Showing posts with label Financial Sector. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial Sector. Show all posts

Friday, June 1, 2012

Predator Nation: Corporate Criminals, Political Corruption, and the Hijacking of America by Charles H. Ferguson--PLEASE READ AND SPREAD THE WORD!



Predator Nation: Corporate Criminals, Political Corruption, and the Hijacking of America
by Charles H. Ferguson
Crown Business, 2012

Book Description
Publication Date:
May 22, 2012


Charles H. Ferguson, who electrified the world with his Oscar-winning documentary Inside Job, now explains how a predator elite took over the country, step by step, and he exposes the networks of academic, financial, and political influence, in all recent administrations, that prepared the predators’ path to conquest.

Over the last several decades, the United States has undergone one of the most radical social and economic transformations in its history.

· Finance has become America’s dominant industry, while manufacturing, even for high technology industries, has nearly disappeared.

· The financial sector has become increasingly criminalized, with the widespread fraud that caused the housing bubble going completely unpunished.

· Federal tax collections as a share of GDP are at their lowest level in sixty years, with the wealthy and highly profitable corporations enjoying the greatest tax reductions.

· Most shockingly, the United States, so long the beacon of opportunity for the ambitious poor, has become one of the world’s most unequal and unfair societies.

If you’re smart and a hard worker, but your parents aren’t rich, you’re now better off being born in Munich, Germany or in Singapore than in Cleveland, Ohio or New York.
This radical shift did not happen by accident.

Ferguson shows how, since the Reagan administration in the 1980s, both major political parties have become captives of the moneyed elite. It was the Clinton administration that dismantled the regulatory controls that protected the average citizen from avaricious financiers. It was the Bush team that destroyed the federal revenue base with its grotesquely skewed tax cuts for the rich. And it is the Obama White House that has allowed financial criminals to continue to operate unchecked, even after supposed “reforms” installed after the collapse of 2008.


Guest Reviewer: Simon Johnson on Predator Nation by Charles H. Ferguson



Simon Johnson is coauthor of 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown and White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters To You.

Predator Nation demolishes the view that the global financial crisis was merely some sort of freak accident. Charles Ferguson makes a convincing case that the world’s banking system was brought to the brink of complete collapse in 2008–09 by a virulent combination of unchecked greed and criminal behavior.

This is an epic crime story with an apparently clean getaway, courtesy of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Both presidents proved unwilling to hold anyone to account—or even to launch meaningful investigations.

Leading bankers walked away with billions of dollars in unjustified compensation. The costs imposed on the rest of us can be measured in the trillions of dollars.

Predator Nation provides a roadmap for prosecution, systematically covering the banks involved, the names of culpable executives, the obvious crimes, the precise laws broken, and the evidence hiding in plain sight. No doubt it will be widely ignored by our legal officials.

Ferguson’s points are also intensely political. Reckless behavior by bankers can be traced back to the bipartisan consensus around deregulating finance in recent decades. This result is a socially destructive industry with immense political power—and capable of defeating all attempts at meaningful reform. The continued predominance of rogue finance is greatly facilitated by its effective corruption of American academia and many so-called “independent experts” (documented in Charles Ferguson’s Oscar-winning movie, Inside Job.)

Big banks hold American politics in a death grip. To understand this—and to start to think about how to break this grip—read Predator Nation and give a copy to everyone you know.


Reviews & Praise for Predator Nation

"A tightly argued, profusely footnoted and deeply enraged castigation of everyone involved, Predator Nation isn’t just a factually unchallengeable account of how Wall Street blew up the global economy. It’s a denunciation, a call for justice and a warning."Salon

“With Predator Nation, Charles Ferguson sets out to finish what he started with his Oscar-winning documentary, Inside Job. This take-no-prisoners account of the financial crisis follows the money, connects the dots, names names, and asks the questions our leaders still refuse to answer: how have those responsible for the crisis not been held accountable, and how can we make sure it doesn’t happen again?—Arianna Huffington, president and editor in chief of the Huffington Post Media Group

“There is fraud at the heart of Wall Street—deliberate intellectual, business, and political deception. Charles Ferguson is in hot pursuit. Inside Job shook up the cozy world of academic finance. Predator Nation should stir prosecutors into action. And if we fail to reform our political system, you can say goodbye to American democracy.” —Simon Johnson, coauthor of White House Burning and professor at MIT Sloan School of Management


“Ferguson presents a fierce indictment of predatory activities of parts of the financial system and of the corruption of democracy that ‘big money’ financial lobbying has caused. A book well worth reading regardless of whether you fully agree or not with all of its arguments.” Nouriel Roubini, professor of economics and international business at Stern School of Business, New York University, and chairman of Roubini Global Economics


“The definitive financial crisis book has now been written. With an encyclopedic factual foundation to support his arguments, the ever-brilliant Charles Ferguson has given us Inside Job on steroids. The collusion between Wall Street and Washington that brought our economy to its knees is set out in a way that will have steam coming out of your ears in fury.” —Eliot Spitzer



“A deeply argued call to action from a lucid, impassioned polemicist.”Kirkus (starred review)

“Charles Ferguson's Predator Nation is nothing less than a devastating narrative portrait of the many times Wall Street has made Main Street and others the victims of its predatory schemes. In his inimitable clear-headed style, Ferguson correctly asks, why do they keep getting away with it? Why indeed.”—William D. Cohan, author of House of Cards and Money and Power


Product Details:
Hardcover: 384 pages
Publisher: Crown Business (May 22, 2012)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 030795255X
ISBN-13: 978-0307952554







Sunday, September 26, 2010
An Incisive Examination of the 2008 Financial Crisis

A Film Review of 'Inside Job' and Interview with the Director Charles Ferguson

by Chuleenan Svetvilas
September 26, 2010
The Panopticon Review

(Reprint)


Inside Job tackles the financial crisis of 2008, delving into the economic policies, conflicts of interest, hubris, and greed that created this decades-long disaster in the making. Yeah, a documentary about the financial catastrophe seems like a super-boring film to sit through but this film is anything but dull. Through riveting personal interviews and plenty of facts and figures, director Charles Ferguson chronicles the intricate web of connections among the investment banks, credit rating agencies, economists, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Treasury Department under the Reagan, Bush I and II, and Clinton administrations.

Though the film is loaded with talking heads — everyone from New York University economics professor Nouriel Roubini (aka Dr. Doom) and former New York governor Eliot Spitzer to French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde and former Federal Reserve Board member Frederic Mishkin — it is tightly edited to keep the viewer's interest.


Ferguson asks pointed questions and it is painfully funny as well as infuriating to watch Mishkin squirm as he tries to explain whether the credit ratings were accurate and why he left his position in the midst of the economic collapse. Economist Glen Hubbard, former chair of the U.S. council of Economic Advisors under George W. Bush and now dean of Columbia’s business school, becomes very hostile and angry when asked about his financial conflicts of interest, for example not revealing that he was paid $100,000 to testify in defense of a financial company. He sneers at Ferguson, "You have three more minutes. Give it your best shot."

Narrated by Matt Damon, the film is divided into five parts: 1. How We Got Here, 2. The Bubble, 3. The Crisis, 4. Accountability, and 5. Where We Are Now. The first four sections craft a cogent argument that deregulation was at the root of the financial crisis and that there were many opportunities to lessen its impact or even prevent it from happening in the first place. The last part seems to falter, not only because it shows how the Obama administration is simply continuing the same policies as previous administrations but because the fury Ferguson raises in the previous parts is gone. It ends with platitudes. The last scene, one of city streets, ends with Damon’s voice intoning: "It won't be easy, but some things are worth fighting for."

Chuleenan Svetvilas interviewed director Charles Ferguson in San Francisco on September 21. Inside Job, his second film, will open in New York on October 8 and Los Angeles on October 15, and in the Bay Area on October 22. Ferguson's first documentary, No End in Sight, a remarkable exposé and indictment of the occupation of Iraq, was nominated for an Academy Award in 2007.


When and why did you decide to make this film about the 2008 financial crisis?


Well I made the final decision when in a 48-hour period, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG fell apart in September of 2008. And when also, as a result of that and everything else that was going on, we all found ourselves staring into nothingness. Then it was crystal clear that this was a gigantic thing and would be with us for a very long time and would have a lot of effects on a lot of people; it was something worth looking into. I had actually started thinking about it earlier, long before. I have two friends, both of whom are in the film, Nouriel Roubini and Charles Morris. They’re both old friends of mine.


In 2007 both Nouriel and Charlie began telling me that there was this huge problem coming and in late 2007 I read Charlie’s book and manuscript. It was published in February 2008, one month before Bear Stearns had collapsed and it was called The Trillion Dollar Meltdown. And at the time I thought he was exaggerating and he told me, “Just you wait, Charles.” And then you know, when major financial institutions began collapsing, I began to take my friends more seriously. Then in September of 2008 I decided, I gotta do this.

At that point did you start contacting people to interview? Once you decided to make the film, what was the first thing you did?


The first thing actually was I approached the two guys who run Sony Pictures Classics, Michael Barker and Tom Bernard and asked them if they would be interested in the film and they said yes. And in fact they financed a little over half the film and agreed to distribute it. So it was at that point that I started doing serious work. The first thing that we did is a lot of research. I talked to a million people. I read everything I could get my hands on.

We did mainly research for six months, a lot of research, including who we might want to film. Then we started filming in March/April 2009. We filmed basically through the end of the summer. I think our last interview was in September 2009 by which point we had already started the editing. We started editing around the time of the last interview.


So did you come up with the other half of the budget yourself?


We had another equity investor and then a small fraction of it is me, myself as an equity investor.


Did you feel that you were well prepared to tackle this subject because you already had one critically acclaimed documentary under your belt [No End in Sight] and then you have this PhD in political science from M.I.T. where you studied economics, political economy, and economic history?


It did and it helped a lot. My prior background in academia was very useful. In the first place I knew a lot of these guys. I also had some understanding of the issues. I wouldn’t say I had a lot. I had become rather disconnected from the financial world over the previous decade and it had changed a lot. It’s very clear that it had changed a lot and mostly for the worse. But I had some familiarity with finance and I also knew from my prior academic background, about the conflicts of interest in academic economics. I had seen the beginnings of that problem when I was a graduate student and a post-doc. So when the crisis occurred and I started making the film, I thought, there’s probably something here so I should look at this. And I looked and I found.


So when you were a graduate student, what did you think about the Chicago School of thinking regarding economics? Did you think that it was a viable thing – unfettered capitalism?


No, and it always seemed obviously dubious to me. I spent a lot of time studying it actually. I took a lot of economics. I read a lot of the kind of advocacy things that the Chicago School and other people wrote. I read Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman’s book, and it always struck me as just very clearly deficient in reality for one thing. It seems as if Friedman was completely sincere in his beliefs. There’s no evidence that he was doing this for financial gain but it was clear that many other people were.

And he had his faithful disciples, Alan Greenspan being one of them.


Yep.


I saw an interview you did in Cannes and you said that you were surprised by the Bush administration’s incompetent handling of the financial crisis. I’m wondering why you were surprised given that you had done No End in Sight, which showed the incredibly inept handing of the occupation of Iraq.


The reason I was surprised was that some of the people who were doing the handling in this case were people who seemed to be more practical and less ideological than the people who had been in charge of the Iraq war. Hank Paulson, whatever you think of him, he had real experience with the real world, not experience handling a financial crisis but a lot of experience with handling what investment banks do and how they behave. And so I was very surprised when it turned out that neither he nor Bernanke had understood that when they shut down Lehman Brothers that British and Japanese bankruptcy law would force the immediate closing of those offices, the immediate freezing of all transactions and accounts that would have this cascading effect throughout the financial system. He didn’t know that. I found that rather surprising, that he wouldn’t know that, that he wouldn’t take the trouble to find out.

I also thought that there would be more and more intelligent consultation with other people. When I asked Christine Lagarde, the finance minister of France, how did you find out Lehman was going to go bankrupt, I assumed that she was going to tell me a day or two earlier or someone had given her a call, and when she told me she found out about it after the fact by opening up the morning paper, I was dumbfounded.


Why wouldn’t you talk to other people who have a stake in this? We’re talking about a worldwide financial market, not just a U.S. financial market.


That seems to have escaped their notice.


Did you decide to structure the film in these five parts because that was the best way to explain the different steps of what had happened? I see similarities to your previous film: dividing the film into different parts and going through things chronologically and having people reflect back on what happened.


I think that I just naturally think like that. I guess it’s my academic background, I don’t know. I have a somewhat systematic, rigorous mind. I tend to do that to things. So partially that and partially I thought that the subject required it. This is something that could be very easily complicated where it would be easy for people to get lost. So giving some structural guidance in the film was something that would help relax the viewer and guild the viewer through a fairly complicated film. There’s a lot of facts in that movie. There’s over 100 documents in that film and a lot of people say a lot of things so it just seemed like a good idea but it’s always naturally how I tend to approach things.


There is a heavy use of voiceover in the film. You have Matt Damon reciting a lot of facts that way. Was that one way you tried to get around putting a lot of numbers and figures on screen to avoid overwhelming the viewer?


Yes, and also we tried to use a mixture of different ways to present information just to keep people stimulated so they wouldn’t get bored. So sometimes you would look at a graph and sometimes you would hear it from somebody’s voice. Sometimes you would see somebody saying it to you. We tried to keep the film visually and otherwise stimulating.




Did you try to interview Brooksley Born, [former head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission]?


Yes, I actually had a very long private conversation with her off the record. She didn’t want to be interviewed on the record because she knew that she was soon going to be appointed to be a member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which she is now a member of. My inference, she didn’t say this, but my inference is that she was afraid that if she spoke on the record that she wouldn’t get appointed and she wanted to be part of that effort. So she didn’t feel comfortable being interviewed on the record. It was too bad. She’s amazing to talk to, really an amazing person.


Does the same thing go for Elizabeth Warren?

Yes, I also had a long private conversation with her. She also declined to be interviewed on the record for similar reasons.


You make it really clear in your film that the regulators, the ratings agencies, economists, etc. didn’t do their job. And even after the crisis they still wouldn’t say that they didn’t do their job or would imply that somebody was looking at things but clearly that’s not true. So what do you hope to accomplish with this film?


I hope to make people aware that this is still an important issue that hasn’t been dealt with and they should become more active in dealing with it — both with regard to their personal financial lives and also in the larger political landscape. Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so too finance is too important to be left to the financiers. So first of all that. I also just wanted to inform people about why it is that America is still in this state, why so many people are losing, have lost their jobs, their savings. I think that, I hope that people want to understand that.


You had mentioned earlier how you were aware of the conflicts of interest regarding people in academia, the economists. At what point during the interviews with people like Glen Hubbard [dean of Columbia Business School and economics professor] did you start asking more probing questions about conflicts of interest?


It depended but it was pretty early. I usually asked them a few relatively general questions first. I wanted to hear what they thought about the crisis in general and so I usually asked them those kind of questions first but pretty quickly I started asking them about these other things and they got uncomfortable pretty quickly.




Yeah, Hubbard was incredibly uncomfortable and said, “You’ve got three minutes.” So how long had you been talking to him before he started shutting down and getting really angry?


Maybe 15, 20 minutes into the interview. There was tension almost immediately but then it kind of got progressively more tense.




Were you surprised that it got so tense so quickly?


I didn’t know what to expect. The personal chemistry issue, how people are going to respond at the emotional level was hard to predict and people responded differently but I was a little bit surprised at how hostile Glen Hubbard got.


After all he agreed to be interviewed.


Yes, but I think what happened with all those people is that they’re not used to being challenged. They’re used to being deferred to, they’re used to people being very respectful and favorable and not antagonistic and not challenging. So I think that they were surprised that they were being challenged. And I think that they were also surprised at how much I knew. They weren’t used to people having read through their papers and gone through their C.V., looked at their financial disclosure forms. I think that came as a bit of a shock to them.


What’s your next project?


I don’t know, I have a number of ideas, some of them documentaries, some of them feature films. Right now I’m spending all of my energy trying to make sure people watch this film. That’s going to totally consume me for at least the next month, maybe for even longer but certainly for the next month.

What are your plans for the film’s website?


The website will have many things on it. It has a lot of information about the people in the film. It has information about some of the issues discussed in the film. It has links to an enormous number of the documents that we read and reference materials that we read: articles, books, all kinds of things. Also, links to organizations that work on these issues. So there’s going to be a lot on the website.




Do you plan on doing a book like you did with your other film?


I tend to doubt it. For one thing the website is going to have so much material on it that it’s not clear to me that there would be much additional benefit to doing the book. Also, I hope that the film speaks for itself. I hope that from watching the film that people will get a good enough idea what the issues are.




What question would you like to be asked or is there anything else you would like to add?


Well, I will take your opportunity to say that I think that the most disappointing thing I encountered was the reaction of the Obama administration and of President Obama personally. Many of us had high hopes for him and he’s been a great disappointment and that’s really too bad. A big opportunity lost but hopefully, hopefully the American people will start pushing him to change.


Chuleenan Svetvilas is a writer and editor in Berkeley, California. Her articles on film have appeared in print and/or online in Alternet, California Lawyer, Documentary, DOX, Hyphen, The Panopticon Review, and Mother Jones. Her 2007 review of Offside will be reprinted in Soccer vs. The State: Tackling Football and Radical Politics in 2011.

Thursday, March 3, 2011

Award Winning Documentary Filmmaker Charles Ferguson On Wall Street, The Financial Crisis, Fraud, Corruption and the Bankrupting of American Democracy

CHARLES FERGUSON

Charles Ferguson is founder and president of Representational Pictures and an acclaimed documentary filmmaker. Trained as a political scientist, he holds a Ph.D. from M.I.T. and has been a consultant to federal agencies and high tech firms. He also co-founded an Internet software company, which created FrontPage, the first visual Web development tool. Ferguson's debut film, 2007's No End in Sight, about the Iraq War. received an Oscar nod, and his latest, Inside Job—on the global financial crisis—won this year's DGA feature documentary award and an Academy Award.

All,

CHARLES FERGUSON IS THE BRILLIANT DIRECTOR OF "INSIDE JOB" THE POWERFUL OSCAR WINNING DOCUMENTARY ON THE WALL STREET FINANCIAL MELTDOWN OF 2008 , HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY TAVIS SMILEY ON PBS, TUESDAY March 1, 2011. CLICK ON THE FOLLOWING LINK BELOW TO SEE THIS IMPORTANT INTERVIEW.

Kofi

http://video.pbs.org/video/1825083939

Watch the full episode. See more Tavis Smiley.



STAFF BLOG: Tavis Smiley on PBS

Charles Ferguson: "What we have now is the new normal..."

Posted by Staff, February 28, 2011

If you watched the Academy Awards Sunday night, then you likely heard "Inside Job" director Charles Ferguson's acceptance speech after his film won for best documentary. Ferguson's acceptance speech began this way:

"Forgive me, I must start by pointing out that three years after our horrific financial crisis caused by massive fraud, not a single financial executive has gone to jail, and that's wrong."


Tonight, Ferguson sits down with Tavis and explains how it feels to have won the Oscar when the actual issue that his film addresses remains unresolved.

"Inside Job" won the 2011 Academy Award for best documentary on Sunday night. The film's director used his acceptance speech to deliver pointed criticism of Wall Street and the financial industry.

The Oscar buildup featured speculation about whether Banksy, a mystery man of the street-art world, might show up for his awards entry, "Exit Through the Gift Shop." If he was at the Oscars, he did not declare himself.

But it was the topic on most people's minds the last two years, the economy, that resonated among Oscar voters.

"Inside Job" director Charles Ferguson subjected Wall Street players, economists and bureaucrats to a fierce cross-examination to depict the economic crisis as a colossal crime perpetrated on the working-class masses by a greedy few.

His film examined the financial crisis of 2008. His speech lamented the lack of accountability three years later.

"Forgive me, I must start by pointing out that three years after our horrific financial crisis caused by financial fraud, not a single financial executive has gone to jail, and that's wrong," Ferguson said.

WATCH FERGUSON'S STATEMENT FOLLOWING HIS OSCAR WIN SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2011:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/charles-ferguson-oscar-speech-inside-job_n_828963.html

Ferguson blogs on The Huffington Post.

WATCH A PREVIEW OF "INSIDE JOB":



Tavis: "If what we witness, so well documented in your piece, "Inside Job," isn't enough to get the American people angry, upset enough to rise up like we see in Egypt and Tunisia, et cetera, et cetera, what's it going to take? I hear the point you're trying to make and I'm trying to be optimistic along with you that we're going to one day wake up and take this situation under control as the American people.

But if this crisis that you document doesn't do it, what's it going to take to get us upset?

Ferguson: Well, it might take another one. It might also take five or 10 years of the American people realizing that what we have now is the new normal. This actually is the first of these financial crises that has made a huge mark on the American people broadly. The first two of them didn't, for various reasons.

But now this has hit a lot of people - the foreclosures, the unemployment rate, and of course average American incomes are actually down. This is the first generation in American history whose children are going to be worse off than their parents, and I think that it's going to take people coming to terms with the fact that that's what has happened as a result of this, and deciding that really, they have to do something about it.

Tavis: So are you hopeful about that?

Ferguson: In the long run, yes. I think that President Obama had a very powerful, unique, historical opportunity when he was elected and he blew it, badly...."

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW


Tavis: Charles Ferguson is a very talented documentary filmmaker who of course won the Academy Award Sunday night for his latest project, "Inside Job." The film is a compelling look at what went wrong on Wall Street and the events that led to the global financial crisis. Beginning March the 8th you can pick up a copy of the film on DVD and Blu-Ray. Here now, though, a scene from "Inside Job."

[Clip]

Tavis: First of all, let the record show that you are wearing jeans today.

Charles Ferguson: Yes, I am.

Tavis: Yeah. For those who saw the show, you'll get the punchline. Congratulations, first of all.

Ferguson: Thank you.

Tavis: Second of all, can I grab this? (the Oscar trophy)

Ferguson: You certainly can.

Tavis: Can I -

Ferguson: Just you've got to give it back.

Tavis: Yeah. Do I have to?

Ferguson: Yup. (Laughter)

Tavis: Whoa. These things are really heavy, and very nice. As I said, congratulations. Let me start by asking how it feels to have done something that is prestigious enough to have claimed this prize. Everybody's been talking about it, who has seen the documentary, and by your own admission and by your own speech the other night, nothing has changed.

What happens when you invest that much of yourself into something and you look up a year later and you claim this prize, but what you really care about, the issue, hasn't been addressed?

Ferguson: Well, it's of course disappointing, but there are many people who are working on these questions and sometimes things take time and you have to take the long view. The world's not a perfect place and democracy sometimes works slowly, but it's better than the alternative.

Tavis: Speaking of "Inside Job," take - I should put this thing down, I'm getting really comfortable here. (Laughter) You might not get this back if I don't set it down.

Speaking of "Inside Job," take me inside and tell me how you came around to the process of knowing how to attack the subject matter. I ask that because this is such a massive issue, and trying to squeeze this into a documentary - how did you know exactly what your route was going to be, the story you wanted to tell?

Ferguson: Well, of course in the beginning I didn't, but I had a lot of help. I am very fortunate in that it turned out that I've known for a long time several of the people who were among those who first warned about the coming of this crisis. Two of the people who are in the film, Nouriel Rabini and Charles Morris are actually people I've known for 10, 20 years.

In 2007 they started talking to me about this, saying something's coming down here. So by the time Lehman Brothers collapsed in September of 2008 and I decided to make the film, I already had been taught a lot about this, and then I just started doing a lot of research.

Tavis: What surprised you most?

Ferguson: There were two big surprises, and both in a pretty negative direction. One was the ineptitude of the Bush administration's response to the crisis in 2008, that people were so completely unprepared for, for example, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and so ignorant about what its consequences would be.

The second surprise was just the incredibly low level of ethical behavior in American investment banking. When I started making the film it was already clear that some bad things had happened, but if somebody had told me that we were going to discover that all the major investment banks had been creating securities and selling them with the intent of profiting by betting against them, betting on their failure, I would have said, no, we don't do that in the United States. But turns out, we do.

Tavis: Just days ago on this program we had Phil Angelides, as you know, the chair of the financial inquiry crisis commission, and their report has a number a conclusions, but two things stand out, one in particular for our conversation.

They discover in their report and share with the American in this now best-selling book that this crisis was avoidable, number one, and number two, that the government was not prepared, as you just mentioned, to really handle it when the crisis came, but it was, in fact, avoidable.

What do you make of the fact that the American people have suffered in the way that they have, and all of this, if we are to believe Mr. Angelides' commission and believe your documentary, all of this was avoidable?

Ferguson: Well, it's horrible, of course, and America went through 40 years without any financial crises when regulation was much tighter and banking wasn't quite so exciting. Banking's gotten very exciting in a very dangerous way, and we have to return to a much more regulated financial sector.

I hope that the American people will become upset enough and angry enough and informed enough and activist enough to do something about this.

Tavis: You mentioned Bush a moment ago, President Bush in your indictment of what went wrong here. This is not, as you obviously know, not just a Republican problem. There's blame for Clinton, there's blame for the Obama administration, the clip we just saw a moment ago. Talk to me about the bipartisan nature of this crisis.

Ferguson: It is a thoroughly bipartisan problem at this point, and many of us, including myself, were deeply disappointed with President Obama's behavior. He said during his campaign things that led us to believe that he would take action about this, and when the American people supported him and voted for him and contributed to his campaign I think that many Americans thought that these issues would be addressed.

It's been a huge disappointment to see that he's turned out to be in many ways just more of the same. Whether it's because of his personal emotional characteristics or whether it's because of the structural issue that Wall Street gives money in enormous quantities to both parties now, I don't know. Maybe some mixture of the two.

But this is, in a general way, now a dangerously bipartisan problem because America only has two political parties, and they're both so captured now by Wall Street and Wall Street's lobbying and money.

Tavis: In the early days, when President Obama started announcing who his team was going to be, should we have known then that nothing was going to happen? When you stack your administration with a bunch of Clintonites, many of them who helped deregulate back in the Clinton years, which started this process in motion, could we have known then that not a whole lot was going to happen?

Ferguson: It certainly began to look that way pretty early, yes. One could always hope that the president himself would override his advisers and control them and manage them, but yes, the first really bad, disappointing sign was the team that he selected, and you're right, it was many Clintonites, it was many people who contributed to causing the crisis. It was also, in some cases, people who had done very unethical things in banking.

Tavis: What about the fact that nobody has paid a price for this; and for somebody to pay a price it means that under the Obama watch somebody in his Justice Department has to make this a priority, and administrations don't really like going after the previous administration. So here again, nobody pays the price.

Ferguson: Yes, and I think one thing that's important to point out is that it wasn't always this way. After deregulation started in the 1980s and America started having very unethical behavior and financial crises as a result - the first one was the S&L crisis in the 1980s - and as a result of that, several thousand financial executives were put in prison - several thousand people were put in prison. This time, literally zero, and it's I think a devastating, devastating -

Tavis: Why is that, or why is that not, to put it more accurately?

Ferguson: I think unfortunately it's predominately the power that Wall Street has now. Wall Street, the financial sector, at the height of the bubble just before the crisis, was 40 percent of American corporate profits, and now the wealthiest one-tenth of 1 percent of the population have the lowest tax rates and an unprecedented amount of wealth, and these companies employ former government officials and they lobby very heavily, and they've become so ingrained in our political system, in our regulatory system, even in the university and academic system, that it's now very, very difficult to take forceful action against them.

Tavis: So how likely is it that over the course of your career that you may end up doing another piece similar to this because we will find ourselves once again in a situation similar to this?

Ferguson: Unfortunately, I think it's very possible that in another 10 or 15 years we're going to have another financial crisis. Since deregulation began we've had a major financial crisis in America approximately every decade, and each one, by the way, has been worse than the last - more criminal and also more financially and economically serious.

So perhaps we're going to have to have another one, a really bad one, before the American people will force our leaders to change these things.

Tavis: If Wall Street has that kind of power, if we have a president who is elected overwhelmingly with progressive support who thought he was going to do something and he has not done anything, how do the American people take this back, as it were?

Ferguson: Well, it will take time and it will take pressure and anger and the creation of new organizations, but - not that the two situations are identical by any means, but one month ago nobody would have thought that Egypt and Tunisia and Libya had any chance of throwing off their dictators, and now they're all gone.

So in the long run I am very optimistic about the American people and about democracy.

Tavis: If what we witness, so well documented in your piece, "Inside Job," isn't enough to get the American people angry, upset enough to rise up like we see in Egypt and Tunisia, et cetera, et cetera, what's it going to take? I hear the point you're trying to make and I'm trying to be optimistic along with you that we're going to one day wake up and take this situation under control as the American people.

But if this crisis that you document doesn't do it, what's it going to take to get us upset?

Ferguson: Well, it might take another one. It might also take five or 10 years of the American people realizing that what we have now is the new normal. This actually is the first of these financial crises that has made a huge mark on the American people broadly. The first two of them didn't, for various reasons.

But now this has hit a lot of people - the foreclosures, the unemployment rate, and of course average American incomes are actually down. This is the first generation in American history whose children are going to be worse off than their parents, and I think that it's going to take people coming to terms with the fact that that's what has happened as a result of this, and deciding that really, they have to do something about it.

Tavis: So are you hopeful about that?

Ferguson: In the long run, yes. I think that President Obama had a very powerful, unique, historical opportunity when he was elected and he blew it, badly. Now it's going to be a much longer, much more gradual, tougher process to get this changed, so now we're talking about years, maybe even decades, before this has changed, but yes, I do think that eventually, it will change.

Tavis: What conditions are you referring to, right quick, that have so changed that if this president had eight years total - we know he's had two, he's got two more to go, may get another term - what conditions have changed so much that he can't do what we thought he could do or would do in terms of transforming this system? Why can't he do that in the next six years?

Ferguson: Well, he could certainly try, and there are many things that he could, indeed, do, but it'll be much more difficult now that there's a Republican Congress; certainly a Republican House. We'll see what happens in the next election. There could be a Republican Senate, too.

I think that there's also a cynicism in America now about its political leaders. I think that his campaign was perhaps the last time in a while that we're going to have really idealistic people believing that they can do something by electing somebody for president. That, of course, that's perhaps the biggest casualty, is -

Tavis: I think you're right about that. I've said that many times. A lot have said that, actually, lately, because I think you get those moments where people believe that something can be transformed, that idealism is alive, and when that goes away it doesn't come back every two years, every four years - it doesn't quite work that way.

His name, of course, Charles Ferguson; of course you know that - winner of the Academy Award this year for best documentary, called "Inside Job." You can get it now on DVD and on Blu-Ray. Charles, once again, congratulations. Great work.

Ferguson: Thank you, sir.

Tavis: I'm honored to have you on this program.

Ferguson: Thank you very much.

Tavis: That's our show for tonight.

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

Robert Kuttner On The Reality of the U.S. Financial Crisis and What Needs To Be Done About It

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/dont-blame-the-dream-of-h_b_610594.html

All,

The brilliant and truly progressive economist, political analyst, and social activist Robert Kuttner cuts through all the bullshit and lies to tell the complete and unvarnished truth about the contemporary ravages of a deadly and ruthless corporate capitalism and its direct very destructive effects on the American people. In the meantime please do yourself a favor by clicking on the following link and checking out his latest very important book A Presidency in Peril . You won't be disappointed...

Kofi


Posted: June 13, 2010

Don't Blame the Dream of Home Ownership
by Robert Kuttner
Co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect
Huffington Post

Here is a fable that is making the rounds. It is a collection of half-truths and outright lies:

The financial meltdown was the result of too many people pursuing the American Dream of home ownership. People who couldn't really afford to be homeowners became speculators. Government added to the damage with cheap mortgages, misguided laws such as the Community Reinvestment Act, and overgrown government-sponsored agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This stuff is a staple of rightwing talk shows. In a moment, I will rebut each element of this storyline, but first I want to single out a wildly misleading piece by the New York Times financial columnist Joe Nocera. The piece, which ran in Saturday's business section, was titled "Wake-Up Time for a Dream."

The dream -- surprise -- is home ownership. It is depressing that a rightwing theme has invaded the mainstream Times.

Nocera writes, "The financial crisis might well have been avoided if we as a culture hadn't invested so much political and psychological capital in the idea of owning a home. After all, the subprime mortgage business's supposed raison d'etre was making homeownership possible for people who lacked the means -- or the credit scores -- to get a traditional mortgage."

Now this is just malarkey. And the Nocera piece is worth reading in its entirety to appreciate just how an influential financial columnist can get a critically important story so utterly wrong.

For starters, the homeownership rate was already 64 percent in the mid 1960s. It peaked at about 69 percent just before the bubble burst -- but was nearly 68 percent in 2001 before subprime lending took off. Back in the 19th century, thanks to the Homestead Acts of the Lincoln era, homeownership (mainly family farms) was well over 70 percent in much of the west.

Ordinary working people can become homeowners and accumulate property wealth when two elements are present. Government programs have to be competently run and prevent private-industry sharks from abusing them. And working people need a degree of financial predictability in their job security.

In the period between, Franklin Roosevelt and LBJ, both factors prevailed. The Federal National Mortgage Association, later privatized as Fannie Mae, was part of the government. If mortgages met its standards, FNMA bought them from local banks and replenished bank working capital. Just as importantly, wages of working people steadily rose, so that more and more ordinary Americans could afford mortgage payments. Not surprisingly, homeownership rates rose. After Congress passed fair housing legislation in 1968, so that minorities could get a fair shot, black homeownership took off, too.

But beginning in the 1970s, wages stopped increasing with productivity growth. And the financial sharks got hold of programs intended to promote homeownership.

A newly privatized FNMA increasingly thought more about using its implicit government guarantee to increase market share and enrich its executives and shareholders. Not until Bush II, however, in 2004 and 2005 just before the housing collapse, was Fannie directed by the political masters in the White House to lower its standards and purchase pools of dubious mortgages so that Bush's "Ownership Society" could claim credit for increasing homeownership rates.

Fannie Mae, a corrupted agency, has become a handy all purpose scapegoat. The lack of a provision in the financial reform legislation to resolve the mess at Fannie has become the main alibi that Republican senators give for voting against the whole reform package.

Nocera contends that the subprime industry's "raison d'etre" was to promote homeownership "for people who lacked the means -- or the credit scores -- to get a traditional mortgage." Sorry, Joe. The industry's reason for being was so that financial wise guys could make a bundle at the expense of suckers. Low income prospective homeowners were merely useful props. They were the poster children, but not the real purpose.

(In 1994, the same Nocera was celebrating prosperity-for-all in a wildly over-optimistic book titled "A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Moneyed Class." If his latest debunking is Nocera's way of doing penance for his own earlier misplaced euphoria, it is just not helpful.)

The pity is that carefully run government programs, from the Homestead Acts to Neighborhood Housing Services, to the good work of community development financial institutions such as Chicago's ShoreBank, have indeed increased the rate of homeownership among working people, and have done so by avoiding bait-and-switch products like subprime loans, not promoting them. The culprit is not the dream of owning your own home, but the utter cynicism of the financial sharks who took advantage of people innocently pursuing the dream.

Large numbers of subprime loans were in fact marketed to elderly people who had low mortgage debts, who could not live on fixed incomes and who needed to refinance their homes to take out equity. This was not about promoting homeownership but destroying it. Many of these victims are now losing their homes. The stripping of home equity is partly a story of a collapsing pension system in the face of rising costs for America's seniors.

The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act, which encouraged banks to keep credit flowing to less affluent neighborhoods "consistent with sound lending standards" is not part of this fiasco at all. Had CRA been enforced, subprime loans that waived underwriting standards would have been illegal. Most of the mortgage brokers who retailed subprime loans were not even covered by CRA.

It's certainly true (and no serious person claims otherwise) that 100 percent of Americans will never own their own homes. Some people are too transient or just too poor. Some would prefer to rent. But, maddeningly, one element of the story that the debunkers of the American Dream invariably leave out is the near-collapse of programs for affordable rental housing. Among moderate income Americans who rent, the fraction of income spent on housing rose steadily for three decades.

Ironically, many low income people turned to homeownership as a last resort because they couldn't find an affordable rental -- and the same Bush Administration that gutted subsidies for affordable rental housing refused to enforce laws on the books specifying standards for responsible lending to aspiring homeowners.

A sound housing policy would combine assistance for homeownership with affordable rental housing. A homeownership rate of 70 percent, which is common in several affluent European nations, is perfectly reasonable -- if our political system keeps sharks like the subprime gang from wrecking the system and agencies such as FNMA from being corrupted.

Fannie Mae, which over-reached and went broke as a private company with a government guarantee, is now a ward of the federal government. It should be restored to its original form under Roosevelt, as a public corporation with high principles and high standards.

In the aftermath of the subprime collapse, many hard working lower income people, including a great many African Americans, have seen their dreams wiped out. The home ownership rate in black communities, which were targeted for subprime loans, is in free fall. Brandeis University's Institute on Assets and Social Policy reports a devastating increase in the black-white wealth gap.

The same New York Times recently published a fine piece by reporter Michael Powell on what is happening to the black middle class in Memphis, "Blacks in Memphis Lose Decades of Economic Gains."

The same story could be told about hundreds of predominantly African American neighborhoods.

The villain of the piece is the mortgage meltdown coupled with rising unemployment rates that are the collateral damage of the same financial collapse. The villain is not moderate income homeowners.

These people paid their mortgages on time, and there was nothing wrong with their dream. What was wrong was the failure of their government to keep the private financial industry from stealing the dream.

Robert Kuttner's new book is A Presidency in Peril. He is co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos.

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

The Declining American Economy, American Corporations, and the Financial Sector: 2000-2009

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28krugman.html?_r=1&th&emc=th

All,

The whole truth and nothing but from the economist Paul Krugman...

Kofi


December 28, 2009

OP-ED COLUMNIST

The Big Zero
By PAUL KRUGMAN
New York Times

Maybe we knew, at some unconscious, instinctive level, that it would be an era best forgotten. Whatever the reason, we got through the first decade of the new millennium without ever agreeing on what to call it. The aughts? The naughties? Whatever. (Yes, I know that strictly speaking the millennium didn’t begin until 2001. Do we really care?)

But from an economic point of view, I’d suggest that we call the decade past the Big Zero. It was a decade in which nothing good happened, and none of the optimistic things we were supposed to believe turned out to be true.

It was a decade with basically zero job creation. O.K., the headline employment number for December 2009 will be slightly higher than that for December 1999, but only slightly. And private-sector employment has actually declined — the first decade on record in which that happened.

It was a decade with zero economic gains for the typical family. Actually, even at the height of the alleged “Bush boom,” in 2007, median household income adjusted for inflation was lower than it had been in 1999. And you know what happened next.

It was a decade of zero gains for homeowners, even if they bought early: right now housing prices, adjusted for inflation, are roughly back to where they were at the beginning of the decade. And for those who bought in the decade’s middle years — when all the serious people ridiculed warnings that housing prices made no sense, that we were in the middle of a gigantic bubble — well, I feel your pain. Almost a quarter of all mortgages in America, and 45 percent of mortgages in Florida, are underwater, with owners owing more than their houses are worth.

Last and least for most Americans — but a big deal for retirement accounts, not to mention the talking heads on financial TV — it was a decade of zero gains for stocks, even without taking inflation into account. Remember the excitement when the Dow first topped 10,000, and best-selling books like “Dow 36,000” predicted that the good times would just keep rolling? Well, that was back in 1999. Last week the market closed at 10,520.

So there was a whole lot of nothing going on in measures of economic progress or success. Funny how that happened.

For as the decade began, there was an overwhelming sense of economic triumphalism in America’s business and political establishments, a belief that we — more than anyone else in the world — knew what we were doing.

Let me quote from a speech that Lawrence Summers, then deputy Treasury secretary (and now the Obama administration’s top economist), gave in 1999. “If you ask why the American financial system succeeds,” he said, “at least my reading of the history would be that there is no innovation more important than that of generally accepted accounting principles: it means that every investor gets to see information presented on a comparable basis; that there is discipline on company managements in the way they report and monitor their activities.” And he went on to declare that there is “an ongoing process that really is what makes our capital market work and work as stably as it does.”

So here’s what Mr. Summers — and, to be fair, just about everyone in a policy-making position at the time — believed in 1999: America has honest corporate accounting; this lets investors make good decisions, and also forces management to behave responsibly; and the result is a stable, well-functioning financial system.

What percentage of all this turned out to be true? Zero.

What was truly impressive about the decade past, however, was our unwillingness, as a nation, to learn from our mistakes.

Even as the dot-com bubble deflated, credulous bankers and investors began inflating a new bubble in housing. Even after famous, admired companies like Enron and WorldCom were revealed to have been Potemkin corporations with facades built out of creative accounting, analysts and investors believed banks’ claims about their own financial strength and bought into the hype about investments they didn’t understand. Even after triggering a global economic collapse, and having to be rescued at taxpayers’ expense, bankers wasted no time going right back to the culture of giant bonuses and excessive leverage.

Then there are the politicians. Even now, it’s hard to get Democrats, President Obama included, to deliver a full-throated critique of the practices that got us into the mess we’re in. And as for the Republicans: now that their policies of tax cuts and deregulation have led us into an economic quagmire, their prescription for recovery is — tax cuts and deregulation.

So let’s bid a not at all fond farewell to the Big Zero — the decade in which we achieved nothing and learned nothing. Will the next decade be better? Stay tuned. Oh, and happy New Year.


Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Saturday, October 24, 2009

The Banks and Corporations Vs. The Rest of Us

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/business/22pay.html?ref=global-home

All,

While this band-aid measure by the government will in itself do very little to address the far bigger problem of seriously regulating and controlling the financial sector it is a small step in the right direction. However, for this directive to have any real impact in establishing genuine public control of the banking industry and Wall Street it must be followed up by new strong regulatory laws imposed by the federal government and broad social democratic demands by American citizens that insist on telling the robber baron financial sector of the U.S. economy what to do and how to do it for a change as opposed to the other way around...So both we and the Obama administration still have a very long way to go to establish true justice and democracy in the economy...

Kofi



October 22, 2009

U.S. to Order Steep Pay Cuts at Firms That Got Most Aid
By STEPHEN LABATON
New York Times

WASHINGTON — Responding to the growing furor over the paychecks of executives at companies that received billions of dollars in federal bailouts, the Obama administration will order the companies that received the most aid to deeply slash the compensation to their highest paid executives, an official involved in the decision said on Wednesday.

Under the plan, which will be announced in the next few days by the Treasury Department, the seven companies that received the most assistance will have to cut the cash payouts to their 25 best-paid executives by an average of about 90 percent from last year. For many of the executives, the cash they would have received will be replaced by stock that they will be restricted from selling immediately.

And for the 25 best-paid executives, the total compensation, which includes bonuses, will drop, on average, by about 50 percent.

The companies are Citigroup, Bank of America, the American International Group, General Motors, Chrysler and the financing arms of the two automakers.

At the financial products division of A.I.G., the locus of problems that plagued the large insurer and forced its rescue with more than $180 billion in taxpayer assistance, no top executive will receive more than $200,000 in total compensation, a stunning decline from previous years in which the unit produced many wealthy executives and traders.

In contrast to previous years, an official said, executives in the financial products division will receive no other compensation, like stocks or stock options.

And at all of the companies, any executive seeking more than $25,000 in special perks — like country club memberships, private planes, limousines or company issued cars — will have to apply to the government for permission. The administration will also warn A.I.G. that it must fulfill a commitment it made to significantly reduce the $198 million in bonuses promised to employees in the financial products division.

The pay restrictions illustrate the humbling downfall of the once-proud giants, now wards of the state whose leaders’ compensation is being set by a Washington paymaster. They also show how Washington in the last year has become increasingly powerful in setting corporate policies as more companies turned to the government for money to survive.

The compensation schedules set by Kenneth R. Feinberg, the special master at Treasury handling compensation issues, comes as many other banks that received smaller but significant taxpayer assistance in the last year have been reporting huge year-end bonuses, setting off a new round of recrimination in Washington about the bailout of Wall Street.

Since his appointment last June by Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, Mr. Feinberg has spent months in negotiations with the companies as he seeks to balance compensation concerns against fears at the companies that any huge restrictions in pay could prompt an exodus of executives. Under a law adopted earlier this year, the Treasury Department was instructed to examine the salaries and bonuses for the five most-senior executives and their 20 most highly paid employees at companies that have received extraordinary assistance.

Mr. Feinberg has already achieved significant results at several companies. As a result of his discussions, Kenneth D. Lewis, the head of Bank of America who recently resigned, agreed to forgo his salary and bonus for 2009. (He will still receive a pension of $53.2 million, although Mr. Feinberg can issue an advisory opinion challenging it that would carry political weight.) And fearful of a political backlash over the pay of Andrew J. Hall, a successful energy trader who received nearly $100 million last year, Citigroup agreed two weeks ago to sell its Phibro unit that Mr. Hall heads to Occidental Petroleum.


Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company


Corporate Capitalism, The Banking Industry, and Economic Collapse: What Is To Be Done?--Part II

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/opinion/20herbert.html?em=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1256130717-L8tuy0dm4G166hjC8/EUUA


October 20, 2009

OP-ED COLUMNIST

Safety Nets for the Rich

By Bob Herbert
New York Times


The headlines that ran side by side on the front page of Saturday’s New York Times summed up, inadvertently, the terrible fix that we’ve allowed our country to fall into.

The lead headline, in the upper right-hand corner, said: “U.S. Deficit Rises to $1.4 Trillion; Biggest Since ’45.”

The headline next to it said: “Bailout Helps Revive Banks, And Bonuses.”

We’ve spent the last few decades shoveling money at the rich like there was no tomorrow. We abandoned the poor, put an economic stranglehold on the middle class and all but bankrupted the federal government — while giving the banks and megacorporations and the rest of the swells at the top of the economic pyramid just about everything they’ve wanted.

And we still don’t seem to have learned the proper lessons. We’ve allowed so many people to fall into the terrible abyss of unemployment that no one — not the Obama administration, not the labor unions and most certainly no one in the Republican Party — has a clue about how to put them back to work.

Meanwhile, Wall Street is living it up. I’m amazed at how passive the population has remained in the face of this sustained outrage.

Even as tens of millions of working Americans are struggling to hang onto their jobs and keep a roof over their families’ heads, the wise guys of Wall Street are licking their fat-cat chops over yet another round of obscene multibillion-dollar bonuses — this time thanks to the bailout billions that were sent their way by Uncle Sam, with very little in the way of strings attached.

Nevermind that the economy remains deeply troubled. As The Times pointed out on Saturday, much of Wall Street “is minting money.”

Call it déjà voodoo. I wrote a column that ran three days before Christmas in 2007 that focused on the deeply disturbing disconnect between Wall Streeters harvesting a record crop of bonuses — billions on top of billions — while working families were having a very hard time making ends meet.

We would later learn that December 2007 was the very month that the Great Recession began. I wrote in that column: “Even as the Wall Streeters are high-fiving and ordering up record shipments of Champagne and caviar, the American dream is on life support.”

So we had an orgy of bonuses just as the recession was taking hold and now another orgy (with taxpayers as the enablers) that is nothing short of an arrogantly pointed finger in the eye of everyone who suffered, and continues to suffer, in this downturn.

Whether P.T. Barnum actually said it or not, there is a sucker born every minute. American taxpayers might want to take a look in the mirror. If the epithet fits...

We need to make some fundamental changes in the way we do things in this country. The gamblers and con artists of the financial sector, the very same clowns who did so much to bring the economy down in the first place, are howling self-righteously over the prospect of regulations aimed at curbing the worst aspects of their excessively risky behavior and preventing them from causing yet another economic meltdown.

We should be going even further. We’ve institutionalized the idea that there are firms that are too big to fail and, therefore, “we, the people” are obliged to see that they don’t — even if that means bankrupting the national treasury and undermining the living standards of ordinary people. What sense does that make?

If some company is too big to fail, then it’s too big to exist. Break it up.

Why should the general public have to constantly worry that a misstep by the high-wire artists at Goldman Sachs (to take the most obvious example) would put the entire economy in peril? These financial acrobats get the extraordinary benefits of their outlandish risk-taking — multimillion-dollar paychecks, homes the size of castles — but the public has to be there to absorb the worst of the pain when they take a terrible fall.

Enough! Goldman Sachs is thriving while the combined rates of unemployment and underemployment are creeping toward a mind-boggling 20 percent. Two-thirds of all the income gains from the years 2002 to 2007 — two-thirds! — went to the top 1 percent of Americans.

We cannot continue transferring the nation’s wealth to those at the apex of the economic pyramid — which is what we have been doing for the past three decades or so — while hoping that someday, maybe, the benefits of that transfer will trickle down in the form of steady employment and improved living standards for the many millions of families struggling to make it from day to day.

That money is never going to trickle down. It’s a fairy tale. We’re crazy to continue believing it.


Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company