the base with missiles and drone attacks. 

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit


U.S. Marine soldiers from 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Battalion landing team deployed from Okinawa, Japan, participate in the U.S. and South Korean Marines joint landing operation in Pohang, South Korea in 2012. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

Based in Okinawa, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit is capable of amphibious landings and overland assaults. The unit is onboard the USS Tripoli in the Arabian Sea and is also equipped to help with emergency evacuations, if needed.

82nd Airborne Division

Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division listen to Lieutenant General Christopher Donahue before a re-designation ceremony officially renaming Fort Bragg into Fort Liberty, near Fayetteville, North Carolina, on June 2, 2023. ALLISON JOYCE—AFP via Getty Images

Based in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division trains to be able to deploy overseas with 18 hours notice. The soldiers can parachute into combat, or launch an overland assault. In late March, Trump ordered about 2,000 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne’s Immediate Response Force sent to the Middle East. The unit is still in the region, housed at an undisclosed base.


Special Operations Forces

Navy SEALs stationed on the East Coast jump from an MC-130J Commando II near Kodiak, Alaska, on Feb. 25, 2024. Salwan Georges—The Washington Post via Getty Images

There are U.S. special operations forces located on bases around the Middle East. The Air Force Pararescue jumpers, Navy SEALS, and the Army’s Delta Force were used in the missions to rescue two U.S. aviators shot down inside Iran in early April, and similar units were part of the complex mission to capture the Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in January. Those elite units are still on call in the Middle East and ready to deploy if ordered.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/10/opinion/trump-iran-psychotic-state-institutions.html

Guest Essay

The Trump Administration Is in a Psychotic State
April 10, 2026
New York Times
An illustration of a grimacing eagle sitting at a desk with a pen writing notes, sandwiched between missiles and an American flag.
                          Credit:  Pete Gamlen
Listen · 9:54 minutes

It has been clear for a long time that President Trump is a person with a disorganized mind and a disordered personality. What the past few months and especially the past few weeks have brought into focus is how his pathologies have cascaded downward and outward through his administration. They have become institutionalized. The reason the administration so often does not act coherently is that it cannot. The world faces something new and baffling and frightening in Mr. Trump’s second term: a psychotic state.

This does not mean that every individual in the government is emotionally or psychologically unstable. Nor is it a clinical diagnosis of the president. The issue is that the administration as a whole lacks a consistent attachment to reality and the ability to organize its thinking coherently. Mr. Trump’s grandiosity, impulsivity, inconsistency and outright breaks with reality have become state policy.

In that respect, Mr. Trump’s second term is different from his first. In 2020 he could confabulate about the election result or babble about treating Covid with injections of disinfectant. But he could not translate his fantasies into reality — at least not usually. In the second term, by contrast, institutional psychosis has been on display since Day 1.

It is the Iran war that has most vividly demonstrated the scope of the problem. In this conflict, the most potent antagonist has been the administration’s own incoherence.

The Trump administration chose to wage a war without deciding on its aims, mapping out a strategy, planning for contingencies or even being able to explain itself. The goal was regime change — until it wasn’t. The demand was unconditional surrender — until it wasn’t. Deadlines were issued and then erased. Threats of total destruction were made and then pulled back. Iran’s nuclear program was a casus belli in February, despite the fact that we were told by Mr. Trump that it was “obliterated” last June. The president called for an international coalition to open the Strait of Hormuz, then said the United States could go it alone, then said the waterway would somehow “open itself.” He claimed that the United States had already won the war, that the war would end soon and that the war would end “when I feel it, feel it in my bones.” As a headline in The Times put it, the president’s position on Iran “can change by the sentence.”

Even as the bombs fell, the administration, concerned about gasoline prices, waived sanctions on some Iranian oil, “giving Iran’s war effort against the U.S. a boost,” as The Washington Post reported. Area experts were shocked when the administration proved unprepared for Iran’s partial closing of the Strait of Hormuz, a tactic experts had anticipated for decades. The administration might have been readier had it not chopped back the State Department’s Middle East desk, gotten rid of its oil and gas experts and eliminated its dedicated Iran office. The administration handicapped its own National Security Council by firing staff members, some at the behest of a conspiracy-minded internet personality, and undercutting its independencenot a good idea before starting a war. Trump’s social media posts seemed self-contradictory and borderline demented.

Incoherence is not incidental in this administration; it is the administration’s modus operandi. The so-called Department of Government Efficiency caused chaos in federal agencies by sacking, then sometimes rehiring employees without any evident rationale — and without making a serious dent in government spending. Mr. Trump flipped from “no more wars” to waging war (in Iran) and using and threatening military force (Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba), seemingly every other month. The policy toward Ukraine was simultaneously supportive and not. Tariffs went up and down and on and off, reflecting the president’s whims. In February he bragged that gas prices were low, then in March that they were high.

This is far from normal.

Normal administrations set up policy processes that assemble evidence from varied sources, collate viewpoints and priorities across multiple agencies and ensure rational deliberation before options reach the president. One of us served in three Republican administrations and participated as interagency reviews took place in a cabinet department, in an executive agency and in the White House itself. A single line in a presidential foreign policy statement might require the input of 20 or more people from the Defense Department, the State Department, the C.I.A., the Department of the Treasury and more.

The policy review process can be tortuous and sometimes mistaken. It can’t substitute for wise presidential judgment. But it is vital. It asks hard questions and assesses competing arguments. It ensures expert input in specific domains, anticipates how policies may ramify and prepares for contingencies.

In all those ways, the systematic review of policy amounts to an institutional mind: a cognitive process that organizes the government’s deliberations to keep them rational and anchored in reality. You might think of it as the government’s equivalent of the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for high-level executive functions such as impulse control and long-term planning. In Mr. Trump’s second term, those functions still exist, but they can be disrupted, circumvented or just plain abandoned at any moment on the say-so of the president and his senior officials. In that respect, the Trump administration is mindless.

Policy judgments should be made by the president, not by subordinate agencies and experts. But irrational processes produce inexplicable outcomes, and that is what we have seen, again and again. The only rhyme or reason is the principle that Mr. Trump proclaimed when explaining his policy toward Cuba: “I think I can do anything I want with it.” That is the principle by which his administration governs.

When an agency goes haywire, the administration might rush to stabilize it — for example, at the Department of Homeland Security, where chaos and brutality led to the killing of two American citizens right on the street in Minneapolis. But until a coherent policy process is restored under a chief executive who understands the need for it, we should expect geysers of mindlessness to keep erupting in unforeseeable ways and places.

Understandably, scholars, journalists and politicians have attempted to fit Trump 2.0 into any number of at least somewhat rational frameworks: populism, isolationism, unilateralism, nationalism, transactionalism, the madman theory, spheres of influence, imperialism and more. Some of those frameworks can help illuminate the president and the people around him. As one of us has argued, he is a patrimonialist — a leader who believes the state is his personal property. And both of us have said that his administration displays hallmarks of fascism. Ultimately, however, institutional psychosis defies rational categories. Predicting this administration’s behavior is impossible under any framework. And if Mr. Trump becomes more desperate as he grows more unpopular, the danger only increases.

Which leaves everyone wondering: What are the implications if the administration of the world’s most powerful country is chaotic in its thinking, unpredictable in its actions and not reliably in touch with reality? It’s impossible to know. America and its allies have dealt with a lot of presidential imperfections and failings, but there is no precedent or even category for the institutional psychosis displayed by the second Trump administration. Precisely because the psychotic state is so unpredictable, setting up systems to manage it will not work.

This puts the country and its allies in the precarious but not hopeless position of overrelying on the rational guardrails that remain. Some of these guardrails are within the executive branch: in the federal bureaucracies and the military services, where nodes of ordinary practice and process carry on as best they can. Still more important are guardrails in the other branches of government. The courts have remained independent and tethered to reality. Congress has quietly nixed some of Mr. Trump’s wildest nominees and overruled some of the administration’s destructive impulses, such as its attack on the science budget. State governments, especially in blue states, have been using the courts and their own policies to resist Mr. Trump’s agenda and demand accountable behavior from Washington.

Perhaps most important, the public supports effective and responsive government, not the wild swings of a fugue state — and it is making its feelings known.

Institutional psychosis is ultimately self-defeating and unsustainable. Reality checks will return because reality always reasserts itself. But severe damage will have been done, damage that may take a generation or more to repair.

As the Trump era winds down, the country may relearn something that never should have been forgotten. Institutions need to be reformed, not destroyed; governing well requires skill and careful attention to detail rather than leaders acting on impulse and ignorance; and character and mental stability matter perhaps most of all

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

FASCIST AMERICA 2026: The Structural and Institutional Interconnections Between Foreign and Domestic Policy within the Ideological and Systemic Dimensions of the Political Economy and Aspirations of American Imperialism Under the Imposed Chaotic Conditions Fostered by A Fascist Regime

Friday, April 10, 2026

FASCIST AMERICA 2026: The Foreign Policy of A Fascist Regime is An Exact Reflection and Heinous Extension of Its Domestic Policy And As Always in the United States the Primary Propaganda Targets Are All Directed At Trying To Rationalize And Justify Massive Corruption, Militaristic Assault, And Institutional Warfare, Deeply Rooted in Pathological Lies in the Name of So-Called ‘American Exceptionalism’; Translation: Endless Greed Plus Endless Hatred Plus Endless Theft On A Global Scale=Imperialism--PART 6

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/us/politics/trump-iran-war.html

How Trump Took the U.S. to War With Iran

In a series of Situation Room meetings, President Trump weighed his instincts against the deep concerns of his vice president and a pessimistic intelligence assessment. Here’s the inside story of how he made the fateful decision.


The decision by President Trump to give the go-ahead to join Israel in attacking Iran was influenced by a presentation by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in February that led to a series of discussions inside the White House over the following days and weeks. Credit: Al Drago for The New York Times

Listen · 24:59 minutes

by Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman

[Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman, both White House reporters for The Times, are the co-authors of the forthcoming “Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump.” This article is drawn from reporting done for that book.]

April 7, 2026
New York Times

Leer en español

The black S.U.V. carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House just before 11 a.m. on Feb. 11. The Israeli leader, who had been pressing for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran, was whisked inside with little ceremony, out of view of reporters, primed for one of the most high-stakes moments in his long career.

U.S. and Israeli officials gathered first in the Cabinet Room, adjacent to the Oval Office. Then Mr. Netanyahu headed downstairs for the main event: a highly classified presentation on Iran for President Trump and his team in the White House Situation Room, which was rarely used for in-person meetings with foreign leaders.

Mr. Trump sat down, but not in his usual position at the head of the room’s mahogany conference table. Instead, the president took a seat on one side, facing the large screens mounted along the wall. Mr. Netanyahu sat on the other side, directly opposite the president.

Appearing on the screen behind the prime minister was David Barnea, the director of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, as well as Israeli military officials. Arrayed visually behind Mr. Netanyahu, they created the image of a wartime leader surrounded by his team.


David Barnea, the director of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mr. Netanyahu and Israeli military officials all participated in the high-stakes meeting with Mr. Trump in the White House Situation Room. Credit: Amir Cohen/Reuters; Eric Lee for The New York Times

Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, sat at the far end of the table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who doubled as the national security adviser, had taken his regular seat. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who generally sat together in such settings, were on one side; joining them was John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director. Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law, and Steve Witkoff, Mr. Trump’s special envoy, who had been negotiating with the Iranians, rounded out the main group.

The gathering had been kept deliberately small to guard against leaks. Other top cabinet secretaries had no idea it was happening. Also absent was the vice president. JD Vance was in Azerbaijan, and the meeting had been scheduled on such short notice that he was unable to make it back in time.

The presentation that Mr. Netanyahu would make over the next hour would be pivotal in setting the United States and Israel on the path toward a major armed conflict in the middle of one of the world’s most volatile regions. And it would lead to a series of discussions inside the White House over the following days and weeks, the details of which have not been previously reported, in which Mr. Trump weighed his options and the risks before giving the go-ahead to join Israel in attacking Iran.

This account of how Mr. Trump took the United States into war is drawn from reporting for a forthcoming book, “Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump.” It reveals how the deliberations inside the administration highlighted the president’s instincts, his inner circle’s fractures and the way he runs the White House. It draws on extensive interviews conducted on the condition of anonymity to recount internal discussions and sensitive issues.

The reporting underscores how closely Mr. Trump’s hawkish thinking aligned with Mr. Netanyahu’s over many months, more so than even some of the president’s key advisers recognized. Their close association has been an enduring feature across two administrations, and that dynamic — however fraught at times — has fueled intense criticism and suspicion on both the left and the right of American politics.

And it shows how, in the end, even the more skeptical members of Mr. Trump’s war cabinet — with the stark exception of Mr. Vance, the figure inside the White House most opposed to a full-scale war — deferred to the president’s instincts, including his abundant confidence that the war would be quick and decisive. The White House declined to comment.

6 Takeaways From the Story of Trump’s Decision to Go to War With Iran

April 7, 2026

In the Situation Room on Feb. 11, Mr. Netanyahu made a hard sell, suggesting that Iran was ripe for regime change and expressing the belief that a joint U.S.-Israeli mission could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic.

At one point, the Israelis played for Mr. Trump a brief video that included a montage of potential new leaders who could take over the country if the hard-line government fell. Among those featured was Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, now a Washington-based dissident who had tried to position himself as a secular leader who could shepherd Iran toward a post-theocratic government.

Mr. Netanyahu and his team outlined conditions they portrayed as pointing to near-certain victory: Iran’s ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks. The regime would be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the likelihood that Iran would land blows against U.S. interests in neighboring countries was assessed as minimal.

Besides, Mossad’s intelligence indicated that street protests inside Iran would begin again and — with the impetus of the Israeli spy agency helping to foment riots and rebellion — an intense bombing campaign could foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime. The Israelis also raised the prospect of Iranian Kurdish fighters crossing the border from Iraq to open a ground front in the northwest, further stretching the regime’s forces and accelerating its collapse.

Mr. Netanyahu delivered his presentation in a confident monotone. It seemed to land well with the most important person in the room, the American president.

Sounds good to me, Mr. Trump told the prime minister. To Mr. Netanyahu, this signaled a likely green light for a joint U.S.-Israeli operation.

Mr. Netanyahu was not the only one who came away from the meeting with the impression that Mr. Trump had all but made up his mind. The president’s advisers could see that he had been deeply impressed by the promise of what Mr. Netanyahu’s military and intelligence services could do, just as he had been when the two men spoke before the 12-day war with Iran in June.

Earlier in his White House visit on Feb. 11, Mr. Netanyahu had tried to focus the minds of the Americans assembled in the Cabinet Room on the existential threat posed by Iran’s 86-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

When others in the room asked the prime minister about possible risks in the operation, Mr. Netanyahu acknowledged these but made one central point: In his view, the risks of inaction were greater than the risks of action. He argued that the price of action would only grow if they delayed striking and allowed Iran more time to accelerate its missile production and create a shield of immunity around its nuclear program.

Everyone in the room understood that Iran had the capacity to build up its missile and drone stockpiles at a far lower cost and much more quickly than the United States could build and supply the much more expensive interceptors to protect American interests and allies in the region.

Mr. Netanyahu’s presentations — and Mr. Trump’s positive response to them — created an urgent task for the U.S. intelligence community. Overnight, analysts worked to assess the viability of what the Israeli team had told the president.
‘Farcical’

The results of the U.S. intelligence analysis were shared the following day, Feb. 12, in another meeting for only American officials in the Situation Room. Before Mr. Trump arrived, two senior intelligence officials briefed the president’s inner circle.

The intelligence officials had deep expertise in U.S. military capabilities, and they knew the Iranian system and its players inside out. They had broken down Mr. Netanyahu’s presentation into four parts. First was decapitation — killing the ayatollah. Second was crippling Iran’s capacity to project power and threaten its neighbors. Third was a popular uprising inside Iran. And fourth was regime change, with a secular leader installed to govern the country.

The U.S. officials assessed that the first two objectives were achievable with American intelligence and military power. They assessed that the third and fourth parts of Mr. Netanyahu’s pitch, which included the possibility of the Kurds mounting a ground invasion of Iran, were detached from reality.

When Mr. Trump joined the meeting, Mr. Ratcliffe briefed him on the assessment. The C.I.A. director used one word to describe the Israeli prime minister’s regime change scenarios: “farcical.”
I
John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, cautioned against considering regime change an achievable objective in a Situation Room meeting the next day.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

At that point, Mr. Rubio cut in. “In other words, it’s bullshit,” he said.

Mr. Ratcliffe added that given the unpredictability of events in any conflict, regime change could happen, but it should not be considered an achievable objective.

Several others jumped in, including Mr. Vance, just back from Azerbaijan, who also expressed strong skepticism about the prospect of regime change.

The president then turned to General Caine. “General, what do you think?”

General Caine replied: “Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They know they need us, and that’s why they’re hard-selling.”

Mr. Trump quickly weighed the assessment. Regime change, he said, would be “their problem.” It was unclear whether he was referring to the Israelis or the Iranian people. But the bottom line was that his decision on whether to go to war against Iran would not hinge on whether Parts 3 and 4 of Mr. Netanyahu’s presentation were achievable.

Mr. Trump appeared to remain very interested in accomplishing Parts 1 and 2: killing the ayatollah and Iran’s top leaders and dismantling the Iranian military.

General Caine — the man Mr. Trump liked to refer to as “Razin’ Caine” — had impressed the president years earlier by telling him the Islamic State could be defeated far more quickly than others had projected. Mr. Trump rewarded that confidence by elevating the general, who had been an Air Force fighter pilot, to be his top military adviser. General Caine was not a political loyalist, and he had serious concerns about a war with Iran. But he was very cautious in the way he presented his views to the president.

As the small team of advisers who were looped into the plans deliberated over the following days, General Caine shared with Mr. Trump and others the alarming military assessment that a major campaign against Iran would drastically deplete stockpiles of American weaponry, including missile interceptors, whose supply had been strained after years of support for Ukraine and Israel. General Caine saw no clear path to quickly replenishing these stockpiles.

He also flagged the enormous difficulty of securing the Strait of Hormuz and the risks of Iran blocking it. Mr. Trump had dismissed that possibility on the assumption that the regime would capitulate before it came to that. The president appeared to think it would be a very quick war — an impression that had been reinforced by the tepid response to the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities in June.

General Caine’s role in the lead-up to the war captured a classic tension between military counsel and presidential decision-making. So persistent was the chairman in not taking a stand — repeating that it was not his role to tell the president what to do, but rather to present options along with potential risks and possible second- and third-order consequences — that he could appear to some of those listening to be arguing all sides of an issue simultaneously.

He would constantly ask, “And then what?” But Mr. Trump would often seem to hear only what he wanted to hear.



Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, departing a press briefing at the Pentagon last week.Credit:  Eric Lee for The New York Times

General Caine differed in almost every way from a prior chairman, Gen. Mark A. Milley, who had argued vociferously with Mr. Trump during his first administration and who saw his role as stopping the president from taking dangerous or reckless actions.

One person familiar with their interactions noted that Mr. Trump had a habit of confusing tactical advice from General Caine with strategic counsel. In practice, that meant the general might warn in one breath about the difficulties of one aspect of the operation, then in the next note that the United States had an essentially unlimited supply of cheap, precision-guided bombs and could strike Iran for weeks once it achieved air superiority.

To the chairman, these were separate observations. But Mr. Trump appeared to think that the second most likely canceled out the first.

At no point during the deliberations did the chairman directly tell the president that war with Iran was a terrible idea — though some of General Caine’s colleagues believed that was exactly what he thought.
Trump the Hawk

Distrusted as Mr. Netanyahu was by many of the president’s advisers, the prime minister’s view of the situation was far closer to Mr. Trump’s opinion than the anti-interventionists on the Trump team or in the broader “America First” movement liked to admit. This had been true for many years.

Of all the foreign policy challenges Mr. Trump had confronted across two presidencies, Iran stood apart. He regarded it as a uniquely dangerous adversary and was willing to take great risks to hinder the regime’s ability to wage war or to acquire a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, Mr. Netanyahu’s pitch had dovetailed with Mr. Trump’s desire to dismantle the Iranian theocracy, which had seized power in 1979, when Mr. Trump was 32. It had been a thorn in the side of the United States ever since.

Now, he could become the first president since the clerical leadership took over 47 years ago to pull off regime change in Iran. Usually unmentioned but always in the background was the added motivation that Iran had plotted to kill Mr. Trump as revenge over the assassination in January 2020 of Gen. Qassim Suleimani, who was seen in the United States as a driving force behind an Iranian campaign of international terrorism.



A billboard in Tehran showing Iranian military personnel with captured U.S. aircraft and a message about the Strait of Hormuz.Credit:  Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

Back in office for a second term, Mr. Trump’s confidence in the U.S. military’s abilities had only grown. He was especially emboldened by the spectacular commando raid to capture the Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his compound on Jan. 3. No American lives were lost in the operation, yet more evidence to the president of the unmatched prowess of U.S. forces.

Within the cabinet, Mr. Hegseth was the biggest proponent of a military campaign against Iran.

Mr. Rubio indicated to colleagues that he was much more ambivalent. He did not believe the Iranians would agree to a negotiated deal, but his preference was to continue a campaign of maximum pressure rather than start a full-scale war. Mr. Rubio, however, did not try to talk Mr. Trump out of the operation, and after the war began he delivered the administration’s justification with full conviction.

Ms. Wiles had concerns about what a new conflict overseas could entail, but she did not tend to weigh in hard on military matters in larger meetings; rather, she encouraged advisers to share their views and concerns with the president in those settings. Ms. Wiles would exert influence on many other issues, but in the room with Mr. Trump and the generals, she sat back. Those close to her said she did not view it as her role to share her concerns with the president on a military decision in front of others. And she believed that the expertise of advisers like General Caine, Mr. Ratcliffe and Mr. Rubio was more significant for the president to hear.

Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, in the East Room last month. Those close to her said she did not view it as her role to share her concerns with the president on a military decision in front of others. Credit: Doug Mills/The New York Times

Still, Ms. Wiles had told colleagues that she worried about the United States being dragged into another war in the Middle East. An attack on Iran carried with it the potential to set off soaring gas prices months before midterm elections that could help decide whether the final two years of Mr. Trump’s second term would be years of accomplishment or subpoenas from House Democrats. But in the end, Ms. Wiles was on board with the operation.
Vance the Skeptic

Nobody in Mr. Trump’s inner circle was more worried about the prospect of war with Iran, or did more to try to stop it, than the vice president.

Mr. Vance had built his political career opposing precisely the kind of military adventurism that was now under serious consideration. He had described a war with Iran as “a huge distraction of resources” and “massively expensive.”

He was not, however, a dove across the board. In January, when Mr. Trump publicly warned Iran to stop killing protesters and promised that help was on its way, Mr. Vance had privately encouraged the president to enforce his red line. But what the vice president pushed for was a limited, punitive strike, something closer to the model of Mr. Trump’s missile attack against Syria in 2017 over the use of chemical weapons against civilians.

The vice president thought a regime-change war with Iran would be a disaster. His preference was for no strikes at all. But knowing that Mr. Trump was likely to intervene in some fashion, he tried to steer toward more limited action. Later, when it seemed certain that the president was set on a large-scale campaign, Mr. Vance argued that he should do so with overwhelming force, in the hope of achieving his objectives quickly.

Vice President JD Vance, the figure inside the White House most opposed to a full-scale war, described it as “a huge distraction of resources” and “massively expensive.” Credit:  Doug Mills/The New York Times

In front of his colleagues, Mr. Vance warned Mr. Trump that a war against Iran could cause regional chaos and untold numbers of casualties. It could also break apart Mr. Trump’s political coalition and would be seen as a betrayal by many voters who had bought into the promise of no new wars.

Mr. Vance raised other concerns, too. As vice president, he was aware of the scope of America’s munitions problem. A war against a regime with enormous will for survival could leave the United States in a far worse position to fight conflicts for some years.

The vice president told associates that no amount of military insight could truly gauge what Iran would do in retaliation when survival of the regime was at stake. A war could easily go in unpredictable directions. Moreover, he thought there seemed to be little chance of building a peaceful Iran in the aftermath.

Beyond all of this was perhaps the biggest risk of all: Iran held the advantage when it came to the Strait of Hormuz. If this narrow waterway carrying vast quantities of oil and natural gas was choked off, the domestic consequences in the United States would be severe, starting with higher gasoline prices.

Tucker Carlson, the commentator who had emerged as another prominent skeptic of intervention on the right, had come to the Oval Office several times over the previous year to warn Mr. Trump that a war with Iran would destroy his presidency. A couple weeks before the war began, Mr. Trump, who had known Mr. Carlson for years, tried to reassure him over the phone. “I know you’re worried about it, but it’s going to be OK,” the president said. Mr. Carlson asked how he knew. “Because it always is,” Mr. Trump replied.

In the final days of February, the Americans and the Israelis discussed a piece of new intelligence that would significantly accelerate their timeline. The ayatollah would be meeting above ground with other top officials of the regime, in broad daylight and wide open for an air attack. It was a fleeting chance to strike at the heart of Iran’s leadership, the kind of target that might not present itself again.

Mr. Trump gave Iran another chance to come to a deal that would block its path to nuclear weapons. The diplomacy also gave the United States extra time to move military assets to the Middle East.

The president had effectively made up his mind weeks earlier, several of his advisers said. But he had not yet decided exactly when. Now, Mr. Netanyahu urged him to move fast.

That same week, Mr. Kushner and Mr. Witkoff called from Geneva after the latest talks with Iranian officials. Over three rounds of negotiations in Oman and Switzerland, the two had tested Iran’s willingness to make a deal. At one point, they offered the Iranians free nuclear fuel for the life of their program — a test of whether Tehran’s insistence on enrichment was truly about civilian energy or about preserving the ability to build a bomb.

The Iranians rejected the offer, calling it an assault on their dignity.

Mr. Kushner and Mr. Witkoff laid out the picture for the president. They could probably negotiate something, but it would take months, they said. If Mr. Trump was asking whether they could look him in the eye and tell him they could solve the problem, it was going to take a lot to get there, Mr. Kushner told him, because the Iranians were playing games.
‘I Think We Need to Do It’

On Thursday, Feb. 26, around 5 p.m., a final Situation Room meeting got underway. By now, the positions of everyone in the room were clear. Everything had been discussed in previous meetings; everyone knew everyone else’s stance. The discussion would last about an hour and a half.

Mr. Trump was in his usual place at the head of the table. To his right sat the vice president; next to Mr. Vance was Ms. Wiles, then Mr. Ratcliffe, then the White House counsel, David Warrington, then Steven Cheung, the White House communications director. Across from Mr. Cheung was Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary; to her right was General Caine, then Mr. Hegseth and Mr. Rubio.

The war-planning group had been kept so tight that the two key officials who would need to manage the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Energy Secretary Chris Wright, were excluded, as was Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence.

The president opened the meeting, asking, OK, what have we got?


Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was the biggest proponent of a military campaign against Iran within the cabinet. Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated to colleagues that he was much more ambivalent.Credit...Photographs by Eric Lee for The New York Times

Mr. Hegseth and Mr. Caine ran through the sequencing of the attacks. Then Mr. Trump said he wanted to go around the table and hear everyone’s views.

Mr. Vance, whose disagreement with the whole premise was well established, addressed the president: You know I think this is a bad idea, but if you want to do it, I’ll support you.

Ms. Wiles told Mr. Trump that if he felt he needed to proceed for America’s national security, then he should go ahead.

Mr. Ratcliffe offered no opinion on whether to proceed, but he discussed the stunning new intelligence that the Iranian leadership was about to gather in the ayatollah’s compound in Tehran. The C.I.A. director told the president that regime change was possible depending on how the term was defined. “If we just mean killing the supreme leader, we can probably do that,” he said.

When called on, Mr. Warrington, the White House counsel, said it was a legally permissible option in terms of how the plan had been conceived by U.S. officials and presented to the president. He did not offer a personal opinion, but when pressed by the president to provide one, he said that as a Marine veteran he had known an American service member killed by Iran years earlier. This issue remained deeply personal. He told the president that if Israel intended to proceed regardless, the United States should do so as well.

Mr. Cheung laid out the likely public relations fallout: Mr. Trump had run for office opposed to further wars. People had not voted for conflict overseas. The plans ran contrary, too, to everything the administration had said after the bombing campaign against Iran in June. How would they explain away eight months of insisting that Iranian nuclear facilities had been totally obliterated? Mr. Cheung gave neither a yes nor a no, but he said that whatever decision Mr. Trump made would be the right one.

Ms. Leavitt told the president that this was his decision and that the press team would manage it as best they could.

Mr. Hegseth adopted a narrow position: They would have to take care of the Iranians eventually, so they might as well do it now. He offered technical assessments: They could run the campaign in a certain amount of time with a given level of forces.

General Caine was sober, laying out the risks and what the campaign would mean for munitions depletion. He offered no opinion; his position was that if Mr. Trump ordered the operation, the military would execute. Both of the president’s top military leaders previewed how the campaign would unfold and the U.S. capacity to degrade Iran’s military capabilities.

When it was his turn to speak, Mr. Rubio offered more clarity, telling the president: If our goal is regime change or an uprising, we shouldn’t do it. But if the goal is to destroy Iran’s missile program, that’s a goal we can achieve.

Everyone deferred to the president’s instincts. They had seen him make bold decisions, take on unfathomable risks and somehow come out on top. No one would impede him now.

“I think we need to do it,” the president told the room. He said they had to make sure Iran could not have a nuclear weapon, and they had to ensure that Iran could not just shoot missiles at Israel or throughout the region.

General Caine told Mr. Trump that he had some time; he did not need to give the go-ahead until 4 p.m. the following day.

Aboard Air Force One the next afternoon, 22 minutes before General Caine’s deadline, Mr. Trump sent the following order: “Operation Epic Fury is approved. No aborts. Good luck.”


ABOUT THE AUTHORS:


Jonathan Swan is a White House reporter for The Times, covering the administration of Donald J. Trump. Contact him securely on Signal: @jonathan.941

Maggie Haberman is a White House correspondent for The Times, reporting on President Trump.

A version of this article appears in print on April 8, 2026, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: How Trump Took the U.S. To War With Iran. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper |

See more on: Ali Khamenei, Donald Trump, U.S. Politics, Benjamin Netanyahu, JD Vance, Marco Rubio